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Infectious diseases have recently found renewed significance in Canadian 
scholarship, with a corresponding increased interest in Canada’s overall preparedness, 
including legal preparedness, to combat infectious disease emergencies.  
Nearly every Canadian province has emergency legislation containing a “basket 
clause” – a provision which, for the duration of an emergency, authorizes a decision 
maker to take ‘all necessary measures’ to defeat it. Public health legal preparedness 
scholarship has not yet examined what criteria the decision maker must consider before 
deciding to deploy measures that could seriously impact the rights of individuals, 
including those under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
This thesis proposes that decision makers ought to have legislative guidance on 
how to use these special powers. The incorporation of public health, ethics, and legal 
principles into reformed legislation could provide for increased accountability, 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INFECTIOUS DISEASE EMERGENCIES 
 
 Over the past fifteen years, infectious diseases have found renewed significance in 
Canadian legal discourse. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on the United States of 
September 11
th
, 2001, Anthrax-laced envelopes were sent through the mail from Trenton, 
New Jersey, to three news network stations and the offices of two Senators. Despite the 
fact that the United States Hart Senate Office Building and the House of Representatives 
were briefly closed, and that government staffers were given prophylaxis, twenty-two 




 A few short years later, in 2003, the world experienced the emergence of Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS. This disease, originating in China, found 
secondary outbreak centers in the Canadian cities of Toronto and Vancouver. The 
outbreak led to 438 reported infections in Canada, with 44 deaths.
2
 At the height of the 
outbreak, on 26 March 2003, Ontario declared a state of emergency under its Emergency 
Management Act and began implementing special measures.
3
 SARS provoked much 
more action in Canada than the 2001 Anthrax scare in the United States. It prompted 
                                                 
1
 Lawrence O Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 2d ed (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
“Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax and Adverse Events from 
Antimicrobial Prophylaxis” in (2001) 50 Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 973, 
online: <http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ mm5044a1.htm>. 
2
 Government of Canada, National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, 
Learning From SARS: Renewal of Public Health in Canada (Ottawa, Health Canada, 
2003) (Chair: Dr. David Naylor, Dean of Medicine, University of Toronto) [the Naylor 
Report]. 
3




several inquiries into the affair: a federal advisory committee,
4
 a senate committee 
report,
5
 a provincial commission,
6
 as well as the striking of an expert panel.
7
 The events 
of SARS and the reports that followed, as well as the prominent media attention they 
received, encouraged noticeable change in Canada’s public health regime: organizational, 
clinical, and legal. 
 Almost on cue, the 2009 H1N1/ swine flu pandemic then mobilized Canada’s 
newly formed, and ostensibly reinvigorated, public health infrastructure. The spread of 
the disease was truly global, and was classified by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) as a phase 6 pandemic.
8
 In Canada, between 12 April 2009 and 3 April 2010, 
there were over 33,000 laboratory confirmed cases of the H1N1 flu, resulting in 8678 
hospitalizations, 1473 intensive care admissions, and 428 deaths.
9
 The vast majority of 
                                                 
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Canada, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 
Reforming Health Protection and Promotion in Canada: Time to Act (Ottawa, November 
2003) (Chair: Senator Michael Kirby). 
6
 Ontario, SARS Commission, Spring of Fear, Final Report (Toronto: Ministry of Health 
and Long Term Care, December 2006)  (Commissioner: Justice Archie Campbell, 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice) [the Campbell Commission, Final Report]. Contained 
within the report were its two initial, interim reports: Interim Report: SARS and Public 
Health in Ontario (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 15 April 2004) 
[Campbell Commission, First Interim Report]; and Second Interim Report: SARS and 
Public Health Legislation (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 5 April 
2005) [Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report]. 
7
 Ontario, Expert Panel on SARS and Infectious Disease Control, For the Public’s 
Health: Initial Report (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 2003 (Chair: 
Dr. David Walker). [the Walker Report] 
8
 Phase 6 is, according to the WHO: “the pandemic phase, is characterized by community 
level outbreaks in at least one other country in a different WHO region in addition to the 
criteria defined in Phase 5. Designation of this phase will indicate that a global pandemic 
is under way”, online : <http://www.who.int/influenza/preparedness/pandemic/ 
h5n1phase/en/>. 
9
 Public Health Agency of Canada, “Flu Watch: March 28 to April 3, 2010”, (9 April 




these infections occurred in five months, between August and December 2009.
10
 While 
these numbers seem high in comparison to SARS (at over seventy times the infection rate 
and nearly ten times the death rate), the disease differed in that it was at least identifiable 
and a vaccine was made available. It also did not end up being as deadly as originally 
feared.
11
 In the words of the director general of the WHO: “This pandemic has turned out 
to be much more fortunate than what we feared a little over a year ago. This time around, 




 Unlike during SARS, no states of emergency were declared in Canada during the 
2009 pandemic. Had H1N1, a disease to which almost no one had a pre-existing 
resistance or immunity, been a more aggressive virus, then the federal and provincial 
governments may very well have felt compelled to institute more drastic, including 
emergency, measures. 
In 2015, a devastating Ebola outbreak emerged in West Africa.
13
 Today, the 
number of globally confirmed cases of Middle East Respiratory syndrome, or MERS, 
                                                 
10
 Public Health Agency of Canada, “Flu Watch: December 20, 2009 to January 2, 2010”, 
(8 January 2010), online: <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/fluwatch/09-10/w51-
52_09/index-eng.php>. 
11
 During the H1N1 pandemic, Ontario actually suffered fewer deaths than it normally 
endures due to seasonal flu: Ontario, Chief Medical Officer of Health, The H1N1 
Pandemic: How Ontario Fared (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, June 
2010) at 10. 
12
 World Health Organization, “H1N1 in Post-Pandemic Period: Director-General’s 




 For a critical analysis of how emergency powers were used in response to the 
outbreaks, see: James G Hodge, Jr, et al, “Global Emergency Legal Responses to the 










The showcasing of these relatively recent infectious disease “highlights” is not 
meant to portray them as anomalies within the general trend in disease emergence of the 
last thirty years. Quite the contrary is so. The report from the federal National Advisory 
Committee on SARS and Public Health (the “Naylor Report”)
16
 noted that infectious 
disease emergence has, in fact, been constant: 
SARS is only the most recent example of emerging infectious diseases 
– diseases that are newly identified, or that have existed previously but 
are increasing in incidence or geographic range. Since 1973, more than 
30 previously unknown diseases associated with viruses and bacteria 
have emerged. Examples include: Ebola virus (1977); Legionnaire’s 
disease (1977); E. coli 0157:H7 – associated hemolytic uremic 
syndrome (1982); HIV/AIDS (1983); Hepatitis C (1989); variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (1996); and H5N1 Influenza A or avian flu 
(1997). West Nile virus infection is an example of a disease that has 
increased in geographic range. As well, some known infectious 





Despite the fact that the emergence of infectious diseases is not now, nor had 
been, an exceptional occurrence, the SARS events triggered an unprecedented call for 
public health investigation and reform - reform that was to a certain extent tested during 
the H1N1 pandemic. Undoubtedly, this was at least in part due to the wide media 
coverage of the SARS events, which garnered global attention and put Toronto, Canada’s 
biggest city in its biggest province, under the microscope; on April 23
rd
, 2003, the World 
                                                 
14
 World Health Organization, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-
CoV), online: <http://www.who.int/emergencies/mers-cov/en/>. 
15
 World Health Organization, Microcephaly/Zika virus, online: 
<http://www.who.int/emergencies/zika-virus/en/>. 
16
 Supra, note 2. 
17




Health Organization placed a travel advisory on Toronto, advising against all but the 
most essential travel.
18
 Ontario and Toronto suffered serious economic losses during 
SARS.
19
 The losses, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, were extensive, and were 
characterized by the Naylor report as follows: 
As a disease outbreak, SARS was relatively small. Nonetheless, the 
disease killed 44 Canadians, and caused illness in a few hundred more. 
The response to the outbreak paralyzed a major segment of Ontario’s 
health care system for weeks, and saw more than 25, 000 residents of 
the Greater Toronto Area placed in quarantine. Psychological effects of 
SARS on health care workers, patients, and families are still being 
assessed, but the economic shocks have already been felt. Estimates 
based on volumes of business compared to usual seasonal activities 
suggest that tourism sustained a $350 million loss, airport activity 
reduction cost $220 million, and non-tourism retail sales were down by 
$380 million. It seems entirely possible that the direct and indirect costs 




While media attention, human hardship, and economic losses would each seem to 
justify the after-the-fact attention SARS received in Canada, that attention may also owe 
something to the fact that, as one American scholar has put it, SARS “in some respects 
returned us to the late 19th-century Ellis Island days; its cause and mode of transmission 
were initially unknown, there was no diagnostic test; there was no vaccine; and there was 
no effective treatment.”
21
 In simpler terms, SARS was frightening.  
                                                 
18
 Naylor Report, supra, note 2, at 37. 
19
 Ontario, The SARS Commission, First Interim Report: SARS and Public Health in 
Ontario (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, 15 April 2004) 
(Commissioner: Justice Archie Campbell, Ontario Superior Court of Justice) [Campbell 
Commission: First Interim Report]. 
20
 Naylor Report, supra note 2, at 211. 
21
 George J Annas, Worst Case Bioethics: Death, Disaster, and Public Health (Oxford: 




Finally, SARS likely garnered such extensive after-the-fact inquiry because it 
exposed Ontario’s (and Canada’s
22
) lack of preparedness to deal with an infectious 
disease emergency: 
SARS showed that Ontario’s public health system is broken and needs 
to be fixed. Despite the extraordinary efforts of many dedicated 
individuals and the strength of many local public health units, the 
overall system proved woefully inadequate.  SARS showed Ontario’s 
central public health system to be unprepared, fragmented, poorly led, 
uncoordinated, inadequately resourced, professionally impoverished, 




Even though Ontario’s public health system suffered from numerous, identified 
shortcomings, SARS was eventually contained and the crisis ended. Perhaps fittingly, it 
was old-fashioned 19
th
-century public health measures that were effective in combating 
SARS, as recognized in the Naylor Report: 
SARS has been contained, at least temporarily – not by the genomic 
revolution, not by advanced pharmaceuticals, but by old-fashioned 
public health measures like hand washing, infection control procedures, 
isolation of cases, and tracing and quarantine of contacts. 
 
What the SARS outbreak showed, perhaps more than anything else, is 
the power of public health. The best current evidence is that without 
effective public health measures, SARS would have eventually 
sickened millions of people on this shrinking planet, causing not 
hundreds of deaths, but countless thousands. The next outbreak, 




While these old-fashioned measures were successful in combating the outbreak 
(and so ought to be viewed positively), it should not be forgotten that public health 
measures (especially emergency measures) such as isolation and contact quarantine, 
mandatory treatment, compulsory vaccination, and others, have at the same time 
                                                 
22
 Naylor Report, supra note 2 at 211. 
23
 Campbell Commission, First Interim Repot, supra note 6, at 25. 
24




enormous potential to interfere with individual autonomy, bodily integrity, and other civil 
liberties. They also have the potential to place disproportionate burdens upon 
disadvantaged groups in society. Like a stick of dynamite, they are very effective and, 
when used appropriately, can indeed be very safe. But they are anything but benign.  
This thesis is set within this context of infectious disease emergence and outbreak, 
and contemporary public health renewal in Canada.  
1.2 RENEWAL 
 
  The various SARS inquires, panels, and commissions generated reports 
containing recommendations for the renewal of public health in Canada, as well as 
improved emergency preparedness and response. There was also a spike in interest from 
the academic community. Substantial commentary emerged, which dealt with both the 
general significance and applicability of public health
25
 (and public health law)
26
 as a 
discipline and approach. This scholarship took its place alongside further research and 
opinions dealing with more specific clinical and ethical issues, for example: emergency 
triage;
27
 health care workers safety, ethical duties and responsibilities;
28
 ethics in 
                                                 
25
e.g. Lawrence O Gostin & James G Hodge Jr, guest eds, “Symposium on Global 
Health, Law, Ethics and Policy” (2007) 35:4 JL Med & Ethics 519; MJ Selgelid, 
“Pandethics” (2009) 123 Public Health 255; George P Smith II, “Re-shaping the 
Common Good in Times of Public Health Emergencies: Validating Medical Triage” 
(2009) 18 Annals Health L 1. 
26
 Lawrence O Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint, 2
d 
ed (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2008); Christopher Reynolds, Public Health Law and 
Regulation (Sydney: Federation Press, 2004); Bailey, Tracey M, Timothy Caulfield & 
Nola M Ries, eds. Public Health Law and Policy in Canada, 2d ed. (Markham: 
LexisNexis, 2008). 
27
 e.g. James Downar & Dori Seccareccia, “Palliating a Pandemic: ‘All Patients Must by 
Cared For’” (2010) 39:2 Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 291; Nathan 
Emmerich, “Anti-theory in Action? Planning for Pandemics, Triage and ICU or: How 






 pre-existing group disadvantage;
30
 the coercion of individuals
31
 and the 
emergency provision of scarce resources.
32
 By a healthy margin, scholarly commentary 
concerned with the experiences, decisions, ethics, duties, and rights of health care 
professionals dominated the discourse. 
The prevalence of writing concerned with the predicaments faced by health care 
workers is neither surprising nor inappropriate: they are the people who will be relied 
upon to execute any emergency plan. They are also the individuals who are put at the 
greatest risk. During SARS, health care workers accounted for a large portion of the 
infected and fatalities. Nurses infected during the SARS outbreak launched a legal action 
                                                                                                                                                 
Jeffrey Kirby, “Enhancing the Fairness of Pandemic Critical Care Triage” (2010) 36 
Journal of Medical Ethics 758. 
28
e.g. Wendy Austin, “Ethics in a Time of Contagion: A Relational Perspective” (2008) 
40:4 CJNR 10; Tracey M. Bailey et al. “A Duty to Treat During a Pandemic: The Time 
for Talk is Now” (2008) 8:8 American Journal of Bioethics 29; Cara R Davies & Randi 
Zlotnik Shaul, “Physicians’ Legal Duty of Care and Legal Right to Refuse to Work 
During a Pandemic” (2010) 182:2 CMAJ 167; Margarita E Pena, Charlene B Irvin & 
Robert B Takla, “Ethical Considerations For Emergency Care Providers During 
Pandemic Influenza – Ready or Not…” (2009) 24:2 Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 
115; James C Thomas, Pia DM MacDonald & Emily Wenink, “Ethical Decision Making 
in a Crisis: A Case Study of Ethics in Public Health Emergencies (2009) 15(2) Journal of 
Public Health Management Practice E16. 
29
e.g. Nancy Berlinger and Jacob Moses, “Pandemic Flu Planning in the Community: 
What Can Clinical Ethicists Bring to the Public Health Table?” (2008) 17 Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 468. 
30
 e.g. Connal Lee, Wendy A Rogers & Annette Braunack-Mayer, “Social Justice and 
Pandemic Influenza Planning: The Role of Communication Strategies” (2008) 1:3 Public 
Health Ethics 223. 
31
 e.g. Jacob Chapman, “Doomsday: A Look at the Ethical Issues Behind the 
Government’s Coercive Powers in Response to a Public Health Nightmare” (2008) 9 
Journal of Law & Social Challenges 24; Rev Clayton L Thomason, “It’s a Small World 
After All: Global Health and the Ethical Lessons of SARS” (2004) 12 Mich St J Int’l L 
315; Sara Mahmoud-Davis, “Balancing Public Health and Individual Choice: a Proposal 
for a Federal Emergency Vaccination Law” (2010) 20 Health Matrix 219. 
32
 e.g. Carolina Alfieri, Proposal of an Ethics-Based Framework for Prioritization of 
Scarce Resources During an Influenza Pandemic (MSc Thesis, McGill University 








  The case was 
dismissed however when the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the government did not 
owe a private law duty of care to individual healthcare workers, but rather a public law 
duty to the population at large.
34
 The decision is especially noteworthy considering that 
the laws of many Canadian jurisdictions authorize the conscription of unwilling 
healthcare workers as an emergency measure. This case discloses a prominent theme in 
public health, public health law, and emergency preparedness scholarly discourse: the 
inherent tension between the best health interests of the population at large (or: “the 
public”) and the liberties (and health) of individuals or smaller groups. 
While the SARS litigation was high profile, private law is not the dominant 
sphere where law and public health converge during and after emergencies: public law is. 
The SARS Commissions specifically identified many points of legislation and public law 
mechanisms that required improvements in order to better combat future infectious 
disease outbreaks, including, amongst others: 
- Inter-jurisdiction cooperation and coordination (needed to manage 








                                                 
33
 2009 ONCA 374, 95 OR (3d) 414. Abarquez was heard alongside four other similar 
cases, all of which failed: Williams v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 ONCA 378, 95 
OR (3d) 401, leave to appeal to the SCC refused [2009] SCCA No 298 (QL); [Williams] 
Laroza v Ontario, 2009 ONCA 373, 95 OR (3d) 764; and Jamal v Scarborough Hospital, 
2009 ONCA 376, 95 OR (3d) 760. See also: Eliopoulus v Ontario (Minister of Health 
and Long Term Care) (2006), 82 OR (3d) 321 (CA), [2006] OJ No 4400 (QL), leave to 
appeal to the SCC refused [2006] SCCA No 514 (QL) [Eliopoulus]. 
34
 Abarquez, ibid, at para 20, relying on Williams, ibid, at para 31, which itself relied on 
Eliopoulus, ibid, at paras 19-20. The complaint in Abarquez also contained a Charter 
damages claim, which was dismissed at paras 49-52. 
35
 Naylor Report, supra note 2, at 164. 
36


















From a legal scholarship standpoint, nowhere was legal structure so critical to 
achieving public health ends as in the subjects of health information, privacy, reporting, 
and sharing.
40
 This is especially so in the international context, where information sharing 
on a global scale becomes critical to detecting and preventing, or mitigating, a coming 
pandemic.
41
 But this thesis is mostly concerned with the last area for reform: the creation 
of explicit statutory authority for necessary, extraordinary measures during an infectious 
disease emergency. When it is truly needed, this authority is critical. As the SARS 
Commission recognized: 
[P]ublic health emergencies will arise despite the greatest vigilance of 
public health authorities and the most vigorous exercise of their daily 
powers. 
 
The quintessential public health emergency is an outbreak of infectious 
disease that overwhelms the capacity of the public health system. The 
most serious predictable public health emergency is pandemic influenza 
which would overwhelm not only the public health and hospital and 
medical systems but also the other systems that keep the province 
going. Pandemic influenza exemplifies the need for strong emergency 
powers.   
 
[…] 
                                                 
37
 Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 175 – 210; 213 – 229. 
38
 Ibid, at 252. 
39
 Ibid, at 304. 
40
 See for example: Elaine Gibson, “Public Health Information Privacy and 
Confidentiality”, chapter 4 in Tracey M Bailey, Timothy Caulfield & Nola M Ries, eds, 
Public Health Law and Policy in Canada (Markham: LexisNexis, 2005). 
41
 Canada is a party to the World Health Organization and has signed on to the The 
International Health Regulations (2005) 2
d 





Although Ontario got through SARS without any special emergency 
powers, the prospect of pandemic influenza brings home the need for 
such powers. Even if all the emergency measures taken during SARS 
were explicitly enshrined in emergency legislation, those measures 
would be hopelessly inadequate in the face of a much larger infectious 




The prospect of pandemic influenza or indeed any outbreak more 
serious even than SARS requires the enactment of emergency powers 




This thesis will argue that legislative amendments can be used to do even more. 
The law can do more than grant explicit authority for emergency measures; it can 
improve the very use of that authority towards achieving public health ends.  
1.3 LEGAL PREPAREDNESS 
 
 The call from the various SARS commissions and committees for reform of 
emergency legislation fits within a branch of commentary and scholarship that has come 
to be know as “Legal Preparedness”.
43
 This field, a subset of public health emergency 
preparedness, has entered into the prevailing public health scholarly commentary 
relatively recently. Thérèse Murphy and Noel Whitty have provided a useful definition: 
[A] term that requires some explanation is ‘public health 
emergency legal preparedness’. Stated shortly, this is all 
about having the right laws in place and then using them in 
the right way in a time of public health emergency. In other 
words, it is about both legal preparedness for, and response 
to, public health emergencies – it is both proactive and 
reactive. More generally, it can be said to be both an 
essential part of both public and global public health 
                                                 
42
 Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 345, 348. 
43
 Indeed, the Campbell Commission recommended that “Legal preparedness be an 
integral component of all public health emergency plans,” Second Interim Report, supra 









B. Kamoie et al. have defined the concept as “attainment of benchmarks within a public 
health system”,
45
 and A.D. Moulton et al. have similarly defined it as the “attainment by 
a public health system… of legal benchmarks essential to the preparedness of the public 
health system”.  They further added that legal preparedness is a contribution that the law 
makes towards the specified ends of the discipline of public health.
46
 These benchmarks 
are usually thought of in the ‘public health’ sense, taking the law as a means to a 
particular public health end. In this author’s view, legal preparedness can be thought of as 
an ongoing process,
47
 adaptable to changes in society and in the natural environment, that 
attempts to improve the law so that we can better prevent, and if necessary respond to, 
future public health emergencies. 
In the context of public health emergencies, legal preparedness literature has quite 
rapidly found itself enveloped by concern for national and international security. Given 
the association infectious diseases like Anthrax have with biological warfare and 
terrorism, this drift in the literature makes sense. However, it is not without its critics,
48
 
and caution must be taken to not associate infectious disease legal preparedness too 
closely with the preparations necessary to deal with other kinds of emergencies. In this 
thesis, public health emergency preparedness is not taken up as principally a national 
                                                 
44
 Thérèse Murphy & Noel Whitty, “Is Human Rights Prepared? Risk, Rights, and Public 
Health Emergencies” (2009) 17 Med Law Rev 219. 
45
 B Kamoie et al, “Assessing Law and Legal Authorities for Public Health Emergency 
Legal Preparedness” (2008) 36 (Spec Supp) J L Med & Ethics 23, at 23. 
46
 AD Moulton et al “What is Public Health Legal Preparedness?”  (2003) 31:4 J L Med 
& Ethics 672, at 674. 
47
 This is similar to the approach implicitly taken by Robert M Pestronk, “Emergency 
Legal Preparedness” (2008) 36 (Spec Supp) JL Med & Ethics 47. 
48




security issue, but rather primarily as a public health issue. It is acknowledged that this is 
a point open to debate. However, the central proposal of this thesis, namely that the 
legislature ought to provide guidance to decision makers, could just as easily be adopted 
under a national security approach to the same facts. 
1.4 THE PROBLEM: TO A HAMMER, EVERYTHING LOOKS LIKE A 
NAIL 
 
This thesis concerns one aspect of public health emergency legal preparedness 
that has, to date, largely been overlooked in the literature: the decision-making process 
undertaken by decision makers when choosing whether or not to deploy extraordinary 
measures. It is argued that the law can do more than simply provide statutory authority 
for extraordinary emergency measures. The decision maker should be able to turn to his 
or her empowering legislation for more than a bare statement of authority. He or she 
could find legal guidance on how he or she ought to go about deciding. 
The extent to which the legislature ought to grant extraordinary powers to the 
executive in times of emergency is not itself a new question. The Campbell commission, 
in recommending that explicit legislative authority be granted post-SARS, was alive to 
the benefits and drawbacks of various approaches. It noted two main models of 
emergency powers – the first, in essence, relies upon enumerated powers specific to a 
certain kind of emergency, and relies largely upon authorities already existing in other 
statutes, either explicitly or implicitly. The second model relies upon the legislature 
granting broad, sweeping authority to the executive during the emergency, even to the 
point of permission to override existing laws.
49
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The Commission debated the merits of each model in its Second Interim Report. 
In so doing, it noted that (at the time) Ontario had the weakest emergency legislation in 
the country – even in the post-Charter
50
 era, every other province had enacted the 
“general” model of emergency legislation.
51
 The Campbell Commission, recognizing that 
the Ontario Legislature already had a Bill before it adopting the general model, 
recommended for increased legislation in this area to ensure that decision makers were 
not inhibited by legal uncertainty. However, it also recommended that the Bill be 
subjected to thorough review by Ontario’s Attorney General to ensure constitutional 
compliance.
52
 Bill 138 eventually made major amendments to the Emergency 
Management and Civil Protection Act,
53
 including the granting of broad emergency 
powers, highlighted below, in the form of what will be referred to as a “basket clause”: 
Emergency orders 
 
(4) In accordance with subsection (2) and subject to the limitations in 
subsection (3), the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make orders in 
respect of the following: 
 
1. Implementing any emergency plans formulated under section 3, 6, 8 
or 8.1. 
 
2. Regulating or prohibiting travel or movement to, from or within any 
specified area. 
 
3. Evacuating individuals and animals and removing personal property 
from any specified area and making arrangements for the adequate care 
and protection of individuals and property. 
 
4. Establishing facilities for the care, welfare, safety and shelter of 
individuals, including emergency shelters and hospitals. 
                                                 
50
 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [the Charter]. 
51
 Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 336. 
52
 Ibid at 354. 
53





5. Closing any place, whether public or private, including any business, 
office, school, hospital or other establishment or institution. 
 
6. To prevent, respond to or alleviate the effects of the emergency, 
constructing works, restoring necessary facilities and appropriating, 
using, destroying, removing or disposing of property. 
 
7. Collecting, transporting, storing, processing and disposing of any 
type of waste. 
 
8. Authorizing facilities, including electrical generating facilities, to 
operate as is necessary to respond to or alleviate the effects of the 
emergency. 
 
9. Using any necessary goods, services and resources within any part of 
Ontario, distributing, and making available necessary goods, services 
and resources and establishing centres for their distribution. 
 
10. Procuring necessary goods, services and resources. 
 
11. Fixing prices for necessary goods, services and resources and 
prohibiting charging unconscionable prices in respect of necessary 
goods, services and resources. 
 
12. Authorizing, but not requiring, any person, or any person of a class 
of persons, to render services of a type that that person, or a person of 
that class, is reasonably qualified to provide. 
 
13. Subject to subsection (7), requiring that any person collect, use or 
disclose information that in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council may be necessary in order to prevent, respond to or alleviate 
the effects of the emergency. 
 
14. Consistent with the powers authorized in this subsection, taking 
such other actions or implementing such other measures as the 
Lieutenant Governor in Council considers necessary in order to prevent, 
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The Commission had it right: the above provision is typical of the legislation 
found throughout Canada, which tends to enumerate specific powers but grants much 
broader authorities either by leaving the list open (an “implicit” basket clause) or, as is 
the case above, by explicitly granting the authority to take whatever action may be 
required in order to meet the emergency.
55
As will be discussed below, it is arguable 
whether such broad grants of power are truly in accordance with the Rule of Law at all.
56
 
But assuming that they are, and even assuming the powers are always exercised within 
the discretion granted by the legislation and in accordance with the principles of statutory 
interpretation, surely the broad authority must still be subject to some higher level of 
scrutiny. In other words, if the Rule of Law is to prevail, the otherwise lawful discretion 
cannot truly be unfettered.  
By the time the Commission released its final report the Bill had become law. The 
Commission expressed trepidation at the existence of such power, and reiterated its call 
to have the law examined, making the following comments: 
It is understandable that the government in its desire to get the 
emergency legislation into place before the next disaster did not pause 
to address and to answer in detail the flaws referred to in the 
Commission’s April 2005 report, flaws which are serious but easily 
remedied. The government has taken no public position in respect of the 
detailed flaws noted by the Commission. It is not as if the 
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unimplemented recommendations have been considered and rejected 
for publicly stated reasons. The unimplemented recommendations have 
simply not been addressed publicly… 
 
The problem is not with the good intentions of those who will 
administer and exercise the emergency powers. The problem is that 
these awesome powers represent a profound change in our legal 
structure and raise issues that need to be addressed further in this statute 
that so fundamentally alters our system of government by law. 
Extraordinary powers like those in the Emergency Management and 
Civil Protection Act are inherently dangerous and require now the sober 
second thought and detailed legal clause-by-clause review and publicly 
stated justification which they did not explicitly receive before. 
 
Ontario’s emergency legislation brings to mind what President Lyndon 
Johnson said about the potential danger of all laws: 
 
You do not examine legislation in the light of the benefits it will 
convey if properly administered, but in the light of the wrongs it 
would do and the harms it would cause if improperly administered. 
 
The Commission recommends the review and amendment of the 
emergency legislation in accordance with the unimplemented 





Notably, the Commission did not call for the legislation to be scrapped, nor for the basket 
clause to be eliminated. It called for examination for potential improvements. In a 
passage that we will return to later in this thesis, the Commission noted: 
Emergency powers are inherently dangerous. They carry the twin 
dangers of overreaction and underreaction. 
 
The first danger is overreaction. Every emergency power, once 
conferred, “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.” 
To a hammer, everything looks like a nail. To some emergency 
managers, every problem may look like an opportunity to invoke 
emergency powers. 
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The second danger is underreaction. In the face of a deadly new disease 
with an uncertain incubation period, ambiguous symptoms, no 
diagnostic tests, uncertainty as to its infectiveness and mechanisms of 
transmission, and no idea where in the province it may be simmering, 
decisive action may be necessary that turns out in hindsight to have 
been excessive. 
 
The central task of emergency legislation is to guard against 
overreaction by providing safeguards and to guard against 
underreaction by avoiding legal restrictions that prevent the application 
of the precautionary principle. 
 
There are no pure public health emergencies. Although pandemic 
influenza might start as a public health emergency, it would rapidly 
snowball into a general emergency. And big general emergencies that 





It is this problem which this thesis seeks to address – how to improve the law to 
be better prepared to meet an infectious disease emergency, particularly by guarding 
against the spectres of overreaction and underreaction. These emergency-power-granting 
legislative provisions form the nucleus of this thesis and its proposal for law reform.  
Further, it is an objective of this thesis to make these provisions more clearly 
constitutionally compliant. Written as they are, they are at the very least vulnerable to 
constitutional challenges, if not on the face of the legislation then in how they are applied. 
The Campbell Commission noted this risk, and highlighted the consequences: 
Ontario’s emergency legislation will probably be challenged in court at 
some time. It will be a major blow to the integrity of the legislation 
should a court strike down as unconstitutional any part of the statute or 
any emergency order made under the statute. It is essential to ensure in 
advance, so much as possible, that the legislation conforms with the 




This is precisely what the law reform proposed in this thesis is meant to do.  
                                                 
58
 Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 9-10. 
59




1.5 THE PROBLEM CONTINUED: MAKING DECISIONS 
 
It is easy to forget when discussing the high-stakes questions concerning 
infectious disease emergencies that will be raised should the extraordinary legislative 
powers ever be activated, that it will be a human being (or a group of them) who will 
have to decide if, when, and how to use these powers. Likewise, it is easy to overlook 
that the government decision maker, in the real world, is not apt to be alone, but rather 
supported by advisors.  
Prominent among them (and the most pertinent for this thesis’s purposes) will be 
the legal advisor. Her job will not be easy. Even relatively straightforward legal activities, 
such as enforcing an order, can become more complex during an emergency. In the words 
of the Campbell Commission: 
Legal counsel for public health units faced a daunting task during 
SARS. When seeking judicial authority to enforce an order, they had to 
navigate a confusing maze of overlapping and uncertain judicial powers 
and procedures when speedy enforcement was vital to the containment 
of SARS. As one lawyer involved in the response to SARS told the 
Commission: 
 
It is quite a challenge to be in a middle of an emergency with the 
kind of huge range of legal issues coming up and you have to figure 
out what the legal requirements are and how to get what needs to be 





Legal preparedness as a discipline includes a component that encourages legal 
professionals to be pre-equipped to deal with the practical matters that will become time-
sensitive during the emergency. One can for example pre-prepare precedents, pre-map 
the emergency court system, and pre-research a quick-reference table for legal 
authorities. But this thesis is more concerned with the provision of advice to the decision 
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maker on whether or not particular extraordinary measures can legally be deployed on a 
given set of facts. This kind of advice during SARs was hard to come by, mostly due to 
the confusing enforcement regime: 
One lawyer told the Commission that their ability during SARS give 
clear legal advice was at times hampered by weaknesses in the 
enforcement portions the Act: 
 
During SARS, I would often say when asked if we could do 
something, ‘you can try it, but if we are challenged we may be on 





Such advice can hardly be considered helpful, yet in the circumstances, it was 
doubtless the best the lawyer could do. In response to this phenomenon, the Campbell 
Commission concluded: 
Public health officials and the lawyers who advise them require not 
only the clear authority to act in the face of public health risks, they 
require also a simple, rational, effective and fair set of procedures to 
enforce compliance and to provide legal remedies for those who 
challenge orders made against them. Delays in legal enforcement may 
cost lives. Delays in legal remedies may put individual liberty at risk. 
The above recommendations are necessary to secure effective access to 






This thesis proposes law reform in the same vein and towards the same objective, but 
concerning a process that has up to now been largely ignored in the literature. During an 
emergency, Canada deserves good, lawful decisions, made in a timely manner. The 
legislature can give direction that will enable decision makers, assisted by their legal 
advisors, to do just that. 
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1.6 POWERS, VALUES, AND COERCION 
 
Coercion is at the center of the individual/ public tension within public health. 
Nola Ries has noted that during the global SARS outbreak coercive public health 
measures, especially quarantine, were used very aggressively in China and Singapore. 
She has also pointed out that, while Canada’s quarantines were almost universally 
voluntary, a large portion of them may actually have been unnecessary.
63
 George Annas 
has been extremely critical of the handling of the SARS crisis and the use of coercive 
measures in both the United States and China, and has pointed out that Canada’s 
response, though more tempered, was still questionable on several occasions.
64
 
At the same time, the Campbell Commission noted that the level of cooperation 
from Canadian residents during the emergency was quite remarkable, and was being 
studied as such by researchers.
65
 This point goes to the inherent limitations of law, both 
as a tool and as an enabler, for public health. As the Campbell Commission noted:  
Laws are only the last resort. Legal procedures are useless without 
overwhelming public cooperation of the kind demonstrated in SARS.  
While it is important to strengthen the legal machinery available to 
public health officials, it is even more important to strengthen the things 




 While law may empower decision makers to use coercion to achieve their 
objectives, over-reliance on these measures can discourage cooperation, resulting in 
diminishing returns as reliance on legal coercion begets more legal coercion. This means 
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that any legislative reform should attempt to do more than just authorize powers and 
provide for coercion. It should be crafted in such a manner that it will increase public 
confidence and cooperation. The powers themselves, the Commissions noted, would 
improve legal preparedness. Presumably this is with a view to improving post-emergency 
public health outcomes. Building in to the legislation provisions designed to encourage 
confidence, cooperation, and compliance could accomplish the same goals.  
Within the public health discipline, it makes sense that professional decisions are 
made by experts. They are the people best prepared for assessing the risks and 
determining the appropriate measures. Weighing their professional judgment against the 
applicable professional code of ethics, they will be well equipped for making a decision. 
Law’s role, in this paradigm, is to enhance preparation by creating the structure that 
enables this process, and grants the powers to decide, implement, and enforce compliance 
if necessary. 
This account might be effective. But it glosses over the inevitable legal 
“balancing” that occurs when the public good come into conflict, or even potential 
conflict, with constitutionally entrenched individual civil liberties. Even if a measure is 
judged as scientifically the “best” measure, and is acceptable according to the standards 
of public health as a discipline, this still does not mean, from a legal perspective, that it 
ought to be deployed. 
 In this vein, this thesis taps into a paradigm of “decisional” legal preparedness 
that is similar to what Tracey M. Bailey et al. called for in their 2008 article “A Duty to 
Treat During a Pandemic: The Time for Talk is Now”. Arguing that health care 




pandemic in order to determine what professional governing bodies would demand of 
their members during a crisis, the authors concluded: 
For it is vital to know where we stand on this issue as a society, both to 
plan for a future pandemic, but also to assess the society in which we 
are living. Will we discover it is based on the values of the common 
good? Or the preservation of autonomy in times of crisis, possibly at the 
expense of our neighbors? Either way, it is a discussion that must be 
carried on. To remain silent is, indeed, an unethical option for those that 





 At its heart, this thesis is posing just such an analysis from a legal perspective. 
Much the same way as Bailey et al. called for health care professionals, reflecting upon 
the society in which they live, to determine how they are going to act during a public 
health emergency, it is advised that Canada, through elected legislatures, can and should 
guide statutory decision makers on how they want emergency powers exercised. 
Specifically, this legislative guidance should be in the form of principles that must be 
taken into account – principles that would find their origin in public health, public health 
law, and ethics, alongside constitutional and administrative law. 
This thesis is not, however, advising that efforts to produce legislative guidance 
ought to displace similar efforts to enhance professional codes of ethics, nor is it 
suggested that efforts towards this law reform must take place at the expense of 
developing and improving ethical frameworks. To the contrary, each will benefit the 
other. Ethical guidance to emergency actors can actually inform and enrich our proposed 
law reform, making it more attuned to the needs of public health. This is particularly easy 
if the ethical guidelines have already been informed by, or perhaps even integrated with, 
underlying Canadian constitutional principles and Charter values. But not all public 
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health ethical systems are so amenable to incorporating Canadian constitutional values. In 
fact, some call for a radical redirecting of ethical analyses away from the perceived 
constitutional priority allocated to the protection of individual rights. Such a rigorously 
fashioned, professional ethical framework may answer precisely the questions posed by 
Bailey et al. But even though it may have been so fashioned by, and according to, the 
experts, it will not necessarily be according to law. If such a framework were to be 
referenced by a decision maker without adherence to the law, the choices made could 
quickly run outside of legal authority no matter how ethical they were. 
The law can do more for infectious disease emergencies than simply authorizing 
professionals to issue orders in accordance with their own expertise and their profession’s 
ethical code. Law can be used as a bridge, joining the fundamental values of public 
health, ethics, and the law into one democratic expression.
68
 If we use legislation, in 
addition to ethics, to articulate the principles to be considered in emergencies and so 
answer the challenge given by Bailey et al, then we may also succeed in changing the 
very focus of emergency legal preparedness. That is to say, it may help us to stop asking 
ourselves “in an emergency, what are we going to do?” and encourage us to instead ask, 
“In an emergency, what kind of a people do we want to be?” 
1.7 DESIRED END STATE 
 
It was stated above that public health emergency legal preparedness research is in 
general conducted with a view to improving the law so that we can better prevent, and if 
necessary respond to, future public health emergencies. Ultimately, the reforms proposed 
in this thesis concerning the use of emergency powers are in support of two principle 
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outcomes: first, better decisions; and second, more meaningful judicial review. The two 
outcomes are not isolated from each other. There are three interconnected lines of 
argument which demonstrate how the proposed legislative reform will accomplish these 
objectives. 
The first line is increased transparency and accountability. Transparency is a 
fundamental value that cuts across public health, public health law, public health ethics, 
and Canadian constitutional and administrative law. Though admittedly some legislation 
can be difficult to navigate (even for legal professionals), statutes and regulations have 
the advantage of being fundamentally ‘public’. Unlike professional ethical frameworks, 
they are created through publicly elected and accountable representatives, often involving 
public (rather than professional or expert) consultation. They are enacted through 
parliamentary procedure, including debates whose transcripts are publically obtainable. 
The finished products are relatively easy to access for the public and the press, 
particularly in the Internet age. Going further, the legislation itself can be used to enhance 
the transparency once the powers it creates are exercised by requiring the publication of 
reasons for the decision made or actions taken with the powers.  
Concerning accountability, having legislative guidance on the values and 
principles which must be protected in deciding how to use emergency powers will greatly 
enhance the utility and meaningfulness of judicial review. If crafted as proposed, the 
legislation would have integrated the values of public health, ethics, underlying Canadian 
constitutional principles and Charter values, as well as judicial precedents. In the context 
of an infectious disease emergency, the stakes are going to be extremely high; the role of 




constitutional meaning even during an emergency, judicial review for the 
constitutionality of the statute itself will be more meaningful, and productive, than it 
would be if a court were faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute conferring 
broad discretionary authority. At the same time, substantive review of the decision itself 
would be far more transparent to all parties. Again, the legislature having “spoken first” 
regarding what principles the administrative decision maker must consider, judicial 
review would be much more focused regardless of the standard of review. 
Through the proposed law reform, the decision maker will be statutorily bound to 
consider legislative factors and to publish reasons for decisions. He or she will be 
accountable for those decisions: first, through meaningful judicial review informed by 
that statute and considering those reasons; and second, to the concerned population, who 
will be able to judge the decision maker’s actions against his or her articulated 
justification. 
This enhanced transparency and accountability should encourage greater public 
trust, cooperation, and participation. This is the first and most obvious way the reformed 
legislation could improve efficiency and effectiveness. Public trust is absolutely critical 
to achieving our desired end state of responding to, and eliminating, the emergency. The 
purposes of any extraordinary measures will be significantly frustrated if there is a 
general lack of public cooperation, and no amount of coercive force can ever equal the 
positive effect to be gained from public acceptance.  
But binding the decision maker by statute to take account public health values and 
ethics as they consider what extraordinary measures to deploy should not only lead to 




explicitly bring public health values and ethics into the legal discussion, the legislature 
could re-orient the administrative decision making-process away from the classic 
dichotomy between individual and the populations as a whole, and towards a richer 
discussion taking full account of the state’s public law duty to the population as a whole. 
The law, then, could serve to improve the technical quality of the decisions taken by the 
decision-maker, while at the same time making the public health bases for those decisions 
transparent to those affected. Having been given the force of law by the democratically 
elected legislature, those principles may also come to have greater legitimacy in the eyes 
of the population.  
Efficiency will also be improved in another important way. If we provide 
emergency decision makers with a more detailed statutory framework, they will more 
efficiently be able to discharge their legal mandate without concern for ambient legal 
ramifications. A corollary to this is that legal advisors will be better equipped to 
discharge their own mandate alongside ethical, scientific, and other professional advisors, 
underlying constitutional issues and Charter values having already been raised and 
examined (even if not judicially resolved) during the legislative process. Decision makers 
will therefore personally be able to more swiftly, and confidently, make their decisions 
and express to the public the precise legal justification and authority they relied upon for 
deploying the measure, instead of relying upon a nebulous authority to do “anything 
necessary” or take “any necessary actions” to meet the emergency. 
The third line is concrete respect for rights, focused and more meaningful, judicial 
review and an enriched constitutional discourse, benefits that are admittedly more 




according to law, there are probably going to be affected individuals displeased with the 
decision. The proposed legislative reform would support more meaningful judicial 
review. But more than that, the unique circumstance of an infectious disease emergency 
provides us with a rare opportunity to enrich the Canadian constitutional discourse by 
bringing public health and ethics openly into the discussion. Here, the “dialogue 
metaphor” of Canadian constitutional scholarship
69
 can be invoked. If our “free and 
democratic society” is to defeat the emergency, then the state will have to apply public 
health and public health ethical principles and practices as it combats the spread of the 
disease. These principles and practices may or may not call for actions that accord with 
those expected by constitutional precedents.  
Though aggrieved individuals can always ask a court to ‘speak’ an opinion on 
‘what the rights mean,’ in the context of an infectious disease emergency, it is actually 
the legislature that must ‘speak first’ if the expression is to be of any use at all. It is the 
legislature that is best equipped to consider the principles and practices of public health 
and ethics, and to integrate them, through legislation, into Canada’s constitutional 
discourse in the specific context of emergencies. In particular, the legislature is well 
positioned to find the commonalities that permeate public health, ethics, and the law, and 
take advantage of those commonalities to craft constitutionally sound legislative 
guidance. One value that public health, multiple ethical systems, and the constitution 
appear to hold in common is the priority given to the protection of vulnerable minorities. 
It is this principle that holds the greatest promise for bridging public health, ethics, and 
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the law in a constitutionally sensitive manner. But more imaginatively, the legislature can 
go even further and take steps to incorporate values into the legislation that have not yet 
been given constitutional standing by the courts. For example, we will see below in 
chapter three that social justice is a core value of public health and public health law, and 
is of central importance across multiple ethical models. Legislation could bring social 
justice considerations into the legal decision-making process in a way that, so far, the 
courts have in general been reluctant to do.
70
  
The legislature is also privileged in that it can proactively carry out this balancing 
and bridging right now, before an emergency arises. Emergency legislation is an 
anomaly; legislatures have granted remarkable power to the executive with equally 
impressive discretion. In the face of a constitutional challenge to a decision made under 
any piece of emergency legislation as it currently stands (and assuming the legislation 
itself survived), the court might provide guidance to the decision maker on how she ought 
to go about making future decisions such that they could pass constitutional muster. But 
were we to rely exclusively on the courts to consider and balance the legal rights at stake 
during the emergency, by necessity we would receive the decision too late: too late for 
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the individual, the public, and for the decision maker. It is therefore also necessary for the 
legislature to “speak first” as a matter of practical reality given the dire nature of 
infectious disease emergencies and the seriousness of the rights at stake. Once the 
emergency is over, if the state has unjustifiably violated the constitutional or other legal 
rights of individuals or groups, it will be too late to begin discussing what the law is or 
should be. Ex post, lawyers may be content to be provided with precedential guidance 
from the courts about what a “correct” or “reasonable” decision would have looked like 
in the circumstances, but no ex post remedy, not even those available under the Charter, 
will probably be satisfactory to individuals or groups affected by an unlawful or 
unreasonable decision made in the absence of legal guidance. On the other hand, if the 
state fails to protect the public because of ultimately unjustified concerns about violating 
rights, the consequences could be just as dire. 
In summary, infectious disease emergencies have recently found renewed salience 
in Canadian legal scholarship. One theme in this literature is emergency legal 
preparedness. Because the emergency powers available to emergency decision makers 
are exceptionally robust, they embody the public health tension between the public good 
and individual civil liberties. However, to date there has been little attention paid in the 
literature to the administrative decision to deploy extraordinary measures. In order to 
improve transparency and accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, and to provide for 
more meaningful judicial review (resulting in concrete respect for rights in an enriched 
constitutional discourse) for these decisions, legislation ought to be established 
articulating specific principles to be considered by administrative decision makers when 






In its Second Interim Report, the Campbell Commission succinctly noted that the 
best infectious disease emergency measure is a robust day-to-day public health system:  
The first goal of public health emergency management is 
to stop emergencies before they start by preventing the 
spread of disease. If a small outbreak is prevented or 
contained, draconian legal powers available to fight a full-
blown emergency will not be needed. 
 
Legal Powers themselves are false hopes in times of 
public crisis. Preparedness and prevention backed by 
enhanced daily public health powers are the best 




In a similar vein, Nuala Kenny et al., speaking from a relational-feminist approach, have 
cautioned against over-focus upon emergency preparedness in the wake of SARS and 
H1N1 at the expense of other, constantly prevailing public health concerns.
72
 
However, these authors probably ought not to be taken to mean that emergency 
preparedness, including legal preparedness, should be ignored. Nor should they be taken 
to mean that where a gap has been identified in the prevailing literature concerning 
emergencies, it ought not to be addressed. While this thesis is limited to the emergency 
context, dealing with the substance of legal preparedness is not the same creature as 
focusing upon the stockpiling of antivirals to the exclusion of clean water initiatives in 
aboriginal communities. The underlying principles which will be fleshed out have the 
potential to become very relevant to future non-emergency public health legal scholarship 
and to administrative decision-making in public health more broadly.  
                                                 
71
 Campbell Commission, Second Interim Report, supra note 6, at 9. 
72
 Nuala P Kenny, Susan B Sherwin and Françoise E Baylis, “Re-visioning Public Health 




 There are many different kinds of public health emergencies: Hurricane Katrina, 
just as much as SARS, has the potential to fit within the public health paradigm as well as 
trigger the deployment of special emergency measures. In choosing to limit the inquiry to 
the context of infectious diseases, this thesis demonstrates agreement with the Campbell 
Commission’s characterization, noted above, of infectious disease outbreaks that 
overwhelm the standing acute care and public health systems as the “quintessential” 
public health emergency. This is not simply due to their contemporary salience (though 
that is indeed an immediate attractor). Rather, infectious disease emergency law provides 
an opportune place to make the argument that legislated guidance ought to exist as a part 
of the emergency decision-making process. The individual and group legal rights at issue 
are most obvious during such an event, and also exist alongside the exceptionally high 
stakes that can logically justify their transgression. Because of this, they also provide a 
most convenient opportunity for building a bridge between public health, ethics, and the 
law.  
The bulk of the analysis in this thesis assumes a state of emergency, or public 
health emergency as the case may require, has already been legitimately declared
73
 and 
the special powers are available to the relevant decision maker. Admittedly, the question 
surrounding what state of affairs would actually justify such a legal declaration is highly 
relevant to this area of scholarship. However, it is a separate line of inquiry, and is 
beyond the intended scope of this thesis. 
Lastly, it may become evident to the reader that this thesis is written from the 
perspective of a practitioner. The goal of the proposed legislative reform is 
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correspondingly a very practical one, which is: if and when the next infectious disease 
emergency arises, then the real-life experiences of several actors – including the decision 
makers, their advisors, and the public - will be improved in a concrete way. 
1.9 STRUCTURE 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. In the next chapter, we will consider 
Canada’s constitutional legal framework, its underlying constitutional principles, and the 
import of Charter rights and values, and consider them in relation to public health in 
general and infectious disease emergencies specifically. In chapter three, we will explore 
the definition, purposes, and scope of public health and public health law with a view to 
both understanding the literature, as well as incorporating their core values into our 
proposed legislative reform. We will also discuss two prominent public health ethical 
systems: descriptive ethics and relational feminist ethics, as examples in order to consider 
whether ethical models, on their own, could be used to achieve our stated objectives. 
Chapter three goes on to consider: if ethical models cannot achieve our objectives on 
their own, to what extent could they be integrated into and enrich legislative reform? 
Chapter four will explore Canada’s complex statutory regime concerning infectious 
diseases. This regime essentially involves three separate species of statutes: public health 
laws; public health emergency laws; and general public welfare emergency laws. 
Examples will be given of some of these statutory provisions as they currently stand, with 
emphasis on the truly remarkable legal powers that are bestowed upon various decision 
makers in times of emergency. In chapter five, the proposed solution will be provided in 
the form of draft legislation. That chapter will then restate the expected benefits of 




benefit of increased concrete respect for rights, more meaningful judicial review, and an 
enriched constitutional discourse. In chapter six, we will discuss the jurisprudential basis 
for judicial review of administrative action in Canada, and attempt to predict how the 
proposed legislation would fit into the current regime. Chapter six will also apply the 
dialogue metaphor of Canadian constitutional scholarship in order to more fully explain 
how legislative reform in pursuit of better infectious disease emergency legal 
preparedness could provide an opportunity to realize some of the initial promise the 
metaphor had for a constitutional-enhancing dialogue between courts and legislatures. 






CHAPTER 2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
PRINCIPLES 
2.1 LEGAL AUTHORITY 
 
 This thesis is focused on government (i.e. administrative) decision makers, and 
what will guide them as they decide whether or not extraordinary measures are required 
in order to confront an infectious disease emergency, and, if so, when or how to deploy 
them. It is for this reason the second chapter is concerned with fundamental law. 
 By what right does this person decide during the emergency, and under what 
authority may they direct such interference with people’s liberty? If, for example, an 
international airport is to be closed, restricting the freedom and commerce of many 
individuals and businesses, there had better be a good answer to this question. The 
answer is: the person decides and directs under the authority of law. It is the law that 
gives this person their jurisdiction, their vires. It is a fundamental principle of Canadian 
law that a public official must be able to trace their authority back to a legal source.
74
 
Correspondingly, the official cannot exercise authority beyond that grant.
75
 In this 
chapter, we will examine the law that underlies our emergency decision maker’s source 
of authority. Later on in chapter four, we will build upon this foundation by providing the 
reader with a general overview of the current state of the legislation, the extraordinary 
character and pervasiveness of basket clauses, as well the availability of some lesser 
known enforcement measures. 
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2.2 DIVISION OF POWERS 
 
 Canada is a federal state with a division of powers between the federal parliament 
and the provincial legislatures.
76
 Health care systems, including public health, are shared 
between the two levels, though acute healthcare is considered mostly within the 
legislative authority of the provinces.  
Sections 91 and 92 of the 1867 Canadian Constitution list the areas of legislative 
competence, or vires, applicable to each level of government. The constitutional language 
of section 92 tends to situate public health laws within the domains of the provinces: 
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in 
relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next 




7. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, 
Asylums, Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the 













Section 91, however, grants powers to the federal Parliament that might be applicable to 
an infectious disease emergency: 
Powers of the Parliament 
 
Legislative Authority of Parliament of Canada 
 
                                                 
76
 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30&31 Vict c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5. 
77




91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the 
Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all 
Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned 
exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for greater 
Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms 
of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in 
this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of 
Canada extends to all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects 
next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, —  
 












27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal 




29. Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the 
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively 
to the Legislatures of the Provinces. 
 
And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects 
enumerated in this Section shall not be deemed to come within the 
Class of Matters of a local or private Nature comprised in the 
Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively 




One of the earliest legal disputes concerning this division of powers between the 
federal and provincial governments actually arose out of an infectious disease outbreak. 
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In the 1886 case Rinfret v Pope,
79
 a five-judge panel of the Quebec Court of Queen’s 
Bench (Appeal Side) ruled 4:1 that laws relating to disease epidemics were strictly within 
provincial jurisdiction. However, a long dissent from Cross J. advocated for a federal 
Parliament which could: 
 …take appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate an epidemic, 
endemic or contagious disease, with which the Dominion, or any part of 
it, was threatened, nor could it be objected that in the carrying out of 





Cross J.’s dissent did not gain much traction concerning outbreaks confined to a single 
province, but the federal Parliament is certainly responsible for legislating in order to 
discharge Canada’s international obligations with regards to infectious disease 
surveillance, notification, and control. It can also exert authority in the event of an inter-
provincial infectious disease outbreak, or, in the extreme case, an intra-provincial 
outbreak that rises to the level of a national emergency.
81
 In today’s age of high 
population density and rapid transportation, there is real potential for an infectious 
disease outbreak to rise to this level.  
Many infectious disease outbreaks, even those rising to the level of emergencies, 
will of course be localized within one province, or even one locality. As in Rinfret v 
Pope, such occasions would fall within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislatures.
82
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2.3 HISTORICAL CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY 
 
 The provincial/ federal jurisdiction question was not the only challenge made to 
the authorities concerning infectious diseases in the 19
th
 century. In the 1892 case of Re: 
George Bowack,
83
 the applicant was detained upon his arrival in Vancouver, BC due to 
his suspected exposure to smallpox across the straits in Victoria. He applied for, but was 
denied, an initial writ of habeas corpus, but was successful upon a second attempt five 
days later. The second judge interpreted the local bylaws in effect at the time, and 
decided that public health officials had limited powers under the law to detain. As 
described in Peter Johnson’s, Quarantined: Life and Death at William Head Station, 
1879-1959: 
The City of Vancouver bylaw stated “The Medical Officer shall have 
power to stop, detain, and examine every person coming from a place 
infected with a pestilential or infectious disease, in order to prevent the 
introduction of the same into the City. But [Justice] Walkem revealed that 
Bowack had been detained without examination. What was the point of an 
examination “when it is impossible to discover whether a person has the 
disease until it actually had broken out… and that takes 14 days to 
incubate.” If that were the case, [Justice] Walkem asserted, only patients 
with the disease could be examined. Bowack was not a patient, and 
therefore Vancouver had acted beyond the limitations of its own bylaw. 
The Justice ordered Bowack’s immediate release and gave him costs 




                                                                                                                                                 
Health Law and Policy, 3
rd
 ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2007). Amir Attaran and 
Kumanan Wilson have challenged this view, and have called for federal jurisdiction over 
all infectious disease emergencies in “A Legal and Epidemiological Justification for 
Federal Authority in Public Health Emergencies” (2007) 52 McGill LJ 381. 
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So we see, well before 1982 and the introduction of the Charter, the courts were 
prepared to enforce, based purely upon the doctrine of vires, restrictions upon what an 
administrative decision maker could do, even when attempting to halt the spread of 
infectious diseases. While public health professionals may scoff at the judge’s dismissal 
of a valid public health tool, i.e. quarantine, as not appropriate because Mr. Bowack was 
not yet sick (that is, after all, the point), the judge’s ruling was not based upon the 




2.4 UNDERLYING CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
 
Bowack of course turned on its own facts. But facts are not alone in informing 
judicial interpretation of a statute,
86
 or in assessing the reasonableness of a decision. 
Underlying constitutional principles run throughout all Canadian law, as does the impact 




Even at its enacting, Canada’s constitution encompassed more than the 
delineation of legislative authority. It included then, as now, traditions, conventions, and 
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common laws which, in the words of Canada’s Supreme Court, “embrace the global 
system of rules and principles which govern the exercise of constitutional authority in the 
whole and in every part of the Canadian state.”
88
 The Supreme Court of Canada in a 
variety of circumstances has discussed these underlying principles, which though 
unwritten have the force of law. For example, in the Provincial Judges Reference,
89
 the 
Court commented in detail on the unwritten constitutional principle of judicial 
independence. In the course of that decision, the Court also reiterated other unwritten 
principles, including: Canada’s form of the doctrine of full faith and credit;
90
 the doctrine 
of federal paramouncy;
91
 the maintenance of the rule of law;
92
 Canada’s parliamentary 
form of representative democracy;
93
 legislative and Parliamentary privilege;
94
 and the 
protection of political speech.
95
 These examples of unwritten constitutional principles 
were not exhaustive. 
 In the case Reference re Secession of Quebec,
96
 the Supreme Court of Canada 
built upon some of the unwritten constitutional rules and conventions it had previously 
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discussed in Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution,
97
 and Re: Objection by Quebec to 
a Resolution to amend the Constitution.
98
 In so doing, it described the four constitutional 
principles that hold the greatest promise for helping us bridge public health, ethics, and 
the law:  
Our Constitution is primarily a written one, the product of 131 years of 
evolution. Behind the written word is an historical lineage stretching 
back through the ages, which aids in the consideration of the underlying 
constitutional principles. These principles inform and sustain the 
constitutional text:  they are the vital unstated assumptions upon which 
the text is based. The following discussion addresses the four 
foundational constitutional principles that are most germane for 
resolution of this Reference:  federalism, democracy, constitutionalism 
and the rule of law, and respect for minority rights. These defining 
principles function in symbiosis.  No single principle can be defined in 
isolation from the others, nor does any one principle trump or exclude 




These four principles ought to inform all of the actors in our scenario: the 
legislature as it enacts the law granting authority to the decision maker; the decision 
maker as they determine what powers the law grants them, along with if, when, and how 
to use those powers; and finally the courts, if and when they are asked to review any of 
the preceding. But more than that, these underlying constitutional principles provide an 
excellent opportunity to bridge public health, ethics, and the law because they are legal 
principles that hold significant commonalities with certain fundamental values of public 
health and ethics. Improved legislation could leverage these commonalities, along with 
other legal considerations (such as Charter values), towards our stated goal of improved 
infectious disease emergency legal preparedness.  
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Continuing to elaborate on the four enumerated principles, the Court explained 
the unwritten constitutional principle of federalism:  
The principle of federalism recognizes the diversity of the component 
parts of Confederation, and the autonomy of provincial governments to 
develop their societies within their respective spheres of jurisdiction. 
The federal structure of our country also facilitates democratic 
participation by distributing power to the government thought to be 
most suited to achieving the particular societal objective having regard 
to this diversity.  The scheme of the Constitution Act, 1867, it was said 
in Re the Initiative and Referendum Act, [1919] A.C. 935 (P.C.), at p. 
942, was 
 
not to weld the Provinces into one, nor to subordinate Provincial 
Governments to a central authority, but to establish a central 
government in which these Provinces should be represented, 
entrusted with exclusive authority only in affairs in which they 
had a common interest. Subject to this each Province was to retain 
its independence and autonomy and to be directly under the 
Crown as its head. 
 
More recently, in Haig v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995, at p. 1047, the 
majority of this Court held that differences between provinces "are a 
rational part of the political reality in the federal process".  It was 
referring to the differential application of federal law in individual 
provinces, but the point applies more generally.  A unanimous Court 
expressed similar views in R. v. S. (S.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254, at pp. 287-
88. 
 
The principle of federalism facilitates the pursuit of collective goals by 
cultural and linguistic minorities which form the majority within a 
particular province.  This is the case in Quebec, where the majority of 
the population is French-speaking, and which possesses a distinct 
culture… 
 
Federalism was also welcomed by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, 
both of which also affirmed their will to protect their individual cultures 
and their autonomy over local matters. All new provinces joining the 
federation sought to achieve similar objectives, which are no less 
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This principle, if applied to infectious disease emergencies, can be thought of as 
either aiding or inhibiting our stated goal of improved legal preparedness (or both). Amir 
Attaran and Kumanan Wilson are two of the more vocal proponents of a unified, federal 
emergency system under the prevailing constitutional structure. In their words: 
It is telling that even after years of preparation and refinement, 
Canada’s national plan for an influenza outbreak is still replete with 
dozens of references to “F/P/T” – the usual shorthand for the federal, 
provincial, and territorial levels of government. 
 
But while the F/P/T lingo sounds harmonious and inclusive, it is 
actually a deceptive balm that covers up a dangerous failure to 
demarcate specific responsibilities and to assign them to individual 




Succinctly put, viruses and bacteria behave independently of political 
considerations. Therefore, to impose a federalist or provincialist view of 





Attaran and Wilson go on to argue that, under contemporary Canadian constitutional law, 
the federal Parliament can, and should, legislate and govern infectious disease emergency 
responses in Canada. 
For now, at least, the federal Parliament has made no specific effort to legislate 
infectious disease emergency response on a national scale. The body of Canada’s 
infectious disease emergency laws remains a multiplicity of federal, provincial, and 
territorial statutes. Attaran and Wilson’s approach, if adopted, would certainly make this 
thesis’s suggested law reform easier to implement (it would take only a single round of 
amendments). On the other hand, there is nothing at present legally preventing the 
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suggested reform from taking place in each individual province or territory, in addition to 
federally. Further, there is nothing necessarily preventing each legislature from coming 
up with different solutions, based upon their own consideration and weighing of the 
relevant constitutional rules, public health principles, ethics, and Charter values. 
Returning to the Secession Reference, after federalism the Court discussed the 
principle of democracy. Going beyond the constitutional requirement for the democratic 
election of the legislature, the Court elaborated that this constitutional principle embodies 
something deeper: 
The consent of the governed is a value that is basic to our understanding 
of a free and democratic society.  Yet democracy in any real sense of 
the word cannot exist without the rule of law.  It is the law that creates 
the framework within which the "sovereign will" is to be ascertained 
and implemented.  To be accorded legitimacy, democratic institutions 
must rest, ultimately, on a legal foundation.  That is, they must allow 
for the participation of, and accountability to, the people, through public 
institutions created under the Constitution.  Equally, however, a system 
of government cannot survive through adherence to the law alone. A 
political system must also possess legitimacy, and in our political 
culture, that requires an interaction between the rule of law and the 
democratic principle. The system must be capable of reflecting the 
aspirations of the people.  But there is more. Our law's claim to 
legitimacy also rests on an appeal to moral values, many of which are 
imbedded in our constitutional structure.  It would be a grave mistake to 
equate legitimacy with the "sovereign will" or majority rule alone, to 
the exclusion of other constitutional values. 
  
Finally, we highlight that a functioning democracy requires a 
continuous process of discussion.  The Constitution mandates 
government by democratic legislatures, and an executive accountable to 
them, "resting ultimately on public opinion reached by discussion and 
the interplay of ideas" (Saumur v. City of Quebec, supra, at p. 330).  At 
both the federal and provincial level, by its very nature, the need to 
build majorities necessitates compromise, negotiation, and 
deliberation. No one has a monopoly on truth, and our system is 
predicated on the faith that in the marketplace of ideas, the best 
solutions to public problems will rise to the top. Inevitably, there will be 
dissenting voices. A democratic system of government is committed to 










This underlying principle even more clearly connects with some of the core 
values of public health. In fact, some public health writers have specifically called for 
greater community involvement and consultation concerning public health initiatives.
103
 
Keri Gammon seems to have given the same significance to local community needs and 
involvement when she wrote: 
[L]ocal needs, values and customs will often elude the federal 
government, which does not have an effective means of identifying 
these local needs and responding to them. In contrast, the local and 
provincial governments are likely to be seized of such mechanisms and 




[W]ith respect to regional differences in public health legislation, such 
differences should not be dogmatically impugned and subjected to 
standardization. Differences in approach do not suggest that provinces 
have abdicated their responsibility or in any way compromised their 
ability to protect the health of their citizenry. On the contrary, the very 
fact of these differences suggests that provincial and municipal 
governments have acted based on the needs and values of their 
communities, thereby fulfilling their responsibility to protect health and, 
at the same time, preserving local democracy and the relationship 




Whichever approach one finds compelling, empowering statutes (which will be 
discussed below) exist currently in federal, provincial, and territorial jurisdictions. 
Whether they are to remain separate and distinct, or made uniform, or absorbed under a 
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single federal statute, is not critical to this thesis’s proposed reform; the reform is 
required regardless. 
Irrespective of which level of government has granted authority to a specific 
decision maker, this deeper constitutional requirement for democracy ought to inform his 
or her interpretation of his or her own statute, as well as their decision making process. 
Taking this approach further empowers the decision maker. Any incorporation of 
constitutional principles (as well as Charter values) into legal interpretation and 
administrative decision-making would enrich the decision, and render it more legally 
sound.
105
 And, as shall be seen in chapter three, the principle of democracy is also one 
which lends itself to bridging public health, ethics, and the law.  
It some ways, the constitutional principles of federalism and democracy may have 
already found some implicit expression in Canadian health law and policy, most notably 
in the reforms of the 1990s and 2000s towards more democratic, local decision making 
regarding the allocation of (mostly acute) health care resources. Diane Longley is one 
scholar who argued that the primacy of health in the human experience, alongside the 
internationally accepted notion that governments had a responsibility to promote the 
health of their citizens, makes for a strong case that health care resources and the systems 
for their deployment ought to be considered of constitutional importance.
106
 Writing, 
from the perspective of the UK, on the reforms that were taking place throughout a large 
part of the developed world in response to radically escalating health care costs and 
public disenchantment with quality of delivery, she commented: 
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The philosophy, or at least the rhetorical justification that underpins 
many of the current changes to the public sector, including health both 
[in the UK] and abroad is that of user choice. Much of the health 
service reforms in the UK were predicated on enhanced local decision 
making… 
 
Such a focus implies that the public will be enabled readily to exercise 
their preferences in relation to the provision of health services, and that 
decisions will be justified by reflecting the values of those people most 
affected. Where this is not the case, decisions will be open to 





 We will see below that some public health scholars have called for increased 
public engagement and participation in public health programs and governance.
108
 Hester 
Lessard has in a similar manner argued that the judiciary ought to take special account of 
such local ‘democratic’ engagement and involvement in public health initiatives when 
considering the constitutional division of powers between Parliament and the provincial 
legislatures.
109
 These ideas are compelling from both theoretical and practical 
perspectives. Similar to the ideas expressed by Longley, such engagement could be 
thought of as giving effect to the fundamental value of democracy. As public health laws, 
for example, were used practically as tools to further public health goals, they could also 
be thought of as an expression of the democratic will of the communities who will bear 
the burdens, as well as reap the benefits, of those same public health decisions and/or 
policies. It is also possible that greater community involvement in public health policy 
development will lead to the more specific needs of that community being met. If this 
leads in turn to increased compliance with and participation in the public health initiative, 
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it could lead to improved public health outcomes and at the same time engender trust and 
cooperation. If, as the Supreme Court said, the legal “system must be capable of 
reflecting the aspirations of the people”, then this is at least one principled area upon 
which we might begin to bridge public health, ethics, and the law. 
 And we do need to consider the law if we wish to effectively and efficiently 
defeat the emergency. As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, all government action 
must be able to trace its authority back to law, and that traceable path is always subject to 
challenge before the courts. This reality finds its basis largely in the fourth underlying 
constitutional principle from the Secession Reference: that of constitutionalism, and the 
role of the judicial branch of government in guarding the rule of law: 
…[S]imply put, the constitutionalism principle requires that all 
government action comply with the Constitution. The rule of law 
principle requires that all government action must comply with the law, 
including the Constitution. This Court has noted on several occasions 
that with the adoption of the Charter, the Canadian system of 
government was transformed to a significant extent from a system of 
Parliamentary supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy. The 
Constitution binds all governments, both federal and provincial, 
including the executive branch (Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, 
[1985] 1 SCR 441, at p. 455). They may not transgress its provisions: 
indeed, their sole claim to exercise lawful authority rests in the powers 






As will be seen in chapter three, infectious disease emergencies, by their very 
nature provoke a population-focused response with a view to safeguarding the general 
public before any one individual or group of individuals. This may be precisely the kind 
of situation where the Court saw a place for the unwritten principle of constitutionalism: 
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…[A] constitution may provide an added safeguard for fundamental 
human rights and individual freedoms which might otherwise be 
susceptible to government interference.  Although democratic 
government is generally solicitous of those rights, there are occasions 
when the majority will be tempted to ignore fundamental rights in order 
to accomplish collective goals more easily or effectively. Constitutional 





Of course, one might assume that the judiciary will be as alert to the seriousness 
of an infectious disease outbreak as the rest of the population; the public interest in 
having it effectively addressed will be evident. But the underlying constitutional 
principles of federalism, democracy, and constitutionalism will not be suspended, even in 
the face of emergency measures taken during an infectious disease emergency. The 
public health decision maker, as well as his or her authorizing legislation, must be able to 
pass a judicial review that will be informed by those principles in addition to the statutory 
objectives.
112
 As they attempt to balance the interests of the population as a whole against 
those of individuals or smaller groups, judges will be appropriately sensitive to the 
unique facts, but they will at the same time have a constitutional duty to ensure that 
government action, even emergency action, complies with the Canadian constitution. 
This will become even more relevant shortly, below, when we consider Canada’s 
constitutionally entrenched bill of rights, the Charter.  
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 The final, though non-exhaustive, unwritten constitutional principle articulated by 
the Court in the Secession Reference was the protection of minorities.
113
 It is this 
principle that holds the most promise for bridging public health, ethics, and the law: 
The fourth underlying constitutional principle we address here concerns 
the protection of minorities.  There are a number of specific 
constitutional provisions protecting minority language, religion and 
education rights.  Some of those provisions are, as we have recognized 
on a number of occasions, the product of historical compromises… 
 
However, we highlight that even though those provisions were the 
product of negotiation and political compromise, that does not render 
them unprincipled.  Rather, such a concern reflects a broader principle 
related to the protection of minority rights. Undoubtedly, the three other 
constitutional principles inform the scope and operation of the specific 
provisions that protect the rights of minorities. We emphasize that the 
protection of minority rights is itself an independent principle 
underlying our constitutional order.  The principle is clearly reflected in 
the Charter's provisions for the protection of minority rights.  See, e.g., 
Reference re Public Schools Act (Man), s. 79(3), (4) and (7), [1993] 1 
SCR 839, and Mahe v Alberta, [1990] 1 SCR 342. 
 
The concern of our courts and governments to protect minorities has 
been prominent in recent years, particularly following the enactment of 
the Charter.  Undoubtedly, one of the key considerations motivating the 
enactment of the Charter, and the process of constitutional judicial 
review that it entails, is the protection of minorities.  However, it should 
not be forgotten that the protection of minority rights had a long history 
before the enactment of the Charter.  Indeed, the protection of minority 
rights was clearly an essential consideration in the design of our 
constitutional structure even at the time of Confederation:  Senate 
Reference, supra, at p. 71. Although Canada's record of upholding the 
rights of minorities is not a spotless one, that goal is one towards which 
Canadians have been striving since Confederation, and the process has 
not been without successes. The principle of protecting minority rights 
continues to exercise influence in the operation and interpretation of our 
Constitution. 
 
Consistent with this long tradition of respect for minorities, which is at 
least as old as Canada itself, the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982 
included in s. 35 explicit protection for existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights, and in s. 25, a non-derogation clause in favour of the rights of 
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aboriginal peoples.  The "promise" of s. 35, as it was termed in R v 
Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, at p. 1083, recognized not only the 
ancient occupation of land by aboriginal peoples, but their contribution 
to the building of Canada, and the special commitments made to them 
by successive governments. The protection of these rights, so recently 
and arduously achieved, whether looked at in their own right or as part 





At first blush, it may not be obvious how the principle of the protection of 
minorities could form a bridge with a discipline that takes as its focus the population at 
large. But as we shall see in chapter three, public health, and public health law, have as 
one of their core principles a commitment to social justice.
115
 Public health initiatives are, 
in fact, powerful tools to achieve social justice as they can help diminish the gap in the 
health outcomes between the wealthy and the marginalized. We will also see in chapter 
three that some systems of public health ethics, though based upon significantly different 
normative values, can nevertheless find common ground in the importance they give to 
social justice and the protection of minorities. The protection of vulnerable minorities has 
also been posited as part of the theoretical justification for judicial review.
116
 Thus, it ties 
together public health, ethics, underlying constitutional values, theoretical justifications 
for judicial review, as well as Canada’s constitutionally enacted bill of rights.  
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2.5 CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTRENCHED RIGHTS 
 
 In ending the focused discussion of Canada’s Constitution and its underlying 
principles, we must discuss the significance of Part I (the first 34 sections) of the 
Canadian Constitution Act, 1982,
117
 which incorporated a bill of rights into the Canadian 
constitution. Under section 34 of that Act, Part I may be referred to as The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or often simply the Charter.
118
 This constitutional bill 
of rights includes several individual rights guarantees that are quite relevant in the 
context of an infectious disease emergency, most notably
119
 those protecting interests 
such as liberty, bodily integrity, privacy, and due process: 
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in 
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
 
8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure. 
 
9. Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned. 
 
10. Everyone has the right on arrest or detention 
 
(a) to be informed promptly of the reasons therefor; 
 
(b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and 
to be informed of that right; and 
 
(c) to have the validity of the detention determined 
by way of habeas corpus and to be released if the 
detention is not lawful. 
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A complete analysis of the last 30 years of Charter interpretations and judicial 
decisions would by far exceed the space or time available here. But we can point out that 
these rights will be omnipresent in the context of an infectious disease emergency. For 
example, warrantless entries and searches are commonly authorized under public health 
emergency laws. While not necessarily unconstitutional in their existence (or 
unconstitutionally unreasonable in their execution),
120
 their legality most certainly has a 
constitutional dimension due to section 8 of the Charter. Likewise, mandatory 
hospitalization or quarantine orders could engage sections 9 and 10. Section 7 “security 
of the person” rights can be particularly tricky, in any legal situation. For example, as I 
have previously written in the family law context, section 7 security of the person rights 
have been found to include:  
the constitutional right of destitute parents to representation by state-
funded legal counsel when subjected by the state to child protection 
legal proceedings, where those proceedings cause severe stress and/or 




In the health law context, section 7 has been found by courts (though not yet by a 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada), to include the right to a private health 
insurance option where a public-only system results in unacceptably long wait times.
122
 It 
has been found to guard against, in one way or another, overly restrictive criminal-
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regulatory regimes for abortion.
123
 It has very recently been found to encompass the right 
to medically assisted suicide for certain individuals.
124
 It was found to oblige courts to 
take the views of mature minors into account when deciding what is in their best interests 
in medical matters,
125
 while at common law individuals over the age of majority have the 
right to refuse medical treatment even if it is not in their best interests to do so.
126
 If the 
state were to purport to order medical treatment against such an adult, then section 7 
would apply.
127
 These are but a few examples of how constitutionally rooted civil 




But just because they can be brought to bear, this does not mean that if a Charter 
right is engaged, then the offending public health initiative is immediately frustrated. No 
right is absolute. The Charter contains two provisions that explicitly contemplate limits.   
The first limit is contained in the very first section of the Charter, which reads:  
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights 
and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted this section of the Constitution many 
times, beginning with the landmark decision R v Oakes,
129
 which created the namesake 
test. Though continuously revisited and refined, the general “steps” that the executive 
must demonstrate in order to uphold the legislature’s limit of a right is: 
(a) Is the limit prescribed by law? 
 
(b) Is the purpose for which the limit is imposed pressing and 
substantial? 
 
(c) Is the means by which the goal is furthered proportionate? 
 
(i) Is the limit rationally connected to the purpose? 
 
(ii) Does the limit minimally impair the right? 
 




If the government can demonstrate to the court that these steps are all satisfied, then the 




 The second way that the Charter limits itself is section 33, which is an override 
provision with regards to certain rights, with a built-in sunset clause: 
33. (1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare 
in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the 
Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision 
included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
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(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration 
made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it 
would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the 
declaration. 
 
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect 
five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be 
specified in the declaration.  
 
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a 
declaration made under subsection (1). 
 
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under 
subsection (4).  
 
Though sparsely used outside of the Province of Quebec,
132
 the existence of s. 33 
is relevant for our purposes in that it contemplates, at least in certain circumstances, the 
legislature disagreeing with the courts concerning the scope of Charter rights. As this 
thesis proposes that legislatures ought to provide, through statute, explicit guidance to 
decision makers during infectious disease emergencies, it attempts to incorporate the 
courts’ existing constitutional rulings along with public health values and ethics. The 
example legislation in chapter five, included for illustration, is presented as 
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constitutionally valid if enacted (and may be more easily interpreted as constitutionally 
compliant than the basket clauses which exist currently). But this is just one approach. If 
Parliament, or a provincial legislature, found that an emergency necessitated limiting the 
scope of a Charter right, then it would probably believe the limit justified under s.1. This 
is most likely how basket clauses are rationalized. But even if in the future judicial 
rulings indicate otherwise, then section 33 provides the legislature with an explicit 
constitutional authority to disagree with the courts and carry on with its legislation. In 
chapter six, the ‘dialogue” metaphor of constitutional jurisprudence will be discussed 
with a view to demonstrating the rare opportunity the subject matter of infectious disease 
emergencies provides for the advancement of Canada’s constitution through ‘dialogue’, 
including through the potential use of section 33. 
There are two final points to be raised concerning the Charter during infectious 
disease emergencies. The first relates to Charter values. Courts employ these 
constitutional principles as an aid in interpreting statutes, common law, as well as 
reviewing government actions. They include, “Human dignity, equality, liberty, respect 
for the autonomy of the person and the enhancement of democracy.”
133
 The Supreme 
Court of Canada recently re-articulated that these values are to be considered on judicial 
review of administrative action in Doré v Barreau du Quebec: 
It goes without saying that administrative decision-makers must act 
consistently with the values underlying the grant of discretion, 
including Charter values (see Chamberlain v Surrey School District No. 
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36, 2002 SCC 86, [2002] 4 SCR 710, at para 71; Pinet v St. Thomas 
Psychiatric Hospital, 2004 SCC 21, [2004] 1 SCR 528, at paras 19-23; 
and Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v Criminal Lawyers’ 
Association, 2010 SCC 23, [2010] 1 SCR 815, at paras 62-75).  The 





After considering the somewhat conflicting precedent from itself (and particularly 
Multani),
135
 on whether or not the Oakes test was the appropriate framework for 
assessing the consistency of administration action with Charter values, the Court 
concluded: 
The alternative is for the Court to embrace a richer conception of 
administrative law, under which discretion is exercised “in light of 
constitutional guarantees and the values they reflect” (Multani, at para 
152, per LeBel J.).  Under this approach, it is unnecessary to retreat to a 
s. 1 Oakes analysis in order to protect Charter values.  Rather, 
administrative decisions are always required to consider fundamental 
values.  The Charter simply acts as “a reminder that some values are 
clearly fundamental and  . . . cannot be violated lightly” (Cartier, at p. 
86).  The administrative law approach also recognizes the legitimacy 
that this Court has given to administrative decision-making in cases 
such as Dunsmuir and Conway.  These cases emphasize that 
administrative bodies are empowered, and indeed required, to consider 
Charter values within their scope of expertise. Integrating Charter 
values into the administrative approach, and recognizing the expertise 
of these decision-makers, opens “an institutional dialogue about the 
                                                 
134
 Doré, supra note 112 at para 24. Doré was not without controversy. See: Matthew 
Lewans, “Administrative Law, Judicial Deference, and the Charter”(2014) 23:4 Const 
Forum Const 19; Audrey Macklin, “Charter Right or Charter-Lite? Administrative 
Discretion and the Charter” (2014) 67:2 Sup Ct L Rev 561; Lorne Sossin and Mark 
Friedman, “Charter Values and Administrative Justice” (2014) 67:2 Sup Ct L Rev 391; 
Matthew Horner, “Charter Values: The Uncanny Valley of Canadian Constitutionalism” 
(2014) 67:2 Sup Ct L Rev 361; Christopher D Bredt and Ewa Krajewska, “Doré: All That 
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appropriate use and control of discretion, rather than the older 






We will return to the Court’s idea of “institutional dialogue” in chapter six.   
The Court’s direction in Doré is clear: decision makers must consider 
fundamental legal values, including Charter values.
137
 In reforming the law to increase 
legal preparedness in a public health context, this must be taken into account. Therefore, 
this thesis proposes to incorporate these fundamental values directly into legislation –  
legislation that would also incorporate the principles and values of public health and 
ethics. In this way, the law regarding infectious disease emergencies, the archetypical 
public health concern, would reflect a public health approach, while at the same time 
reflecting fundamental constitutional values. ‘Bridging’ public health, law, and ethics in 
this way will leverage the law to its maximum effect in defeating the emergency through 
the stated outcomes of improved transparency, efficiency and effectiveness, and more 
meaningful judicial review. 
By placing the guidance directly in the legislation, the administrative decision 
maker will be more effectively supported by his or her legal advisor,
138
 and will be able 
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to better understand the legal requirements in order to exercise what may appear in the 
basket clause to be unfettered discretion. It may be easy for a lawyer to understand that 
basket clauses are still subject to the constitution, and that decision makers must still take 
into account constitutional, and especially Charter, values, but it is hardly transparent to 
the public, and may not even be transparent to the decision maker. Explicit legislative 
guidance will make it transparent to a much greater audience. The Campbell commission 
was concerned that Ontario’s new emergency measures statute did not explicitly limit the 
measures available under the basket clause to objectively ‘reasonable’ ones.
139
 This thesis 
proposes that the law should do more than add the word ‘reasonable’.  
The last point that in this chapter on the Charter concerns how it relates to the 
protection of vulnerable minorities. In addition to the unwritten principle of the 
protection of minorities, as well as the explicit minority protections built into Canada’s 
original written constitution (i.e. religious and language minorities), the Charter contains 
an explicit anti-discrimination provision: 
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right 
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination 
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has 
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or 
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
 
The courts interpret this section in light of its purpose and underlying values:  
As this Court has pointed out on several occasions, this value of 
substantive equality at the heart of s. 15 is closely tied to the concept of 
human dignity: Miron, at paras 145‑46; Law, at paras 52 and 54; Blencoe 
v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 (CanLII), 
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[2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, at para 77; Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), 
2002 SCC 84 (CanLII), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, at para 20.  The innate and 
equal dignity of every individual is invariably an “essential value 
underlying the s. 15 equality guarantee”:  Kapp, at para 21.  Indeed, the 
Court has said that “the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of 
essential human dignity and freedom” (Law, at para 51) and to eliminate 
any possibility of a person being treated in substance as “less worthy” than 
others:  Gosselin, at para 22.  In other words: 
 
This principle recognizes the dignity of each human being and each 
person’s freedom to develop his body and spirit as he or she desires, 
subject to such limitations as may be justified by the interests of the 
community as a whole. It recognizes that society is based on 
individuals who are different from each other, and that a free and 
democratic society must accommodate and respect these differences. 
(Miron, at para 145) 
 
The principle of personal autonomy or self‑determination, to which 
self‑worth, self‑confidence and self‑ respect are tied, is an integral part of 
the values of dignity and freedom that underlie the equality guarantee:  
Law, at para 53; Gosselin, at para 65.  Safeguarding personal autonomy 
implies the recognition of each individual’s right to make decisions 
regarding his or her own person, to control his or her bodily integrity and 
to pursue his or her own conception of a full and rewarding life free from 
government interference with fundamental personal choices:  R. v. Big M 
Drug Mart Ltd., 1985 CanLII 69 (SCC), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at p. 346, 
per Dickson J; R. v. Morgentaler, 1988 CanLII 90 (SCC), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 
30, at p. 164, per Wilson J.; Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), 1993 CanLII 75 (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at p. 554, per 





While it is possible that a challenge to a decision, or its enabling legislation, could 
be brought during an emergency under section 15, this thesis does not take up this 
question. The point to be made here is the strength that section 15 lends to the promise 
the principle of protection of minorities has for bridging public health, ethics, and the 
law. As the Supreme Court said in the Secession Reference, this section of the Charter, 
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along with the provisions of the Constitution specific to Canada’s aboriginal peoples,
141
 
demonstrate the continued endurance of this ideal in Canada’s legal history. In the next 
chapter, it will be shown that many of the underlying legal principles, rights and values 
which were discussed in this chapter hold commonalities with the values of public health 
and ethics, with the protection of vulnerable minorities being particularly helpful. It will 
also introduce the related claim that social justice, a core value of public health and 
central concern of relational feminist ethics, could be brought in to the law through this 
thesis’s suggested reform. 
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CHAPTER 3 PUBLIC HEALTH, LAW, AND ETHICS 




Our goal is to use legislation to reconcile the principles of public health, ethics, 
and the law with a view to improving the quality of decisions made during an infectious 
disease emergency. This improved legal preparedness should realize superior real world 
outcomes through better transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of measures, and 
more meaningful judicial review. We have already discussed the principles underlying 
Canada’s constitution, and asserted that they are compatible with the principles of public 
health and ethics. It is time to discuss what some of those principles are. 
First, it may be necessary to ask what exactly is meant by “public health,” and 
“public health law”. Scientific, political, and scholarly disciplines concerned with the 
prevention and management of infectious disease emergencies would intuitively fall 
within a lay understanding of “public health”, but this does not explain all that public 
health might mean. 
This chapter will cover what can be meant by public health and public health law. 
It further contains a brief foray into public health ethics, in that it describes two 
prominent examples of public health ethical systems. With a view to providing an 
example of how the law can (and should) do more to guide emergency decision making, 
this chapter will develop that argument by demonstrating how fundamental constitutional 
principles could be used to reconcile, at least in part, discrepancies between different 
ethical models, while at the same time ensuring that at least some of the underlying 
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values of a given system are paid attention as we reform the law. Specifically, the new 
legislation ought to oblige the emergency decision maker to pay explicit attention to any 
effects a decision may have on vulnerable minorities, and to weigh those consequences 
separately and distinctly from any other negative effects expected from the same 
decision. Such a provision would be a strong example of how law reform in this area is 
capable of bridging public health, ethics, and law. 
3.1.1 Public Health 
Public health is at the same time a goal, a science, and a scholarly discipline. A 
distinct practice from acute healthcare, public health has various definitions, varying 
from the quite broad to the nearly universal. Barbara von Tigerstrom has proffered: 
A much-quoted definition states that public health is “what we, as a 
society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be 
healthy.” It is “public” in the sense both of collective action (primarily, 
though not exclusively, government action) and of concern with the 
health of a population rather than specific individuals. Contemporary 
public health practice is characterized by an approach that is 




Lawrence Gostin, building upon the same ideas found above in von Tigerstrom’s 
definition, has proposed five “core values” of public health as a discipline, which are: 1) 
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Collective responsibility for health and well-being; 2) Population focus; 3) Community 
involvement and civic responsibility; 4) Prevention orientation; and 5) Social justice.
144
  
 It is from Gostin’s account of public health’s core values that we can immediately 
find some common ground with Canada’s constitutional rights and values. Though the 
values of collective responsibility and population focus do no fit as neatly with the values 
of “human dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of the person and the 
enhancement of democracy”,
145
 the core value of community involvement and civic 
responsibility seems synergistic with the underlying constitutional principle of 
democracy. Likewise, the core value of social justice could find some common ground 
with the underlying constitutional principle of the protection of (vulnerable) minorities. 
Though the definitions of what public health means, even taking into account 
Gostin’s proposed values, are numerous, Christopher Reynolds has expressed a fairly 
clear definition:  
The process that keeps individuals and their communities healthy… 
most obviously seen as the array of interventions directed to health 
promotion campaigns, the things done to prevent the spread of 
communicable disease, the food and sanitation requirements and the 
pollution controls written into our environmental laws. Less obviously 
it is also a series of initiatives in areas of product safety, the regulation 
of drugs and therapeutics and a range of initiatives that aim to further 
the World Health Organization definition of “health” as a “state of 
complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the 
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As Reynolds’ mention of “health promotion” and a “range of initiatives” 
foreshadows, some authors have even more radically broad interpretations of what 
“public health” might mean, and what matters of policy might legitimately be within its 
discipline. Susan Sherwin, for example,
147
 has proposed that public health might 
legitimately be concerned with far more than the fields cited by Reynolds. Championing 
the WHO Ottawa Charter of 1986 on health promotion, a sub-system of public health, she 
writes: 
Health promotion is the process of enabling people to increase control 
over, and to improve, their health. To reach a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being, an individual or group must be 
able to identify and to realize aspirations, to satisfy needs, and to 
change or cope with the environment. Health is, therefore, seen as a 
resource for everyday life, not the objective of living. Health is a 
positive concept emphasizing social and personal resources, as well as 
physical capacities. Therefore, health promotion is not just the 
responsibility of the health sector, but goes beyond healthy life-styles to 
well-being… 
 
The fundamental conditions and resources for health are: peace; shelter; 
education; food; income; a stable eco-system; sustainable resources; 
social justice; and equity. 
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Thus, depending on one’s definition, the scope of “public health” as a discipline can be as 
narrow as the provision of sanitation and disease control services, or as broad as 
facilitating and supervising multilateral-peace treaties or guaranteeing income.  
 It is important to flag the differing views on public health’s scope in order to fully 
articulate how the law can do more than it currently does for public health in an 
emergency. Infectious disease management as a subject matter, even in the non-
emergency context, fits squarely within the mandate of public health across all (or nearly 
all) political philosophies. This is important, since the tensions which reside within public 
health practice and literature is primarily political in nature, not scientific. That is to say, 
the question is not truly (or at least, not at its heart) about whether supplying clean 
syringes and safe injection sites to people with drug additions is a scientifically effective 
health policy – it is about whether we ought to provide these syringes; whether it is good 
or right to do so.
149
 It is probably safe to say that most, if not all, political philosophies 
would agree that combatting infectious disease emergencies fits within the paradigm of 
public health,
150
 and also that they ought to be combatted. But looking deeper, during that 
emergency, a decision to deploy or not to deploy a measure will legally turn on more than 
the scientific probability of effectiveness (though it will certainly turn on that as well). 
The emergency decision maker will be considering other factors, both legal and ethical – 
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factors which will be influenced at least in part by the official’s understanding of the 
proper scope of public health.  
Stepping back from the emergency itself, there is another reason we must 
understand the wide scope of activities to which public health may lay a claim. When 
reform is proposed, the way in which that reform is approached will surely be subtly 
influenced by the underlying views various players have about the legitimate scope of 
public health as a discipline and practice. Public health ethics is likely to be influenced in 
the same manner, which we will examine in section 3.2 below.  
3.1.2 Public Health Law  
 Within public health as a scholarly discipline, there exists the subdivision of 
public health law. Law is a powerful tool of public health, and is the medium through 
which many public health initiatives and actors find their powers, legitimacy, and 
restraints. Nola Ries has observed that “[l]aw and legal instruments at all levels – from 




But public health law is not only the corpus of laws that perform this role for 
public health. Law, without any modifier, is not solely a tool for organizing society and 
settling private and public disputes (though it surely is those things). Law is at the same 
time a scholarly discipline and pursuit. In this vein, Lawrence Gostin has given his 
definition of public health law: 
Public health law is the study of the legal powers and duties of the state, 
in collaboration with its partners (e.g., health care, business, the 
community, the media, and academe), to ensure the conditions for 
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people to be healthy (to identify, prevent, and ameliorate risks to health 
in the population), and of the limitations on the power of the state to 
constrain for the common good the autonomy, privacy, liberty, 
proprietary, and other legally protected interests of individuals. The 
prime objective of public health law is to pursue the highest possible 
level of physical and mental health in the population, consistent with 





Christopher Reynolds has offered a connected, but more practice-centered description: 
A general definition of public health law and its practice might be that 
it: 
 
-is the specific, often long-standing, statutory responses that assist and 
empower public health regulators in the range of areas that they work; 
 
- is the body of law and legal practice that affects public health practice 
and the public’s health more generally; 
 
- recognises that changing existing law and practices that damage the 
public’s health is as significant a task for those involved in public health 




Depending upon what one considers legitimately a public health issue, nearly any 
law could be characterized as a “public health law” (which then might become the 
concern of scholarly research in the field of public health law). However, as both Gostin 
and Reynolds have noted, there is little to be gained from public health law making 
imperial claims to laws from other areas; such an approach dilutes the discipline, departs 
from traditional and long-held areas of expertise, and risks political polarization.
154
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Law as a tool of public health can operate in several fashions. It can impose taxes 
on unhealthy activities (e.g. alcohol taxes) and use those funds to promote healthier ones. 
It can alter the informational environment relating to unhealthy products (e.g. tobacco 
advertising prohibitions and mandatory warnings), or restrict access to certain products or 
behaviours (e.g. underage alcohol consumption). Occupational health and safety and 
environmental regulations are further examples of how law can be used as a tool of 
public health. Law can also be used to address larger-scale risk factors for public health 
ills, such as zoning for public housing, improved access to and quality of public 
education, and even aggressive re-distribution of wealth. Again, taking the scope of 
public health to its zenith, it would be difficult to argue that any law does not somehow 
have a public health purpose in mind.  
 As we discuss the discipline of public health law, and its related real-world tools, 
specific or combinations of public health laws, it becomes clear that public health law is 
inherently interdisciplinary. Public health laws and policies concerning infectious 
diseases, as well as their associated scholarly literature, reveal the migration of concepts 
and language across disciplines. This is not surprising – lawyers, politicians, policy 
reformers and legal scholars cannot help but bring to the table their pre-conceived notions 
of legal and constitutional norms and rights any more than public health practitioners and 
scholars cannot help but bring to the table the ethics and norms that form the substance of 
their own disciplines. This adds some credibility to the claim that Canadian constitutional 
and administrative law can (and does) inform public health law and ethics, and more 




 Infectious disease control and the management of emergencies easily fall within 
the scope of public health and public health law. But even as this thesis criticizes the 
sufficiency of the current laws in Canada designed to effect that mandate, we must 
remain aware of the broader landscape within which infectious disease emergency law 
(and ethics) is but one of the challenges facing public health and public health law. 
Further, one does not have to be a public health legal scholar to have an opinion about the 
legitimate reach of public health laws into the lives of individuals or groups. Academics, 
professionals, and individual citizens can quite reasonably disagree on these issues. Since 
they will be exposed to the risks of the emergency just the same as the public health 
scholar or professional, they should rightly expect to have a say. 
 This discord can potentially be mitigated with reference to public health law’s 
own principles. Lawrence Gostin, as one example, has written: 
… [M]any forward thinkers urge greater community involvement in 
public health decision making so that policy formation becomes a 
genuine civic endeavor. Under this view, citizens strive to safeguard 
their communities through civic participation, open forums, and 
capacity building to solve local problems. Public involvement should 
result in stronger support for health policies and encourage citizens to 





Gostin further goes on to describe what this kind of involvement might look like: 
Public health authorities, for example, might practice more deliberative 
forms of democracy, involving closer consultation with consumers and 
the voluntary organizations that represent them (e.g. town meetings and 
consumer membership on government advisory committees). This kind 
of deliberative democracy in public health is increasingly evident in 
government-community partnerships at the [United States] federal, 
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It could be very difficult to carry out such consultation and community 
involvement in the specific context of an infectious disease emergency, but this does not 
mean that this principle cannot find its expression in some other way. This democratic 
expression could be at least partially conveyed in the passing of reformed emergency 
legislation, more informed, transparent and accountable decision making, and more 
meaningful judicial review.  
3.1.3 Public Health Legal Preparedness 
 This thesis argues for legislative reform in order to guide emergency 
administrative decision makers during an infectious disease emergency. Consequently, 
this thesis could equally be considered as calling for both administrative law and public 
health law reform. A large portion of this thesis is dedicated to analyzing the legal 
requirements for reform. But this does not mean that legal considerations alone drive the 
need for change, nor is the call made at the expense of public health principles, goals, or 
concerns. Public health professionals might quite rightly perceive such an approach as an 
example of the tail wagging the dog.  
 The scholarship concerning public health legal preparedness was canvassed in 
chapter one. Fitting in to that literature, the law reform proposed by this thesis is with a 
concerted view to improving public health outcomes. This is, according to some authors, 
the very purpose towards which public health legal research ought to be turned.
157
 While 
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this thesis is not rooted in empirical research or behavioural science, it is grounded in the 
significant coalescence of Canadian constitutional and public health legal principles. 
Which principles already inform and frame both legal disputes, as well as public health 
professional practice. 
3.1.4 “Soft-Law” 
The examples of law that common law lawyers and legal scholars tend to think of 
as “hard” law sources, that is to say statutes, executive orders, and judicial rulings, are 
not the only tools available to achieve outcomes in the course of public health practice. 
They are likewise not the only tools available to help achieve the real-world objective of 
ensuring decision makers make ethical, lawful, and accountable choices in times of 
emergency. Professional codes of conduct, best practices, internal policy documents, and 
other “soft law”
158
 instruments, have the potential to achieve some of our stated 
objectives, but with the advantage (in a manner of speaking) of avoiding the cumbersome 
legislative and/or regulatory process. The creation of something like an “ethical 
framework”,
159
 a rigorous document that detailed factors to be considered when making 
professional judgments, might achieve some of the desired outcomes. It might also be 
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created by the kind of public consultation and professional engagement and partnership 
that public health law encourages.  
Clearly useful, soft-law instruments unfortunately lack the same binding (and 
occasionally coercive) effect of law. They may not appear as transparent to the public, 
and until such time as they are examined and adopted in whole or in part by a court, they 
lack a legal (and certainly a constitutional) expression.
160
 They neither confer nor restrain 
legal authority, or vires, in the constitutional or administrative law sense, nor do they 
provide compulsory guidance on how existing authority ought to be exercised. A judicial 
review of a law, or of an administrative decision made pursuant to that authority, would 
be less likely to include deference to a soft-law document if free-standing legal rights 
were in the balance.  
For example, in the very recent case of Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration),
161
 Abella J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, reversed the 
decision of an immigration officer taken under section 25(1) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act.
162
 In that case, an immigration officer had relied on Ministerial 
Guidelines in order to determine whether a foreign national who did not qualify for 
admission to Canada ought to be permitted to remain on humanitarian or compassionate 
grounds. In deciding that the officer’s strict adherence to the guidelines was 
unreasonable, Abella J. wrote:  
There is no doubt, as this Court has recognized, that the Guidelines are 
useful in indicating what constitutes a reasonable interpretation of a 
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given provision of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: 
Agraira, at para 85. But as the Guidelines themselves acknowledge, 
they are “not legally binding” and are “not intended to be either 
exhaustive or restrictive”: Inland Processing, s. 5.   Officers can, in 
other words, consider the Guidelines in the exercise of their s. 25(1) 
discretion, but should turn “[their] mind[s] to the specific circumstances 
of the case”: Donald J. M. Brown and The Honourable John M. Evans, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (2014), at p. 12-45. 
They should not fetter their discretion by treating these informal 
Guidelines as if they were mandatory requirements that limit the 
equitable humanitarian and compassionate discretion granted by s. 
25(1): see Maple Lodge Farms Ltd. v. Canada, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 2, at p. 
5; Ha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 
49, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 195 (C.A.), at para 71. 
 
The words “unusual and undeserved or disproportionate hardship” 
should therefore be treated as descriptive, not as creating three new 
thresholds for relief separate and apart from the humanitarian purpose 
of s. 25(1).  As a result, what officers should not do, is look at s. 25(1) 
through the lens of the three adjectives as discrete and high thresholds, 
and use the language of “unusual and undeserved or disproportionate 
hardship” in a way that limits their ability to consider and give weight 
to all relevant humanitarian and compassionate considerations in a 
particular case. The three adjectives should be seen as instructive but 
not determinative, allowing s. 25(1) to respond more flexibly to the 




In conclusion, Abella J. summarized the failure of the immigration officer: 
Finding that no single factor amounted to hardship that was “unusual 
and undeserved or disproportionate”, the Officer ultimately concluded 
that humanitarian and compassionate relief was not warranted.  But 
these three adjectives are merely descriptive, not separate legal 
thresholds to be strictly construed. Finally, the Officer not only 
unreasonably discounted both the psychological report and the clear and 
uncontradicted evidence of a risk of discrimination, she avoided the 
requisite analysis of whether, in light of the humanitarian purpose of s. 
25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the evidence as a 
whole justified relief.  This approach unduly fettered her discretion and, 
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The decision in Kanthasamy illustrates the double-sided vulnerability of soft-law 
instruments. On the one hand, they may come to fetter the discretion of the decision 
maker in a manner not intended under the authorizing statute and not permitted at law. 
On the other hand, the decision maker may in good faith rely on them as they go about 
applying the law, only to find out after the fact that the result of such reliance was 
unreasonable. This can occur even if the soft-law instrument has previously been given 
favourable treatment by the courts, as was the case in Kanthasamy.
165
  
Still, soft-law guidance, incorporating both public health law and principles and 
Canadian constitutional principles (especially Charter values) for emergency decision 
makers would certainly be superior to the current state of affairs: no guidance of any 
substance at all. And as we said, the great promise of soft-law instruments is that they are 
particularly influential upon the decisions of professionals. Professional codes of conduct 
and ethics, with or without the force of law, are more than morally binding upon their 
subjects (though they could be that as well) – professionals are held accountable for any 
contravening actions. In addition, soft-law documents that are not professional codes are 
still likely to be consulted and followed if they represent the current professional or 
clinical standard in a given field.  
The literature already contains ethical frameworks designed to guide public health 
planners and emergency managers. These frameworks would be useful to our infectious 
disease emergency decision maker, but they are not specifically directed at him or her. A 
possible compromise, then, would be this: if we cannot get emergency legislation on the 
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agenda, then perhaps we can get the desired content of that legislation into soft-law 
instruments explicitly directed at, and made available to, emergency decision makers. If 
these instruments pay due attention to Canadian constitutional and administrative legal 
norms, they may come close to achieving the desired public health outcomes. The courts 
may also give them some attention. Lost, however, will be the binding force that comes 
with legislation; the greater certainty with which the decision maker can rely on it in 
exercising his or her discretion; the community consultation and democratic legitimacy; 
the improved efficacy of the decision maker’s legal advisors; and the potential 
opportunity for Canada’s constitutional discourse as described in chapter six. 
3.2 PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 
3.2.1  Ethics Informing Law 
Precisely because professional ethics are so likely to influence the behaviour of 
public health professionals, public health ethics figure prominently in this thesis’s 
proposed reform. The following section is meant to further explain the general 
preference
166
 for law reform over ethical guidance. It is also meant to show the promise 
the law has for bridging ethical systems and allowing for a richer development and 
interpretation of the law. 
Just as we saw that public health cuts a wide swath with regards to what may, or 
may not, be considered legitimately within its scope, public health ethics, and what those 
ethical theories or models might be, are equally diverse. A complete literature review of 
the current Canadian state of public health ethics is well beyond the scope of this 
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 For illustration, we will briefly examine two major examples of public health 
ethics, and use them to situate the proposed draft legislation. The chosen ethical models 
are descriptive ethics on the one hand, and relational feminist ethics on the other. 
Descriptive ethics was chosen both due to its prominence and close alignment 
with the main body of public health and public health law literature. It was also chosen 
because its findings, so obviously influenced by the same principles as Canadian 
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constitutional law, provide a convenient and clear example of how public health ethics 
could be seamlessly incorporated into law reform.  
Relational feminism was chosen for precisely the opposite reasons. First, it is a 
relatively novel approach, claiming a radical departure from the focus of other systems, 
and is beginning to attract attention in the literature. It is prescriptive, and its proposed 
values, providing an excellent contrast to the status quo exemplified by descriptive ethics, 
are not at first glance easy to reconcile with prevailing constitutional legal precedents. 
Despite this, it is still possible to give effect to certain aspects of the relational feminist 
ethical model in the proposed law reform. In particular, relational feminism approaches to 
public health ethics align particularly well with the core public health value of social 
justice, as well as the unwritten constitutional principle of the protection of minorities. 
 Thus, the two representative ethical models were chosen because, in spite of their 
considerable differences, they are both amenable to combining core principles of public 
health with unwritten constitutional principles and Charter values, and can therefore both 
inform and enrich a law reform effort concerning infectious disease emergency decision-
making.  
Further narrowing the scope, this discussion of public health ethics and law is not 
meant, in any large degree, to include discussions of public health professional ethics, 
based upon professional normative values. Rather it is focused on large-scale ethical 
decision-making. In other words, the discussion is not focused on the ethics of whether 
health care workers ought to refuse to go to work during an infectious disease emergency, 
or under what circumstances it would be ethically permissible for them to do so. Rather, 




decision maker in deciding whether or not to order (for example) that health care 
professional to work, and whether or not to physically enforce the order or to sanction 
non-compliance.  
3.2.2  Introducing Public Health Ethics 
The most powerful factor driving public health ethics is the population focus of 
public health. Given that the discipline is concerned not with the health of individuals or 
groups, but rather with improving the health outcomes of a given population as a whole, 
it is understandable that the discussion contained within public health ethics scholarly 
literature often concerns the tension between individual rights, choices, and 
responsibilities, and the health of the population as a whole. Infectious diseases, and the 
problems they cause, can lead to classic examples of this tension.
168
 
 Michael J. Selgelid has aptly highlighted the kinds of ethical questions that can 
arise in the context of infectious diseases. After pointing out that infectious diseases 
ought to be addressed in greater detail by bioethicists
169
 if only due to their drastic 
consequences, he writes: 
A second reason why infectious diseases warrant more of bioethicists’ 
attention is that they raise serious, difficult philosophical/ ethical 
questions of their own. Obvious examples arise from the fact that 
infectious diseases can be contagious. Depending on the disease in 
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question, infected individuals can threaten the health of other 
individuals or society as a whole. The public health measures required 
to protect other individuals and society from contagion (again, 
depending on the disease) might sometimes involve surveillance, 
mandatory testing, mandatory vaccination or treatment, notification of 
authorities or third parties, isolation (of individuals), quarantine (of 
entire regions), or travel restrictions. Because public health care 
measures could infringe upon widely accepted basic human rights and 




In other words, we are confronted with ethical dilemmas.  
3.2.3 First Example: Descriptive Ethics 
 In order to assist society in tackling these ethical dilemmas, some scholars have 
taken up the challenge in the form of descriptive ethics. They have used the concrete, real 
world examples of infectious disease emergencies (especially SARS) in order to identify 
the specific normative values at play (and in conflict) during specific situations, for 
example isolation, quarantine, and information sharing. This process is intricately 
intertwined with the identification and selection not only of what ethical values are or 
were at play during emergencies, but those the authors think ought to have been at play.  
 Peter A. Singer et al.’s article “Ethics and SARS: lessons from Toronto”
171
 is one 
example of this kind of scholarship. In explaining the nine authors’ mandate, they write: 
We formed a working group to identify the key ethical issues and 
values most important for an analysis of ethical dimensions of the 
SARS epidemic. The final list of issues and values was agreed by a 
consensus process and found to have face value and credibility. We 
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then developed a framework for looking at the ethical implications of 
the SARS outbreak, identifying 10 key ethical values relevant to SARS, 




The ten ethical values the authors identified were: 1) individual liberty; 2) protection of 
the public; 3) proportionality; 4) reciprocity (ethical duty of society to compensate those 
quarantined, isolated etc. for their economic losses); 5) transparency; 6) privacy; 7) 
protection of communities from undue stigmatization; 8) duty to provide care (left 
unresolved by the authors); 9) equity (in allocation of scarce health care resources); 10) 
solidarity (ethical duty to the greater global community). Most of this language should be 
familiar to lawyers and legal scholars, though the working group was purposefully 
interdisciplinary: “The authors [who] formed the working group [are] scholars in 
bioethics who come from various disciplines, including medicine, surgery, health law, 
social work, teaching, nursing, and epidemiology.”
173
 
 Descriptive ethics is useful, especially in bringing to bear the full value of the 
inherent interdisciplinary nature of public health, public health ethics, and public health 
law. For example, an infectious disease outbreak may be localized within a ghetto 
occupied almost exclusively by immigrants of a given ethnicity. Notifications need to be 
made in order to help prevent further spread. By pointing out that there actually is an 
ethical dimension to stigmatizing a given ethnicity (even if that was never the intent of 
the scientifically justified informative measure), descriptive ethics has the potential to 
influence behaviours and courses of action. A decision maker may alter their choice if 
alternatives are available which satisfy both the values of “protection of communities 
from undue stigmatization” and “protection of the public.” Alternatively, if there is no 
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way to satisfy both completely, avenues may be considered which will at least lessen the 
wrong done under a value that may not otherwise have been considered.  
 However, descriptive ethics has limited use beyond this identification function for 
a legal decision maker during an infectious disease emergency. While it highlights the 
need to consider certain normative values (whether they are characterized as “ethical”, 
“legal”, “constitutional” or “Charter” values), it does not tell that decision maker how to 
go about deciding or how to balance the values. In other words, it does not help the 
decision maker deal with a true dilemma. Decision-making in the face of such problems 
can only be accomplished by appealing to a normative baseline.  
 One place where it is temping to try to find these underlying normative values is 
the scholarship of public health ethics. Sometimes descriptive projects take on a very 
prescriptive dimension, selecting ethical values that ought to be at play based upon a pre-
determined set of norms. This is precisely what the expert panel did, above. These values, 
in their recommendation, ought then to form part of the balancing act. Though in the 
descriptive literature we are not necessarily told how to balance them, we are told we 
ought to consider them. In any case, any attempt at balancing in the absence of concrete 
facts and probabilities of outcomes would be a less than fruitful exercise. 
 Part of the challenge is that even within the descriptive exercise there can be 
normative discord. For example, in the Singer et al. piece, no consensus could be reached 
regarding the ethical duty of health care professionals to provide care. This is neither a 
surprise nor a criticism; it is a divisive issue. The failure to reach an agreement on this 




have little luck if they expect a definite answer on this difficult ethical question during an 
infectious disease emergency.  
 But this challenge alone does not mean that descriptive public health ethics cannot 
assist us with our goal of improving legal preparedness. Admittedly, the suggested law 
reform will not solve this problem, and will in fact suffer from precisely the same 
challenge. The decision maker will have guidance in the form of mandatory principles to 
consider, but legislation can never decide for him or her. Still, if public health ethics were 
to inform that law and if the law were to incorporate and pay attention to those values and 
purposes, then the decision maker would have something more than he or she had before 
– a democratic expression of what values and ethics the law demands he or she consider 
as a condition for the authority and jurisdiction, the vires, to act. Further, as we can see 
from the ethical values indicated above, despite public health’s population focus, public 
health ethics are not diametrically opposed to the Canadian constitution’s protection of 
individual rights. In fact, it seems to have been clearly informed by them. Ethics, 
informed by law, could re-inform the law (specifically, emergency legislation) to enhance 
our legal preparedness.  
3.2.4  Second Example: Relational Feminism 
 Another example of public health ethics scholarship, the relational feminist
174
 
approach, illustrates by contrast that public health ethics and the constitution are not 
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necessarily always so compatible. This is, in some scholars’ views, potentially a good 
thing. Francoise Baylis, Nuala P. Kenny and Susan Sherwin, three prominent relational 
feminist scholars, wrote in their extremely pertinent and helpful piece “A Relational 
Account of Public Health Ethics”
175
 about the need to re-conceptualize ethical 
discussions in the public health context. They call for an ethical discussion that is in 
direct opposition to the one put forward by Michael J. Selgelid above in the previous 
section (where he highlighted the tension between individual rights and the rights of the 
population during an infectious disease emergency). These relational feminist scholars 
deny that this should be the primary starting point: 
Much of the recent discussion of public health ethics among policy 
makers has occurred in the context of pandemic planning. This focus is 
not surprising given the urgent, uncertain, risky and fear-generating 
conditions of pandemic. What is surprising, however, is the primary 
focus in pandemic planning on the values and priorities of individuals. 
Many pandemic plans appear to privilege the values of liberty, dignity, 
and privacy and highlight the rights and interests of individuals with 
particular attention given to such issues as restrictions on individual 
liberty and freedom, potential social stigma and isolation and access to 
antivirals, vaccines and other potentially scarce resources. From the 
perspective of pandemic planning and public health, this is an odd and 
limited list of ethical concerns – a list that likely would not have been 
generated but for the fact that the analysis remains steeped in an 
individual rights discourse inherited from clinical ethics and research 
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Throughout the article, the authors are openly critical of approaches similar to the 
one taken above by Singer et al., especially the one taken by the University of Toronto 
Joint Centre for Bioethics.
177
 Baylis, Kenny, and Sherwin argue for a new focus: 
The nature and scope of public health require an approach to ethics that 
is itself ‘public’ rather than individualistic, i.e., one that understands the 
social nature of public health work. It must do more than simply 
identify the tensions between individual benefit and community benefit, 
individual freedom and public safety, resource allocation to known 
affected individuals and to the community as a whole. It must make 
clear the complex ways in which individuals are inseparable from 





This new approach flows from the authors’ wider school of thought, which is to 
say, relational feminist theory. This is a theory of the human condition which posits that 
we are not, in the way we experience and behave in the world, independent, rational, self-
interested deliberators. We are neither capable of independently knowing what we value, 
nor can we independently make choices based upon those values. Rather, humans are 
socially constructed entities, existing as systems of complex relationships. The authors 
sum up their theory of relational, feminist human existence in this way: 
Persons are constituted by their relationships, and the communities they 
inhabit are complex layers of different sorts of social connections. Their 
interests cannot be easily divided into discrete units that operate 
independently of the interests of others since the interactions among 
persons are constitutive of persons to the point that we cannot fully 





 The authors go on to advocate for a “relational” approach to public health ethics. 
Some of the real-world benefits of this approach, the authors argue, will be greater 
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consideration given to the impact pandemic plans will have on historically marginalized 
groups,
180
 alongside an increased focus upon communities rather than individuals. 
Relying on the relational feminist accounts of relational autonomy and relational 
solidarity, the authors suggest that: 
A commitment to social justice requires us to recognize the special 
disadvantages that face members of social groups who are subject to 
systematic discrimination and reduced power. As regards matters of 
public health, it is important to remember, as Powers and Faden (2006) 
stress, that health risks are generally higher for those with [the] lowest 
social status and power and these risks are compounded by the multiple 
dimensions of hardship that affects members of the most vulnerable 
groups. Hence, when we attend to relational solidarity, we need to be 
attentive to the increased and quite particular risks faced by members of 
some social groups as compared with others. While this sort of 
attentiveness should not deteriorate into an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality, 
it does require us to be more specific in our attitudes of solidarity and to 
eschew a vague concern for all of humanity and replace it with one that 
is cognizant of, and responsive to, the particular types of needs 






 Given the population focus contained within public health by definition, it is not 
surprising that relational feminist scholars would apply their relational theory to public 
health problems, including responses to public health emergencies. Their re-framing of 
public health ethics is compelling. Instead of trying to construct an ethics that can assist 
in coming to ethically permissible decisions or actions when the mission and vision of 
public health comes into conflict with the public’s own views about right, wrong, and 
what has value (i.e. liberty, dignity, privacy etc.), the authors posit that this “dominant 
moral and political culture” is misinformed about how humans really exist, and therefore 
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incorrect. Rather, public health ethics ought to be based upon a kind of “public” values, 
and the focus of decisions shifted accordingly.  
 Were an emergency decision maker to today use this theory as a foundation for 
legal decision-making, it might be legally risky. Whether or not it is true or correct in 
theory, it would at present appear to be opposed to the prevailing constitutional 
jurisprudence, seen in chapter two, which indicates that the protection of the individual 
against popular desire for “the greater good” is precisely what the constitution is for. The 
relational feminist account of public health ethics seems to call for a radical change in 
how individual rights are regarded, and indeed how each individual is regarded in se. 
 But this does not mean relational feminism is any less of a valuable tool to inform 
law reform. Robert Leckey aptly captured in his book Contextual Subjects: Family, State, 
and Relational Theory
182
 why this is so: there is nothing so radical about applying a 
relational, or as he would have it, “contextual”, approach to human problems within the 
legal sphere. While he finds great value in applying the approach to human problems in 
the legal arena, he does not view that approach alone to be determinative of the outcome. 
He separates relational approaches into two categories. The first, what Leckey calls the 
‘weak’ conception, employs the relational theory as a methodology alone. For Leckey, 
this generates no real results; similar to descriptive ethics, simply paying attention to 
relationships instead of individuals will not necessarily yield a particular, or desirable, 
policy:  
Given the feminist political orientation of relational theorists, I think 
there is an implication that merely undertaking a relational inquiry is 
likelier than not to lead to policy outcomes congenial to feminist 
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missions… When given this sense, relational theory implies, I think 
unhelpfully, that the basis for dispute between relational theorists and 
others will not be, as it sometimes is, normative disagreement over the 
definition of desirable relationships, but simply the difference between 





 This assessment calls unto question whether applying the relational approach 
championed by Baylis, Kenny, and Sherwin would truly bring the theory into conflict 
with the underlying Canadian constitutional values at all. Simply having emergency 
decision makers recognize that humans have and value relationships as they deploy 
exceptional measures would not seem controversial. Why not consider relationships? It is 
not as if this inquiry tells us at the outset which relationships the decision maker ought to 
safeguard, nor which he or she ought to hold in lesser esteem than another. 
‘Relationships’ could just as easily be incorporated into the proposed legislative guidance 
as any other ethical value. Were the decision maker to employ a relational approach as he 
or she went about deciding what extraordinary measures to deploy, their legal advisor 




 But reconciliation is not so easy as that. What is really going on in Baylis et al.’s 
article is not the mere suggestion of a methodology. They are plainly adopting what 
Leckey refers to as the ‘strong’ conception of the relational approach, which is, in his 
words, “frankly substantive and normative”. He goes on: 
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It is not indifferent to the kinds of relationships that should be regarded 
as desirable in a particular setting. The normative conception dives right 
into substantive debates. Nailing its colours to the mast, it adopts 




What exactly is meant by “relational autonomy” can, of course, vary from scholar to 
scholar.  
 Leckey goes on to give many examples of how relational theory alone cannot 
justify the conclusions made by relational feminist scholars without admitting to the 
underlying, normative values driving the analysis. This commitment to a normative 
center is not a bad thing. It allows scholars to promote a compelling agenda, through a 
potentially valuable methodology. This can lead Canadians towards genuine policy and 
law reform (such as the reform proposed in this thesis). It allows us, in Leckey’s words, 
to “[criticize] the judge who excuses the homicidal cuckold”.
186
 Like all ethical 
scholarship, it can express itself as powerful rhetoric as easily as compelling apologetics. 
In claiming the declared values of public health, arguably with the broadest view of 
public health, the relational feminist approach to public health ethics seeks, in a 
compelling way, to further the normative commitments shared between academic 
feminism and public health – which is to say, deep commitments to substantive equality 
and social justice. 
 And yet, “strong” relational feminism as applied to public health ethics is still 
largely in dissonance with Canadian constitutional jurisprudence concerning the 
protections of individual rights. The “values of liberty, dignity, and privacy” are still 
privileged, and “the rights and interests of individuals, with particular attention given to 
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such issues as restrictions on individual liberty and freedom, potential social stigma and 
isolation and access to antivirals, vaccines and other potentially scarce resources” are still 
‘highlighted,’ as a matter of ethics, as a matter of policy, and at law. To subordinate the 
interests of individuals, on ethical grounds, to some focus upon the “complex ways in 
which individuals are inseparable from communities and build on the fact that the 
interests of both are interrelated”, would not (yet) be legally advisable to the decision 
maker. As the law currently stands, the emergency decision maker does not have much of 
a choice. He or she can either make use of the status quo soft-law ethical framework(s) 
which their legal advisors find consistent with Canada’s constitutional jurisprudence, or 
they can take a leap of faith towards a re-imagined view of what it means to be human in 
order to achieve more progressive, equitable results.  
This is one important reason why this thesis argues for legislation. Through 
statute, the legislature can import core public health values, including those that coincide 
with a “strong” relational feminist conception of rights (e.g. social justice), into the law 
without waiting for a shift in Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. Given that the 
history of constitutional, and especially Charter, jurisprudence seems to presume 
individuals exist in the way that relational feminists challenge, it may be a long road to 
fully realizing their desired end state by attempting incremental change through 
litigation.
187
 But a partial realization could be achieved by incorporating relational 
feminist values and approaches into legislation that also instructed the decision maker to 
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consider underlying constitutional principles (like the protection of minorities) as well as 
Charter values. There is no reason to wait for the constitution to catch up. 
 In a way, this thesis is arguing for a kind of re-alignment in the law similar to the 
re-alignment of ethics proposed by Kenny, Baylis, and Sherwin. Without needing to 
weigh in on the metaphysical justification for relational feminism, it is easy to agree with 
the claim that it shares some of the same core values as public health – and in particular, 
the core value of social justice. When this core value of both relational feminism and 
public health is placed alongside the unwritten constitutional principle of the protection 
of minorities, it becomes clearer how public health, ethics, and the law might be bridged 
through progressive legislation, while at the same time rendering that legislation, and 
decisions taken on its authority, more robust in the case of a constitutional challenge.  
3.3 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
 This chapter began by claiming that fundamental constitutional principles could 
be used to reconcile, at least in part, the discrepancies between different ethical models, 
while at the same time ensuring that at least some of the underlying values of a given 
system are paid attention as we reform the law. The descriptive ethics of Singer et al.,
188
 
already informed by Canadian constitutional law and Charter values, could be easily 
integrated into legislative guidance. Relational feminist public health ethics could be 
partially integrated by explicitly declaring that attention be paid to protection of 
(vulnerable) minorities, taking advantage of the fact that Canada’s underlying 
constitutional principle of the protection of minorities corresponds to the similar 
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emphasis given to the protection of vulnerable minorities in those ethics. Going even 
farther, social justice concerns could be brought into the legislation, progressively 
reforming the law towards that core value of public health, one that it shares with 
relational feminism. In the context of an infectious disease emergency, there may be any 
number of vulnerable minorities depending upon how the outbreak develops:  the 
impoverished; visible minority populations; persons with disabilities; the elderly; the very 
young; refugees and certain immigrant populations, are a few easily imagined 
possibilities. The list is not closed. By taking hold of public health and feminism’s core 
value of social justice, and correlating it with the public health ethical-and-relational-
feminist value of the protection of vulnerable minorities, we can build a bridge to 
Canadian constitutional legal principles and import progressive reform into the law. 
To be clear, any ethical model could be brought to bear to enrich the proposed 
legislative (or, if legislation is not possible, soft-law) reform, so long as it paid homage to 
Canada’s fundamental constitutional values, including Charter values. Descriptive and 
relational feminist ethics were chosen for illustration due to their contrast, but this thesis 
asserts neither that they are the only models, nor that they are the best ones, to inform the 
proposed legislation. They are simply examples used to demonstrate how we can bridge 
public health, ethics, and law in order to try to achieve public health benefits (and 
potentially, other benefits). It is true that public health and Canadian constitutional law 
have some clear differences in focus. This is to be expected given that constitutional law 
must regulate decision-making in public health just as it must regulate decision-making in 
other realms of legislative and administrative action. At the same time, they have enough 




CHAPTER 4 HARD LAW 
It has been asserted since the beginning of this thesis that the powers granted to 
decision makers during an infectious disease emergency are truly extraordinary, but those 
powers have not yet actually been discussed in any detail. This chapter will examine the 
current state of Canada’s infectious disease emergency laws, with a view to creating a 
better understanding of both the complex legal landscape, and the gravity of the current 
authorizations. At the same time, it will demonstrate that the spirit behind the kind of 
guidance this thesis proposes may already find some expression in the current statutes, 
just not at the level required to truly leverage its effect. 
4.1 STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS 
 
 In the context of public health emergencies (and specifically infectious disease 
emergencies), there are two parallel bodies of law that are engaged at both the federal and 
provincial/ territorial level. On the one hand, there are general emergency preparedness 
and action statutes designed to deal with a multitude of disasters and threats to the 
public’s welfare. These laws cover a wide variety of topics, from natural disasters to 
epidemics to states of war or insurrection. They are general instruments that tend to 
provide for the swift deployment of aggressive measures without the need for extensive 
bureaucratic processes or before-the-fact procedural safeguards. These measures might 
include, for example: the closure of roads, businesses, or public places; the conscription 
of buildings, land, or supplies for the emergency efforts; or the evacuation of certain 
territory. The main federal law in this vein is the Emergencies Act.
189
 Provincial statutes 
go by various names, but are usually entitled the “Emergency Measures Act,” or words to 
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that effect. A table of each province’s current legislation is provided at the end of this 
chapter. 
 At the same time, there exist specific health, or public health, statutes. At the 
federal level, and in the infectious disease context, the non-emergency Quarantine Act
190
 
is this type of statute, which is aimed at preventing the spread of diseases from 
individuals entering (or leaving) Canada through airports, seaports, and other kinds of 
international border crossings.
191
 This act is a completely new, post-SARS version of its 
archaic predecessor, and was passed nearly contemporaneously with the federal Public 
Health Agency of Canada Act.
192
 The federal agency that Act created has a narrow 
(though important) mandate when compared to its provincial counterparts. It serves, 
amongst other public health roles, as an infectious disease surveillance agency, 
information collector, disseminator, and public relations conduit.  
 Even outside of the infectious disease context, the federal Parliament in Canada 
has legislated, under its federal constitutional mandate, in many other areas within the 
public health domain. The Food and Drugs Act
193
 and Tobacco Act
194
 are examples of 
federal statutes which fit within the narrow definition of public health. Broader 
definitions of public health might include, for example, the new Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act, 2012.
195
 Whether one subscribes to a broad or narrow view of the 
legitimate scope of public health and public health law, it is sufficient to say that in 
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Canada, the federal parliament, and by extension the executive, has a role to play in 
ensuring the public’s health, including by combating infectious diseases. However, as 
suggested in chapter two, the greater part of infectious disease management law comes 
from provincial legislatures.  
 Provincial public health legislation, as might be expected, is eclectic. There are 
however some general commonalities, and infectious diseases tend to be one of them; 
they are almost always dealt with in some fashion by these provincial laws. The general 
trend over the last decade has been for provinces to move away from specific infectious 
or venereal disease statutes towards ones incorporating infectious (or “communicable”) 
disease laws and regulations into more generalized regimes. These general public health 
statutes may or may not consider emergency situations.  
 Some provinces, such as Ontario
196
 and New Brunswick,
197
 have public health 
statutes with no, or very few, emergency (or “epidemic”) provisions. These provinces’ 
public health statutes, vis-à-vis infectious diseases, rest upon measures designed to 
contain infectious disease through the normal, non-emergency public health system. They 
leave the emergency measures strictly within the sphere of their general, emergency 
management statutes.  






 have special 
emergency regimes and powers within both statutes simultaneously. Though it is beyond 
the scope of this current thesis, it is worth noting that there exists great potential for at 
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best confusion and at worst, conflict, if states of emergency exist simultaneously under 
both statutes. In such a case, different decision makers would have different but 
overlapping mandates and authorities to deal with the same facts. This is especially so in 
the case of jurisdictions where the precedence between the statutory powers in unclear.
201
 
Coupled with the potential for an emergency to be declared under the federal 
Emergencies Act as well, there exists even greater potential for the best-intentioned 
cooperative plans to become confused or delayed.
202
 
One criticism that can be levied against this arrangement is that general 
emergency legislation, insofar as it can be used to deal with infectious disease 
emergencies, passes off as ‘general’ what is really a public health issue. Potentially, it is 
possible to conceptualize all emergencies, be they public disturbances, wars, natural 
disasters or infectious diseases, as public health emergencies. At a minimum, even within 
a single layer of constitutional authority, the existence of multiple statutes, ministries, and 
staffs each with its own legal mandate, authority, and process, has the potential to delay 
or derail any emergency response.  
Jacob Shelley has argued that, for the sake of academic and legal classification, 
infectious disease emergencies should conceptually be viewed as general public welfare 
emergencies, as opposed to uniquely and specifically public health emergencies governed 
by public health law.
203
 It is not necessary for this thesis to support or disagree with his 
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argument, but it is mentioned at this stage to further drive home the point that, under the 
current legal regimes, the possibility of a legal “turf war” during an emergency is a real 
one (even by accident). If the law does not clarify who is in charge (as opposed to who 
has the public health expertise), or worse yet, seems to give charge to more than one 
individual,
204
 the results could be at best delay and at worst non-response during an 
emergency. Law reform in this area could alleviate some of this tension if and when it 
reaches the stage of enactment if the Bill contained provisions designed to clarify 
authority. The Campbell Commission called for just such clarity.
205
 
Since SARS, many provinces have passed updated and modernized legislation 
promoting the public’s health, managing communicable diseases, and dealing with 
emergencies. To give some examples, British Columbia passed its new Public Health 
Act
206
 in 2008, proclaimed in force in March 2009.
207
  New Brunswick, passed a new 
Public Health Act
208
 before SARS in 1998, but did not proclaim it until November, 2009, 
after subsequent amendments and the preparation of regulations. Nova Scotia passed its 
Health Protection Act
209
 earlier (2004), and Manitoba enacted its modernized Public 
Health Act
210
 in 2006. Ontario made several amendments to its Health Protection and 
Promotion Act
211
 in the wake of SARS, and took steps to refurbish its general emergency 
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 Ontario’s statute, as we saw in chapter one, got the attention of the 
Campbell Commission for multiple reasons, not the least of which was its use of an 
aggressive basket clause. 
 For the territories, the Northwest Territories also passed a new public health 
statute, the Public Health Act,
213
 in 2007 and proclaimed it in 2009 (Nunavut has yet to 
follow suit, and retains the Public Health Act
214
 of 1988, with no amendments save 
changing the French name of their workers compensation legislation
215
). The Yukon 
made substantial amendments to its Public Health and Safety Act,
216
 also in 2009.  
These statutes, for the most part, are the essential
217
 legal tools for authorizing 
public health measures. Rules about sanitation, disease monitoring and reporting, clean 
water, and food preparation are usually found within these statutes. Infectious diseases 
are also generally dealt with, as well as emergency provisions for those jurisdictions that 
have chosen to incorporate them in to these types of statutes.  
The legal bastions of infectious disease control are these non-emergency public 
health statutes. Detection, reporting, tracing, monitoring, and isolation, coupled with 
treatment and/or immunization are the day-to-day measures that truly deal with infectious 
disease risks: robust, effective non-emergency systems, it is hoped, prevent states of 
emergency from ever arising. The legal tools available to decision makers and actors in 
the non-emergency system can in themselves be quite coercive, especially in the case of a 
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recalcitrant patient. There need not be an emergency situation for someone’s 
constitutional rights to liberty and bodily integrity to be at stake. Chapter two gave some 
examples of individuals who, with mixed results, challenged the legitimacy of infectious 
disease control measures in the circumstances.
218
 
But even though it is the non-emergency system that does the heavy lifting of 
infectious disease control, this does not diminish the appropriateness of improving 
emergency legal preparedness. 
4.2 STATUTORY CONTENT – THE SCALE OF POWERS 
 
 At both the federal and provincial levels, the scale of powers in an emergency can 




 For the federal government, under the general emergencies statute, the 
Emergencies Act,
220
 the specific legislative powers conferred in the event of an infectious 
disease emergency are actually quite conservative. Even in the preamble, the statute 
declares the government’s obligations towards Canadians: 
WHEREAS the safety and security of the individual, the 
protection of the values of the body politic and the 
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preservation of the sovereignty, security and territorial 
integrity of the state are fundamental obligations of 
government; 
 
AND WHEREAS the fulfilment of those obligations in 
Canada may be seriously threatened by a national 
emergency and, in order to ensure safety and security during 
such an emergency, the Governor in Council should be 
authorized, subject to the supervision of Parliament, to take 
special temporary measures that may not be appropriate in 
normal times; 
 
AND WHEREAS the Governor in Council, in taking such 
special temporary measures, would be subject to the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
Canadian Bill of Rights and must have regard to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
particularly with respect to those fundamental rights that are 







Though not having the force of law on its own, the mentioning of the Charter, the 
Bill of Rights, and the International Covenant in the preamble is helpful.
222
 This is so 
even considering that regardless of whether or not it is mentioned, no statute can 
contravene the Charter since it is a part of the Constitution.
223
 If the Emergencies Act 
were to be in violation, then the offending provisions would simply be of no force or 
effect under s.52 of Canada’s 1982 Constitution, regardless of the preamble.
224
 But 
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before the day in court, any decision maker relying upon the statute for his or her 
authority could take account of that preamble as they went about determining the scope 
of their statutory authority, as well as when and how to use it. The proposal in this thesis 
would take this general preamble statement to the next level, and provide specific, 
articulable principles that the decision maker must consider. Courts make substantial use 
of preambles when helpful for statutory or constitutional interpretation. While judicial 
review of administrative action will be discussed in more detail in chapter six, suffice it 
to say at this stage that if a decision maker were to ignore, or inappropriately weigh, this 
statement in the preamble, then it would be difficult to justify the decision as either 
correct, or even as reasonable, on review before the court. 
The limits placed upon emergency action under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which is also included in the preamble, are of interest, 
especially considering that a few of the rights enumerated in that covenant cannot be 
limited even during an emergency (Article 4 explicitly allows for the limiting of most 
rights during times of national emergencies, though it does oblige states to report on and 
justify those infringements). The rights that are inviolable under the Covenant even in 
times of national emergency are: the right to life (that is, the right not to be deprived of 
life, not to be kept alive);
225
 the right against subjection to cruel or unusual punishment or 
medical experimentation without consent;
226
 the prohibition on slavery and servitude (but 
not compulsory labour in time of emergency);
227
 imprisonment for breach of contract 
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 the right not to be found guilty of an offense which did not exist at 
the time of the act;
229
 the right not to be deprived of legal personality;
230
 and the right to 
freedom of conscience, belief, and religion (but with limits, if prescribed by law, on the 
“manifestation” of  religious beliefs to “protect public safety, order, health, or morals or 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of others”).
231
 Notably absent from the Covenant’s 
list of inalienable rights are two that could be most notably engaged during an infectious 
disease emergency, namely liberty and security of the person (i.e. autonomy regarding 
bodily integrity).  
 Concerning diseases, the federal Emergencies Act neither authorizes the kinds of 
measures that might be considered excluded by the Covenant, nor those that the Covenant 
tolerates in times of emergency. The actual powers conferred during a “public welfare” 
emergency are quite limited when compared to some provincial statutes.  
The preamble of the Emergencies Act indicates that Parliament has turned its 
mind to providing some form of guidance to emergency decision makers. They also, 
potentially, express a kind of Parliamentary constitutional interpretation – indicating that 
certain values must be given weight. Some provincial statutes have similar provisions. 
Such provisions and preambles are the seedlings of the kind of principled, legislative 
guidance that ought to be available to decision makers in emergency situations. 
 The federal statute, as a general emergency statute, distinguishes between kinds of 
emergencies and the powers they may require. Under the law, a “public welfare 
emergency” is: 
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an emergency that is caused by a real or imminent 
 
(a) fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake or other natural phenomenon, 
 
(b) disease in human beings, animals or plants, or 
 
(c) accident or pollution 
 
and that results or may result in a danger to life or property, social 
disruption or a breakdown in the flow of essential goods, services or 




The co-required state of “national emergency” means: 
is an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that 
 
(a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of 
such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a 
province to deal with it, or 
 
(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to 
preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada 
 





If both the conditions of national emergency and public welfare emergency are 
established, and such an emergency is declared by the Governor-in-Council under s.6, 
then specific regulatory powers become available to the Governor-in-Council. They read: 
8. (1) While a declaration of a public welfare emergency is in effect, the 
Governor in Council may make such orders or regulations with respect 
to the following matters as the Governor in Council believes, on 
reasonable grounds, are necessary for dealing with the emergency: 
 
(a) the regulation or prohibition of travel to, from or within any 
specified area, where necessary for the protection of the health or 
safety of individuals; 
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(b) the evacuation of persons and the removal of personal property 
from any specified area and the making of arrangements for the 
adequate care and protection of the persons and property; 
 
(c) the requisition, use or disposition of property; 
 
(d) the authorization of or direction to any person, or any person of a 
class of persons, to render essential services of a type that that 
person, or a person of that class, is competent to provide and the 
provision of reasonable compensation in respect of services so 
rendered; 
 
(e) the regulation of the distribution and availability of essential 
goods, services and resources; 
 
(f) the authorization and making of emergency payments; 
 
(g) the establishment of emergency shelters and hospitals; 
 
(h) the assessment of damage to any works or undertakings and the 
repair, replacement or restoration thereof; 
 
(i) the assessment of damage to the environment and the elimination 
or alleviation of the damage; and 
 
(j) the imposition 
 
(i) on summary conviction, of a fine not exceeding five hundred 
dollars or imprisonment not exceeding six months or both that 
fine and imprisonment, or 
 
(ii) on indictment, of a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars or 
imprisonment not exceeding five years or both that fine and 
imprisonment, 
 





Canada’s constitutional federalism manifests itself in the subsections immediately 
following, which dictate that the emergency powers may be exercised only within the 
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specific area to which the emergency is confined,
235
 and further oblige the Governor-in-
Council to avoid making rules that might interfere with provincial capacities or 
measures.
236
 Still further, if the public welfare emergency situation is confined to one 
province, the state of emergency can only be declared and the special powers exercised 
with the de facto consent of the executive branch of government of that province: 
14. (1) Subject to subsection (2), before the Governor in Council issues, 
continues or amends a declaration of a public welfare emergency, the 
lieutenant governor in council of each province in which the direct 
effects of the emergency occur shall be consulted with respect to the 
proposed action. 
 
(2) The Governor in Council may not issue a declaration of a public 
welfare emergency where the direct effects of the emergency are 
confined to, or occur principally in, one province unless the lieutenant 
governor in council of the province has indicated to the Governor in 
Council that the emergency exceeds the capacity or authority of the 




Viewed in light of these provisions, it is probable that if an infectious disease 
outbreak were confined to one province, then the federal government, in an emergency 
measures capacity, would be in a supporting role (as opposed to directly managing the 
situation pursuant to federal law). 
 It should be highlighted that the federal Parliament has only granted the executive 
specific powers (above) during a public welfare emergency. This can be contrasted with 
the powers granted in the event of a War Emergency, an event just as serious: 
40. (1) While a declaration of a war emergency is in effect, the 
Governor in Council may make such orders or regulations as the 
Governor in Council believes, on reasonable grounds, are necessary or 
advisable for dealing with the emergency. 
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The only measure explicitly exempted from this broad authority is the ability to institute 
military conscription by regulation.
238
 This broad authority to deal with a War 
Emergency is a “basket clause”. Unlike the specific, enumerated powers detailed for 
public welfare (which include infectious disease) emergencies, basket clauses grant broad 
powers, with few limits (e.g. articulated conditions, such as that orders must be made “on 
reasonable grounds”; the constitution; or the rules of statutory interpretation). We saw 
above in chapter one that the Campbell Commission expressed trepidation over Ontario’s 
post-SARs emergencies Bill, which included a basket clause.
239
 
The federal Emergencies Act does not employ basket clauses for any other kind of 
emergency besides a War Emergency. The Campbell Commission was concerned with 
Ontario, but in fact nearly every provincial legislature, in contrast to the federal 
Parliament, has employed basket clause language in either their general emergency 
legislation or their public health laws, or both. Alberta, for example, contains such basket 
clauses in its public health statute, characteristically contained within other enumerated 
powers:  
29(1) A medical officer of health who knows of or has reason to suspect 
the existence of a communicable disease or a public health emergency 
within the boundaries of the health region in which the medical officer 
of health has jurisdiction may initiate an investigation to determine 
whether any action is necessary to protect the public health. 
 
(2)  Where the investigation confirms the presence of a communicable 
disease, the medical officer of health 
 
(a)    shall carry out the measures that the medical officer of health is 
required by this Act and the regulations to carry out, and 
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(b)    may do any or all of the following: 
 
(i)    take whatever steps the medical officer of health considers  
necessary 
 
(A)    to suppress the disease in those who may already 
have been infected with it, 
 
(B)    to protect those who have not already been exposed 
to the disease, 
 
(C)    to break the chain of transmission and prevent 
spread of the disease, and 
 
(D)    to remove the source of infection; 
 
(ii)    by order 
 
(A)    prohibit a person from attending a school, 
 
(B)    prohibit a person from engaging in the person’s 
occupation, or 
 
(C)    prohibit a person from having contact with other 
persons or any class of persons 
 
for any period and subject to any conditions that the medical officer of 
health considers appropriate, where the medical officer of health 





(2.1)  Where the investigation confirms the existence of a public health 




(b)    may take whatever other steps are, in the medical officer of 
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Similarly, in Nova Scotia: 
 
Where the Minister has declared a public health emergency, the Chief 
Medical Officer may implement special measures to mitigate or remedy 




any other measure the Chief Medical Officer reasonably believes is 







And in Quebec: 
 
123. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary, while the public 
health emergency is in effect, the Government or the Minister, if he or 
she has been so empowered, may, without delay and without further 
formality, to protect the health of the population, 
 
(1)  order compulsory vaccination of the entire population or any part of 
it against smallpox or any other contagious disease seriously 
threatening the health of the population and, if necessary, prepare a list 
of persons or groups who require priority vaccination; 
 
(2)  order the closing of educational institutions or of any other place of 
assembly; 
 
(3)  order any person, government department or body to communicate 
or give to the Government or the Minister immediate access to any 
document or information held, even personal or confidential 
information or a confidential document; 
 
(4)  prohibit entry into all or part of the area concerned or allow access 
to an area only to certain persons and subject to certain conditions, or 
order, for the time necessary where there is no other means of 
protection, the evacuation of persons from all or any part of the area or 
their confinement and, if the persons affected have no other resources, 
provide for their lodging, feeding, clothing and security needs; 
 
(5)  order the construction of any work, the installation of sanitary 
facilities or the provision of health and social services; 
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(6)  require the assistance of any government department or body 
capable of assisting the personnel deployed; 
 
(7)  incur such expenses and enter into such contracts as are considered 
necessary; 
 
(8)  order any other measure necessary to protect the health of the 
population. 
 
The Government, the Minister or another person may not be prosecuted 
by reason of an act performed in good faith in or in relation to the 






It is evident that the scale of powers available to statutory decision maker under these 
statutes can be quite extraordinary, depending upon the circumstances. 
The kind of legislative guidance proposed in this thesis would be an evolution of 
current statute law, not a radical novelty. Analogous to what was seen in the preamble to 
the Emergencies Act, many provinces have gone further and actually included guidance-
related provisions into their emergency statutes. For example, Ontario’s Emergency 
Management and Civil Protection Act declares in section 7.0.2: 
The purpose of making orders under this section is to promote the 
public good by protecting the health, safety and welfare of the people of 
Ontario in times of declared emergencies in a manner that is subject to 




Taking a different approach, section 2 of Nova Scotia’s Health Protection Act reads: 
Restrictions on private rights and freedoms arising as a result of the 
exercise of any power under this Act shall be no greater than are 
reasonably required, considering all of the circumstances, to respond to 
a health hazard, notifiable disease or condition, communicable disease 
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This is very similar to the approach taken my Manitoba, which states in its own public 
health statute (passed two years after Nova Scotia’s): 
If the exercise of a power under this Act restricts rights or freedoms, the 
restriction must be no greater than is reasonably necessary, in the 
circumstances, to respond to a health hazard, a communicable disease, a 




British Columbia, in its Public Health Act, limits the use of emergency powers by stating: 
Conditions to be met before this Part applies 
52  (1) A person must not exercise powers under this Part in respect of a 
localized event unless the person reasonably believes that 
 
(a) the action is immediately necessary to protect public health from 
significant harm, and 
 
(b) compliance with this Act, other than this Part, or a regulation made 
under this Act would hinder that person from acting in a manner that 





 Like the preamble to the Emergencies Act, these provisions could imply some 
intention of the legislature to balance, or restrain, the power. They could be interpreted as 
the legislature taking account of Canada’s underlying constitutional principles. They 
oblige the decision maker to consider “all of the circumstances”. Ontario’s statute makes 
an explicit reference to the Charter, communicating to the decision maker that the 
legislature does not consider emergencies so special as to place them outside of the 
constitutional order. These provisions may modestly enhance legal preparedness by 
increasing, in a humble measure, transparency and accountability.  They at least make it 
clear the decision maker has to turn his or her mind to the general question of consistency 
of a proposed action with constitutionally protected rights. 
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 It is questionable however whether the above provisions are specific enough to 
give full effect to this thesis’s goal of improved legal preparedness As they are very 
general, it is difficult to imagine them providing much ammunition to the decision 
maker’s legal advisors. It is likewise difficult to imagine them either as reassuring or 
restraining the decision maker appreciably. But the greatest shortcoming with these 
general provisions is that they suffer from the inverse inadequacy that was levied earlier 
against reliance upon professional codes of ethics alone. Though some of these 
provisions are obviously informed by public health values (e.g. “protect public health 
from significant harm”; “promote the public good by protecting the health, safety and 
welfare of the people of Ontario in times of declared emergencies”), they represent an 
impoverished incorporation. A more thorough articulation of the principles to be 
considered by the decision maker would lead to better legal decisions and to tighter 
accountability. And further, if those principles were informed and enriched by public 
health values and ethics, we could bridge them with Canadian constitutional, (including 
Charter) values and produce better decisions for both public health and law. In other 
words, our legal preparedness to defeat the emergency would be enhanced. 
4.3 COMPLIANCE 
 
Even after a decision is made, an order is only a piece of paper. It is not just 
statutory powers that make law in such scenarios relevant – it is the real-world ability to 
see them carried out. Under normal circumstances, government decisions made within 
lawful authority are expected to be obeyed, with the threat of administrative, quasi-




and the Rule of Law rely on the fact that the majority of people will obey, if not out of 
respect for the law then out of anxiety in the face of possible sanction.  
However, during an infectious disease emergency, the motivation to obey the law 
may be diminished or entirely absent. For example, some health care or other emergency 
workers may quite rationally opt to accept the risk of some form of legal sanction (e.g. 
professional discipline) in the future if it means not having to work in an infectious 
environment today. 
Is the decision maker then to order police officers to round up health care workers 
and escort them to work? In the context of an infectious disease emergency, would police 
officers be able to enforce such an order with reasonable means and minimal force? 
Would they even be willing to do so? Under s. 273.6 of the National Defence Act,
247
 
provinces can request the support of the armed forces. More powerfully, under part VI of 
that Act, titled Aid of the Civil Power, in the event of a riot or disturbance of the peace, 
provinces can actually requisition the armed forces. Would our decision maker avail him 
or herself of these provisions in order to see his or her directions obeyed?
248
 
Probably not. It is widely agreed that physically coercive measures are not the 
most effective tools for achieving public health outcomes. The situation would have to 
rise to a science-fiction state of severity in order for the decision maker to contemplate 
calling out the armed forces to effect his or her orders. As we saw in chapter three, public 
cooperation is best achieved through community consultation and buy-in, rather than 
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physical coercion. As we saw above, the Campbell Commission made precisely this 
point: 
Laws are only the last resort. Legal procedures are useless without 
overwhelming public cooperation of the kind demonstrated in SARS.  
While it is important to strengthen the legal machinery available to 
public health officials, it is even more important to strengthen the things 




In other words, cooperation would not be encouraged by calling out soldiers, but rather 
by making transparent, reasonable decisions according to law, based upon a demonstrable 
and articulated public health need or risk. The proposed legislation is designed to achieve 
that. If a member of the public, or a specific community, is still dissatisfied, then they 
always have the option of launching a challenge in a court of law.
250
 If the legislature has 
enacted its guidance, and the decision maker has had occasion to follow it, such a 
challenge could incidentally turn out to be very productive for Canada’s constitutional 
discourse.  
4.4 TABLE OF LEGISLATION 
 
* An “implicit” basket clause is one where the legislation employs an open list of powers, 
rather than having an explicit provision authorizing the decision maker to take ‘all other 
necessary measures’, or words to that effect. 
 
Jurisdiction Statute Emergency Decision 
Maker 
Powers 
Federal Emergencies Act, RSC 1985, c 22 (4th Supp) 
E-4.5, s.8(1) 
Governor-in-Council Enumerated 
Alberta Public Health Act RSA 2000, c P-37, s. 29. Local Medical Officer 
of Health, Minister of 
Health and Wellness, 
or Regional Health 
Authority. 
Enumerated 
Emergency Management Act RSA 2000, c E-
6.8, s. 19(1);  
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Designation and Transfer of Responsibility 




Public Health Act SBC 2008, c 28, ss. 54-57. A health officer, a 
medical health 
officer, the provincial 
health officer, and the 
Minister of Health. 
Enumerated 
Emergency Program Act, RSBC 1996, c 111, 
s.10. 
 
BC Reg 477/94 [up to B.C. Reg. 200/98], s. 6, 
Schedule 1.  
 
Minister of Public 
Safety/ Minister of 
Health 
 
British Columbia is 
an interesting case. 
Under the 
Interpretation Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 238, 
the minister 
responsible for the 
Act is the “minister” 
mentioned in the Act 
(and so, would be the 
emergency decision 
maker). This is 
currently the Minister 
of Public Safety. 
However, under the 
Emergency Program 
Management 
Regulation, s. 6, the 
minister responsible 
for “coordinating the 
government’s 
response to the 
occurrence” of an 
infectious disease 
emergency is the 
Minister of Health. 
Implicit 
Basket 
Manitoba Public Health Act, 2006, SM 2006, c 14, 
[CCSM c P-210], s. 67(1), (2), (3) 
Chief public health 
officer (for certain 
powers, under the 
supervision of the 
Minister of Health) 
Enumerated 
Emergency Measures Act, CCSM c E-80, s. 
12; s.1 “minister”;  
 
Manitoba OIC 349/2009, 3 November 2009 
(The Executive Government Organization Act, 









Public Health Act, SNB 1998, c P-22.4, s. 1, 
s. 26(1), s.26.1(1). 
 
(Ambiguous emergencies) 
Minister of Health 
(Limited powers - 






designation of new 
disease only) 
Emergency Measures Act, SNB 2011, c 147, 
s.12. 







Communicable Diseases Act, RSNL 1990 c 
C-26, s.2;  
 
Department of Health and Community 
Services Notice, 2003, OC 2003-370;  
 
Department of Government Services and 
Lands Notice, 2003, OC 2003-369 (Executive 
Council Act, RSNL 1990, c E-16.1). 
 
Minister of Health 
and Community 





(some powers need 
approval of Lt. 
Governor-in-Council) 
Enumerated 
Emergency Services Act, SNL 2008 c E-9.1. 
 
Department of Municipal and Provincial 
Affairs Notice, 2003, OC 2003-377 (Executive 
Council Act).  
Minister of Municipal 





Public Health Act, SNWT 2007, c 17, s.33. 
 
Chief Public Health 
Officer (once a state 
of emergency is 
declared by Minister 




Civil Emergency Measures Act, RSNWT 
1988, c C-9, s.12. 





Nova Scotia Health Protection Act, SNS 2004, c 4, s. 
53(2). 




Emergency Management Act, SNS 1990, c 8, 
s.2(g), s.14. 
 






Minister of Justice). 
Explicit 
Basket 
Nunavut Public Health Act, RSNWT 1988, c P-12. 
 
Government of Nunavut, online: 
<http://www.gov.nu.ca/en/Departments.aspx>
. 
Minister of Health 
and Social Services 
Silent 
Emergency Measures Act, S Nu 2007, c 10. 
 








Ontario Health Protection and Promotion Act, RSO 
1990, c H-7, s.1, s.77.5, s.18(3). 
 
(Very limited emergency provisions) 
Minister of Health 




Chief Medical Officer 
of Health (directives 





and medical officers 
only) 
Emergency Management and Civil Protection 







Public Health Act, RSPEI 1988 c P-30. Chief Health Officer 
(requires approval of 
Minister of Health 
and Wellness for 
some measures) 
Enumerated 
Emergency Measures Act, SPEI 1990, c 11, 
s.1. 
 








Quebec  Public Health Act, RSQ, c S-2.2, s. 2; s.123. Government or 
Minister of Health 
and Social Services 
Explicit 
Basket 




Saskatchewan Public Health Act, 1994, SS 1994, c P-37.1, 
s.2 
 
Government of Saskatchewan, online: 
<http://www.health.gov.sk.ca/ 
legislation>. 
Minister of Health Enumerated 
Emergency Planning Act, SS 1989-1990, c E-
8.1, s.2, 18(1). 
 




Safety, and Policing 
Explicit 
Basket 






Civil Emergency Measures Act, RSY 2002, c 
34. 
 











CHAPTER 5 PROPOSED REFORM 
5.1 SAMPLE DRAFT LEGISLATIVE TEXT 
 
 Below is an attempt to incorporate the values of public health, ethics, and 
Canadian constitutional law into draft legislative provisions. The draft section and 
subsection numbers are arbitrary. The empowering article (s. 99) was not created from 
scratch, but was built upon the frame of the emergency provisions in Nova Scotia’s 
Health Protection Act.
251
 If the kind of law reform this thesis calls for were to be enacted 
in Nova Scotia and applied to that Act, below is an example of what that reform might 
look like.  
The sample provisions are not held out as ideal or perfect. Rather, they are 
submitted principally with the modest view of exhibiting how the drafting of such reform 
is in fact possible. 
The draft provisions should also not be taken as an assertion of what this author 
believes the reform ought to look like, nor what particular principles ought to be given 
greater status or more consideration than others. In keeping with the principle theme of 
this thesis, the underlying constitutional principle of democracy and the public health 
value of community consultation are central to the proposed law reform’s credibility and 
ultimately its effectiveness; it is the legislature, using all of its tools, which needs to 
decide what status, if any, to give to each principle. The draft principles are only meant to 
reveal how the theoretical arguments in the preceding chapters might cash out in a 
statute. They are however drafted in a manner that is intended to be constitutionally 
compliant (admittedly, perhaps conservatively so).  
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The reader may notice that the emergency decision maker in the sample text is the 
Chief Medical Officer [of the jurisdiction]. This is simply because the Chief Medical 
Officer [of Health] is the decision maker in the Nova Scotia legislation. The decision 
maker could just as easily be some other official, a cabinet minister, or the Lieutenant 
Governor-in-Council. As was seen above in chapter four, Canada’s many jurisdictions 
have between them chosen a wide variety of decision makers in their emergency 
legislation. The question of who the decision maker ought to be – whether for legitimacy 
reasons, expertise, or some other reason, is a relevant line of inquiry, but it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
DRAFT TEXT 
 
99. Where the Minister has declared a public health emergency, the Chief Medical 
Officer may implement special measures to mitigate or remedy the emergency including 
any measure the Chief Medical Officer reasonably believes is necessary for the protection 
of public health during the public health emergency. 
 
Guidance for Exercising Powers 
 
100. (1) Restrictions on individual rights and freedoms arising as a result of the exercise 
of any power under this Part shall be no greater than are reasonably required, considering 
all of the circumstances, to respond to a public health emergency. 
 
(2) In deciding whether to exercise the powers conferred by section 99 and this section, 
the Chief Medical Officer shall take into account all of the factors that the Chief Medical 
Officer determines to be relevant, including, but not limited to, the following guidance: 
 
(a) the Chief Medical Officer, on behalf of and with the government of Nova 
Scotia, has a mandate to safeguard the health, security, and well being of the 
population, and for this common good has a duty to respond rapidly and 
effectively to the public health emergency; 
 
(b) actions that will or that will have the potential to interfere with the rights and 
freedoms of individuals must be justified in relation to the best available 
assessment of the public health risk; 
 
(c) wherever practicable, voluntary cooperation of individuals shall be sought 





(d) interference with, seizure, confiscation, or use of private property under the 
authority of the Chief Medical Officer must be in furtherance of a demonstrable 
public health benefit that can be derived from such action, which justifies such 
interference, seizure, confiscation, or use when balanced against the best available 
assessment of the public health risk; 
 
(e) the liberty of individuals should only be limited when there is a demonstrable 
benefit that can be derived from such action, which justifies any such limitation 
when balanced against the best available assessment of the public health risk; 
 
(f) the coercive interference with the bodily integrity of individuals should only be 
taken as a last resort, and must in all circumstances be justified when balanced 
against the best available assessment of the public health risk; and 
 
(g) all reasonable efforts shall be taken to avoid or minimize any disproportionate 
burdens or restrictions of rights that may be experienced by any individual or 
group, with particular attention to the circumstances of vulnerable or historically 




101. (1) Upon deciding to exercise the special powers conferred by sections 99 and 100, 
the Chief Medical Officer shall, within seven days, cause the decision to be 
communicated or published by such means as the Chief Medical Officer considers the 
most likely to make the contents of the decision known to the people of the area affected.  
 
(2) Any publication under subsection (1) shall contain the reasons for the decision, 
including the consideration of the applicable guidance in s. 100(2) and any other factors.  
 
(3) Unless, in the opinion of the Chief Medical Officer, it is necessary to include the 
personal information of individuals in a publication under subsection (1), such personal 
information shall not be included.  
 
No Appeal From Decisions 
 
102. (1) Decisions made during a public health emergency by Chief Medical Officer 
pursuant to sections 99 and 100 are final. 
 
5.2 IMPROVED LEGAL PREPAREDNESS 
 
The above proposal fits into the body of scholarly literature that emerged mostly 










 are any 
indication, they are not going anywhere. This thesis proposes that we build a bridge 
between public health, ethics, and the law through new legislation in order to be better 
prepared for infectious disease emergencies. In an emergency the stakes will be high, 
with a correspondingly high potential for disputes between individuals or vulnerable 
groups and the state. While the potential for disputes cannot be eliminated, the law should 
be able to help us reduce their occurrence and mitigate their effects. The law should also 
be able to help us make better decisions. This chapter discusses the implications of this 
thesis’s research by reaffirming exactly how the proposed law reform will better legally 
prepare us for the next infectious disease emergency.  
5.3 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 Nearly every single ethical structure cited in chapter three claimed transparency 
as a central value.
255
 Administrative law scholarly literature generally considers increased 
transparency in government decision-making desirable, even if difficult to achieve.
256
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Public health scholarship generally considers increased transparency a tool for increasing 
the effectiveness of any infectious disease outbreak response.
257
 Both SARS commissions 
called for increased transparency.
258
 Indeed, as one audience member commented when 
the preliminary research for this thesis was presented at the University of Toronto in 
2011, “it is difficult to argue against more transparency.”  
 Transparency is a value that already finds some expression in the statutes. 
Consider Nunavut’s Emergency Measures Act, which provides:  
Immediately after declaring a state of emergency, the Minister shall 
cause the details of the declaration to be published in the manner that 
the Minister considers is most likely to make the contents of the 





Other provinces and territories have similar provisions in their general emergency 
statutes.
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these similar provisions requiring publication, but that applies specifically to the special 
measures taken (as opposed to the declaration only, which the legislation should also 
require) and adds the requirement for reasons. The reasons must include the consideration 
of the guidance in ss. 100 (2), as well as any other factors (since our decision maker must 
turn her mind to “all of the circumstances” if a special measure is to restrict any 
individual right or freedom: s. 100(1)). 
Transparency of decisions is a deep-seated value in Canadian law, and often results 
in a demand for cogent reasons to be given for a decision.
261
 The Supreme Court of 
Canada commented in the Provincial Judges Reference:  
The importance of reasons as the basis for the legitimate exercise of 
public power has been recognized by a number of commentators. For 
example, in “Developments in Administrative Law: The 1992-93 
Term” (1994), 5 S.C.L.R. (2d) 189, at p. 243, David Dyzenhaus has 
written that 
 
what justifies all public power is the ability of its incumbents to offer 
adequate reasons for their decisions which affect those subject to 
them. The difference between mere legal subjects and citizens is the 
democratic right of the latter to require an accounting for acts of 
public power. 
 
Frederick Schauer has made a similar point (“Giving Reasons” (1995), 
47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, at p. 658): 
 
. . . when decision makers . . . expect respect for decisions because 
the decisions are right rather than because they emanate from an 
authoritative source, then giving reasons . . . is still a way of showing 




                                                                                                                                                 
emergency has ended, direct that a review be conducted and, within one year, report to 
the House of Assembly on the cause and duration of the emergency and on the measures 
implemented in response to the emergency.” 
261
 See for example the decisions in: Northwestern Utilities Ltd and al v Edmonton, 
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The Court in the Provincial Judges Reference then immediately clarified that in the 
passage above it was not “endorsing or establishing a general duty to give reasons, 
neither in the constitutional nor in the administrative law context.”
263
 But in the case of 
Baker v Canada, the Supreme Court wrote that “in certain circumstances, the duty of 
procedural fairness will require the provision of a written explanation for a decision.”
264
 
In Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, the Court went as far as to say that “[i]n judicial review, 
reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and 
intelligibility within the decision-making process.”
265
 The Court refined the law 
surrounding reasons in Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and 
Labrador (Treasury Board),
266
 ruling that the adequacy of reasons was not a stand-alone 
ground for appellate intervention, nor were reasons necessarily always required by every 
kind of case. 
Concerning an infectious disease emergency, it is debatable whether reasons 
would be required of the decision maker at common law. Emergencies can justify 
relaxed, perhaps even suspended, procedural fairness requirements.
267
 In any case, the 
Supreme Court has been willing to be flexible concerning what will qualify as reasons in 
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the administrative law context;
268
 even if there were a duty for reasons at common law 
(and there probably is not), the minimum requirements should be easy to satisfy. The 
Supreme Court of Canada has also indicated an openness to the idea that the procedural 
fairness requirements under the Charter, and in particular the principles of fundamental 
justice under s. 7, might be justifiably infringed in emergency situations.
269
 This will be 
discussed again briefly in chapter six.  
But though neither the common law nor the Charter would likely require reasons, 
the legislature need not tolerate a lack of transparency from its chosen decision maker. 
Through statute,
270
 the legislature should demand reasons in order to enhance 
transparency and improve the quality of judicial review. For this reason, the draft 
legislation includes a specific legal duty to publish reasons.  
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 Giving reasons, according to some authors, may actually increase the “risk” of 
judicial intervention.
271
 It is not necessary to enter the debate on the rightness or 
wrongness of various strengths of judicial review. In Canada, judicial review will be 
irresistible – and through the above-proposed law-reform the courts will be better 
equipped to provide the applicants and decision makers with meaningful judicial review. 
If the legislature communicates to the courts the factors the official must consider, and 
the decision maker provides his or her reasons according to those principles based upon 
the facts known at the time, that judicial review will become more meaningful. Judges 
would be better situated to analyse both the basket clause itself and the decision made 
under it against underlying ethical principles and constitutional and Charter values, 
interpret them,
272
 and then apply the rules established in Dunsmuir and Doré to review 
the actual decision. 
This enhanced, more meaningful judicial review could provide a powerful method 
of accountability. As we will see in chapter six, the powers of Canada’s superior courts 
are extensive, and especially so whenever a Charter right is in the balance. If decision 
makers rely on a statutory framework that has incorporated the relevant (applicable) 
ethical principles and Canada’s constitutional rights and values, and which also requires 
reasons explaining how those principles, rights and values were balanced with public 
health protecting objectives, judicial review could be more focused. It would remain a 
necessary check on the administrative state and maintain the rule of law. It is of course 
possible, perhaps even probable, that when conducting the legal balancing our decision 
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maker, being human, will get a decision wrong. Holding him or her to account through 
the courts is not a bad thing. Having the discussion already framed by the legislature, not 
as a challenge, but as assistance to the courts, can only serve to give confidence to our 
decision maker (and his or her legal advisors). 
Lastly, the courts are not the only avenues available to hold our decision makers 
accountable, nor are they necessarily the best or most effective one. Transparent 
decisions, with reasons, publicly justified (for example through publication), will yield 
significant practical benefits. It will not take long for the press and the public to make it 
known if the reasons for a decision are found wanting. This may or may not become a 
source of concern for our decision maker (likely it will depend upon the reasons for the 
dissatisfaction), but whether concerned or not they will certainly be accountable. 
Compared with whatever benefits that could be gained from an ex post inquiry and 
report, contemporaneous publication and explanation would have the potential not only to 
expose abuses or shortcomings, but also to highlight justifications, excellence, and 
identify areas for improvement and future prevention. Like transparency, public 
accountability could also improve the effectiveness of measures through increased 
cooperation and compliance – knowing that the decision maker will be held to account, 
and in fact seeing him or her so held, could encourage public trust, and so public health 
effectiveness.  
5.4 EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS  
 
As was noted by the Campbell Commission in its Second Interim Report: 
Emergency powers are inherently dangerous. They carry the 





The first danger is overreaction. Every emergency power, 
once conferred, “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for 
the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible 
claim of an urgent need.” To a hammer, everything looks 
like a nail. To some emergency managers, every problem 
may look like an opportunity to invoke emergency powers. 
 
The second danger is underreaction. In the face of a deadly 
new disease with an uncertain incubation period, ambiguous 
symptoms, no diagnostic tests, uncertainty as to its 
infectiveness and mechanisms of transmission, and no idea 
where in the province it may be simmering, decisive action 





Providing a legal, constitutionally considered framework within which to conduct 
an analysis should waylay legal hesitation or doubt on the part of the decision makers. 
This could help guard against the twin dangers of overreaction and underreaction. 
Obliging the decision maker to consider Charter values alongside other legislative 
guidance should guard against the spectre of over-reaction (with the improved safeguard 
of a more focused judicial review). At the same time, having a statute that lays out 
specific principles the legislature wants the decision maker to consider, and knowing 
those things were in fact considered in good faith, should provide the decision maker 
with confidence when faced with controversial but critical choices. It should therefore 
mitigate the risk of under reaction.  
There would be another benefit. By including provisions obliging the decision 
maker to consider the effects of her decision on vulnerable individuals or groups, and to 
take account of the proportionality of any such effects, a core value of public health - 
social justice (shared with the public ethics proposed by relational feminism) - would be 
brought into the decision making process. At the same time, this principle should be 
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defensible before the courts as it is grounded in the constitutional principle of the 
protection of minorities. By bringing this value into the process through statute, it will do 
more than bring an ethical dilemma to the attention of the decision maker where one may 
not have been thought to exist before. It will create a legal dilemma where one did not 
exist before. As was seen above in chapter three, public health, even in the narrow sense, 
is concerned with more than keeping the maximum number of human bodies alive. 
Obliging the decision maker to take account of social justice concerns during her 
decision-making process would reflect this.  
Increased attention to the risks faced by vulnerable minorities, and more generally 
taking account of social justice concerns, are not merely symbolic gestures. Having these 
principles etched in statute should lead to better emergency decisions based upon public 
health’s own core values. And if the law, passed through the democratically elected 
legislature, can be used to re-orient the administrative decision making-process away 
from the binary tension between the individual and the greater good and towards a 
broader discourse taking account of public health, ethics, and constitutional values, the 
novel aspects of that broader discussion would be at least more transparent and 
potentially more legitimate in the eyes of the real people living through the emergency.    
Admittedly, stronger legislative guidance on how to go about deciding may not 
automatically lead to the swift implementation of public health professional 
recommendations, but it would at least add clarity to the emergency decision-making 
process. If the legislation was seen to take note of Charter rights, and to incorporate 




and ethical principles, the legal advisors to the decision maker would be better positioned 
to provide them with swift, useful support.
274
  
 After a legal decision has been made to deploy a measure (especially a potentially 
coercive one), the cooperation of the public is critical for its success. Notwithstanding the 
dramatic suggestions of some Hollywood films, it is quite simply not feasible to coerce 
large portions of the population. The Campbell Report acknowledged this: 
Voluntary compliance is the bedrock of any emergency response. Even 
the most exquisite emergency powers will never work unless the public 
cooperates.    
 
Legal powers are false hopes during a public crisis. No law will work 
during a disaster without the public cooperation and individual sacrifice 
shown during SARS. Nor will any law work without the machinery that 
supports and compensates those who sacrifice for the greater good of 
public health.   
 
Voluntary compliance also depends on public trust in those managing 
the emergency and public confidence that medical decisions are made 





In sum, coercion (and the laws that enable it) is a last resort.
276
 Public trust is 
fundamental. 
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The above-proposed reform is meant to maintain the public trust. If a drastic, 
coercive measure is actually required, it will be taken by a decision maker whose 
authority depends on the consideration and weighing of values that give legitimacy to 
decision-making. That decision maker will be required to publicly give reasons for that 
decision in light of those values. Such a law will not by itself create public trust, but it 
will be a considerable step in the right direction. 
5.5  MORE MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW, RESPECT FOR RIGHTS, 
AND ENRICHED CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
 
We will discuss below Canada’s constitutional requirement for recourse to 
judicial review in order to ensure that the choices of decision makers are made in 
compliance with the constitution. But a few words are necessary here to completely flesh 
out the argument for the proposed reform. This is because, in the context of an infectious 
disease emergency, the right to request review is too little, too late.  
Individuals or groups seeking interlocutory injunctions or mandatory orders 
during the emergency itself are going to be controversial figures. During a true 
emergency, the stakes, and emotions, are going to be high, and it will be provocative if a 
party asks a judge to grant an interlocutory order while the press is reporting newly 
confirmed cases of infection or death. In most instances, it will be extraordinarily 
difficult for any judge to deliver a decision which does justice to the needs of the 
applicants and the public in such an expedited manner. 
                                                                                                                                                 
because not only liberty is at stake in deciding to quarantine, but the effectiveness of 
public health itself. To be effective in preventing disease spread from either a new 
epidemic or a bioterrorist attack, public health officials must also prevent the spread of 
fear and panic – and, as important, must not panic themselves. Maintenance of public 





But once the emergency is over, if it is judged that the decision maker’s choices 
unjustifiably violated constitutional or other legal rights of individuals or vulnerable 
minority groups, it will be too late. This is not to say that after the fact review will not 
have value. Quite the opposite is true. After the fact decisions could provide the very kind 
of guidance for the future that this thesis proposes.  In fact, judicial guidance could end 
up being more detailed and therefore more useful guidance than could be provided by 
general provisions in a statute. Depending upon the content of the decision, it could be 
more powerful guidance, and might conveniently come from the same courts that would 
be reviewing future decisions. In any case, there will always be the potential for some 
circumstance that could not have been anticipated by the legislature such that judicial 
review will need to be the vehicle for interpretation and refinement.  
Nevertheless, such precedent could only come after the real people, who were 
affected on the ground, needed it. No ex post remedy, not even those available under the 
Charter, is like to make right the wrong done to those applicants who may have been, 
(now)-unlawfully and against their will quarantined, isolated, inoculated, or treated. The 
fact that the courts could be helpful in establishing guidance for the emergency decision 
maker is no reason for the legislature not to do so. Insofar as potential circumstances can 
be foreseen, the legislature can speak now, in proactive anticipation of a public health 
emergency and the decisions which may have to be taken to manage it. It can bridge 
public health, ethics, and the law to give real content to, and display respect for, the rights 
of individuals and vulnerable minorities before the emergency happens. This approach is 
the only one that makes sense if we are to honestly take account of what, in an 




 But more than this, our context provides a target of opportunity. By speaking first 
on a matter of fundamental individual rights, concerning conditions where the public 
good must take a prominent place, the legislature will be assisting the courts in their role 
as arbiters of the rule of law. It is an opportunity for the beginning of, as Gregoire 
Webber imagines,
277
 a true dialogue as dialectic, delivering to Canada and Canadians a 
renewed and enriched constitutional discourse.  
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CHAPTER 6 MORE MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW AND 
ENRICHED CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
So far, we have dug into Canada’s underlying constitutional principles, canvassed 
the core values of public health, public health law, and public health ethics, and surveyed 
the content of Canadian legislation concerning infectious disease emergencies, 
particularly the prominence of basket clauses. To contribute to the literature of 
emergency legal preparedness, this thesis proposed draft legislative provisions providing 
more extensive guidance for decision makers on the values they should weigh and 
balance in exercising the authority that basket clauses give to them. This proposal 
connected the values of public health and ethics with Canadian constitutional principles, 
including Charter values, with a view to creating the benefits of increased transparency, 
accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness. This thesis also argues that one of the 
benefits of this legislative reform would be more meaningful judicial review, should any 
application be made in response to a decision made under the reformed legislation. 
This penultimate chapter begins with a brief note concerning procedural fairness 
before recounting the approach the courts will likely take when reviewing emergency 
decisions taken under the kind of statutory authority canvassed in chapter four. It will 
then estimate how the reform proposed in this thesis might fit into that framework. It goes 
on to consider what the suggested approach of legislating-in-advance might mean in the 
greater context of Canadian administrative law, judicial review of both executive
278
 and 
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legislative action, and Canada’s larger constitutional discourse by referencing the 
‘dialogue’ metaphor
279
 of Canadian constitutional scholarship. 
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It is precisely because of the extraordinary potential for the state to overstep 
individual constitutional rights during an infectious disease emergency that all three 
branches of government must be engaged in order to achieve the full effect of this 
thesis’s proposed reform: the legislature, to improve the written law; the executive, who 
will better defeat the emergency through the emergency decision maker so empowered by 
that law; and the judiciary, which will have a crucial part to play regarding the 
maintenance of the rule of law as the powers are exercised. 
Judges seized of cases of judicial review brought before them during, or after, an 
infectious disease emergency will have the final word on whether the challenged 
decisions are defensible in light of the relevant and applicable values and principles.
280
 
The Campbell Commission believed that the legislation itself (as opposed to the decisions 
alone) would inevitably be challenged.
281
 But notwithstanding who will speak last, it is 
the legislature that actually ought to speak first in ‘balancing’ the constitutional rights and 
values at stake during the emergency with the exigencies of managing the emergency 
effectively in the interests of population health. The unique context provided by an 
infectious disease emergency is one where the legislature is actually much better 
equipped to speak first regarding what the administrative decision maker must consider 
when faced with challenging questions about “what weight(s) do the rights, values and 
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public health objectives have?” The legislature is likewise properly equipped to 
incorporate not only Canadian constitutional and administrative legal principles, but also 
the principles of public health, public health law, and ethics – which principles, as we 
saw in chapter three, are not necessarily at odds with Canadian constitutional, and in 
particular Charter, values. The benefits resulting from such an approach would include 
improved transparency, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, and were canvassed 
in chapter five. 
6.2 A BRIEF NOTE ON PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 
 
 Though this thesis is concerned predominantly with substantive review, a few 
brief comments on procedural fairness are warranted. As was mentioned briefly in 
chapter five, during an emergency, common law procedural fairness requirements are 
likely to be extremely relaxed and perhaps even suspended (if the situation so 
warrants).
282
 But even if this is the case at common law, the fact that Charter rights (and 
especially section 7 rights) could be breached by emergency decisions may breed 
uncertainty. Although this thesis has for the most part focussed on the potential for 
individuals or groups to allege overreaction, the suspension or relaxing of procedural 
rights could conceivably be relevant to those worried about underreaction as well,
283
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creating a very large pool of potentially aggrieved section 7 ‘fundamental justice’ 
claimants. 
A complete analysis of this potential issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
the Supreme Court of Canada has established a few clues as to how it might be resolved. 
It has written, though in obiter, that if administrative efficiencies or expediencies that 
violate the principles of fundamental justice (which for this purpose, could be natural 
justice) were to be upheld under constitutional scrutiny, they would likely have to be in 
response to serious emergencies. In Ref. Re: BC Motor Vehicle Act, Lamer J. (as he then 
was), referring to absolute liability offenses for which imprisonment was a penalty, 
wrote:  
Section 1 may, for reasons of administrative expediency, 
successfully come to the rescue of an otherwise violation of 
s. 7, but only in cases arising out of exceptional conditions, 







Later on, however, in New Brunswick v G (J), a child protection case concerning the 
rights of a parent, he in contrast elaborated:  
… First, the rights protected by s. 7 -- life, liberty, and 
security of the person -- are very significant and cannot 
ordinarily be overridden by competing social interests. 
Second, rarely will a violation of the principles of 
fundamental justice, specifically the right to a fair hearing, 
                                                                                                                                                 
nor restricted the movement of potential vectors, then that community may feel affected 
by such underreaction and assert a right to be heard on the matter (legal or otherwise). 
284
 [1985] 2 SCR 486, at 518, [1985] SCJ No 73 (QL). These comments may reflect the 
sentiment that emergency laws and measures, even those which engage s.7 of the 
Charter, do not automatically require recourse to a s.33 “notwithstanding clause” 
override. As was seen in chapter two, infectious disease response has long been 
considered a legitimate exercise of government power - In other words, justifiable in a 




be upheld as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a 




 These comments from the Supreme Court of Canada may indicate a willingness 
on the part of the courts to be flexible when considering what markers of procedural 
fairness and natural justice will be required during emergencies, including 
“epidemics”.
286
 Flexibility, however, does not equate to suspension. As the remarks of 
Lamer J. disclose, the standard of justification will be high. 
6.3 JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
In 2008, The Supreme Court of Canada had the opportunity to revisit and 
rearticulate the underlying rationale for judicial review of administrative action
287
 in the 
significant case Dunsmuir v New Brunswick.
288
 On the function of judicial review, 
Justices Bastarache and Lebel wrote for the majority: 
As a matter of constitutional law, judicial review is 
intimately connected with the preservation of the rule of 
law. It is essentially that constitutional foundation which 
explains the purpose of judicial review and guides its 
function and operation. Judicial review seeks to address an 
underlying tension between the rule of law and the 
foundational democratic principle, which finds an 
expression in the initiatives of Parliament and legislatures to 
create various administrative bodies and endow them with 
broad powers. Courts, while exercising their constitutional 
functions of judicial review, must be sensitive not only to 
the need to uphold the rule of law, but also to the necessity 
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of avoiding undue interference with the discharge of 
administrative functions in respect of the matters delegated 
to administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures. 
 
By virtue of the rule of law principle, all exercises of public 
authority must find their source in law. All decision-making 
powers have legal limits, derived from the enabling statute 
itself, the common or civil law or the Constitution. Judicial 
review is the means by which the courts supervise those 
who exercise statutory powers, to ensure that they do not 
overstep their legal authority. The function of judicial 
review is therefore to ensure the legality, the reasonableness 






 When the Charter is engaged,
290
 the approach the courts will take towards 
challenges
291
 to administrative actions can become more complex than in administrative 
law cases with no Charter element. In the 2006 case of Multani,
292
 the majority of the 
Supreme Court of Canada decided that the administrative law standard of review was not 
applicable when a Charter right was infringed by a government decision. Charron J. 
wrote for the majority: 
With respect for the opinion of Deschamps and Abella JJ., I am 
of the view that [the administrative law] approach could well 
reduce the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Canadian Charter to mere administrative law principles or, at 
the very least, cause confusion between the two. It is not 
surprising that the values underlying the rights and freedoms 
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guaranteed by the Canadian Charter form part — and 
sometimes even an integral part — of the laws to which we are 
subject.  However, the fact that an issue relating to constitutional 
rights is raised in an administrative context does not mean that 
the constitutional law standards must be dissolved into the 
administrative law standards. The rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter establish a minimum 
constitutional protection that must be taken into account by the 
legislature and by every person or body subject to the Canadian 
Charter.  The role of constitutional law is therefore to define the 
scope of the protection of these rights and freedoms.  An 
infringement of a protected right will be found to be 
constitutional only if it meets the requirements of s. 1 of the 
Canadian Charter.  Moreover, as Dickson C.J. noted in Slaight 
Communications Inc. v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038, the more 
sophisticated and structured analysis of s. 1 is the proper 
framework within which to review the values protected by the 
Canadian Charter (see also Ross v New Brunswick School 
District No. 15, [1996] 1 SCR 825, at para 32).  Since, as I will 
explain below, it is the compliance of the commissioners’ 
decision with the requirements of the Canadian Charter that is 
central to this appeal, it is my opinion that the Court of Appeal’s 
analysis of the standard of review was inadequate and that it 
leads to an erroneous conclusion. 
 
As this Court recognized in Ross, judicial review may involve a 
constitutional law component and an administrative law 
component (para 22).  In that case, for example, the appeal 
raised two broad issues. From the point of view of 
administrative law, the Court first had to determine whether, 
based on the appropriate administrative law standard of review, 
namely reasonableness, the human rights board of inquiry had 
erred in making a finding of discrimination under s. 5(1) of the 
Human Rights Act, RSNB 1973, c H‑11, and whether that Act 
gave it jurisdiction to make the order in issue. (It should be 
noted here that the Court did not confuse the protection against 
discrimination provided for in s. 5(1) of the Act with the right 
guaranteed in s. 15 of the Canadian Charter.)  However, the 
conclusion that there was discrimination and that the Act 
granted the board of inquiry a very broad power to make orders 
did not end the analysis.  Since the respondent had also argued 
that the decision infringed his freedom of expression and 
religion under the Canadian Charter, the Court also had to 
determine whether the board of inquiry’s order that the school 
board remove the respondent from his teaching position was 




recognized, “an administrative tribunal acting pursuant to its 
delegated powers exceeds its jurisdiction if it makes an order 
that infringes the Charter” (para 31; see also Slaight 
Communications).  The Court therefore conducted an analysis 
under ss. 2(a) and (b) and 1 of the Canadian Charter to decide 
the constitutional issue. The administrative law standard of 






 But in the 2012 case of Doré v Barreau du Quebec,
294
 the Supreme Court, with 
unanimous reasons authored by Abella J., overruled Multani, deciding instead that the 
administrative law approach was applicable to the constitutional component of judicial 
review: 
It seems to me to be possible to reconcile the two regimes in a 
way that protects the integrity of each.  The way to do that is to 
recognize that an adjudicated administrative decision is not like 
a law which can, theoretically, be objectively justified by the 
state, making the traditional s. 1 analysis an awkward fit. On 
whom does the onus lie, for example, to formulate and assert the 
pressing and substantial objective of an adjudicated decision, let 
alone justify it as rationally connected to, minimally impairing 
of, and proportional to that objective?  On the other hand, the 
protection of Charter guarantees is a fundamental and pervasive 
obligation, no matter which adjudicative forum is applying it.  
How then do we ensure this rigorous Charter protection while at 
the same time recognizing that the assessment must necessarily 
be adjusted to fit the contours of what is being assessed and by 
whom? 
 
We do it by recognizing that while a formulaic application of the 
Oakes test may not be workable in the context of an adjudicated 
decision, distilling its essence works the same justificatory 
muscles: balance and proportionality. I see nothing in the 
administrative law approach which is inherently inconsistent 
with the strong Charter protection — meaning its guarantees 
and values — we expect from an Oakes analysis.  The notion of 
deference in administrative law should no more be a barrier to 
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effective Charter protection than the margin of appreciation is 
when we apply a full s. 1 analysis. 
 
In assessing whether a law violates the Charter, we are 
balancing the government’s pressing and substantial objectives 
against the extent to which they interfere with the Charter right 
at issue. If the law interferes with the right no more than is 
reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives, it will be found 
to be proportionate, and, therefore, a reasonable limit under s. 1.  
In assessing whether an adjudicated decision violates the 
Charter, however, we are engaged in balancing somewhat 
different but related considerations, namely, has the decision-
maker disproportionately, and therefore unreasonably, limited a 
Charter right.  In both cases, we are looking for whether there is 
an appropriate balance between rights and objectives, and the 
purpose of both exercises is to ensure that the rights at issue are 
not unreasonably limited. 
 
As this Court has noted, most recently in Catalyst Paper Corp v 
North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 SCR 5, the 
nature of the reasonableness analysis is always contingent on its 
context.  In the Charter context, the reasonableness analysis is 
one that centres on proportionality, that is, on ensuring that the 
decision interferes with the relevant Charter guarantee no more 
than is necessary given the statutory objectives.  If the decision 
is disproportionately impairing of the guarantee, it is 
unreasonable.  If, on the other hand, it reflects a proper balance 






 The decision in Doré was not without commentary.
296
 In the 2015 case Loyola 
High School v Quebec (Attorney General),
297
 Abella J. for the majority applied the ratio 
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from Doré, but in a separate concurring opinion, McLachlin C.J and Moldaver J (with 
Rothstein J concurring) seemed to apply the approach from Multani as if Doré had not 
overruled it.
298
 This calls for a degree of caution in predicting what judicial review of 
administrative action would look like under the proposed legislative reform. 
 But assuming that the approach endorsed by the entire Supreme Court in Doré 
and the majority in Loyola endures until the next infectious disease emergency, then the 
proposed law reform will be fitting, both for effective decision-making and for judicial 
review.
299
 Emergency measures are going to impact protected Charter rights.
300
 
Under the rule in Doré, the emergency decision maker must ensure that her decisions 
interfere with relevant Charter guarantees no more than necessary in order to achieve her 
statutory objective.
301
 The sample draft legislative provisions in chapter five contained a 
provision to that effect – an explicit and specific reminder of constitutional concerns, 
similar to the general ones seen in contemporary emergency statutes throughout Canada 
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Hoi L Kong, “Doré, Proportionality and the Virtues of Judicial Craft” (2013) 63:2 Sup Ct 
L Rev  501. 
297
 2015 SCC 12, [2015] 1 SCR 613 [Loyola]. 
298
 Loyola, ibid, at paras 145-151. 
299
 Compare: Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61, where 
the majority of the Supreme Court was less than deferential to an administrative decision 
maker’s use of a soft-law instrument.  
300
 Note that while this thesis is concerned primarily with judicial review for correctness 
or reasonableness, in the event of a Charter breach, the remedies available to a superior 
court under the constitution are extensive, and are expanding. See: Doucet-Boudreau v 
Nova Scotia (Minister or Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 SCR 3; R v Nasogaluak, 
2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 SCR 206; Vancouver (City) v Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2 SCR 
28; R v 974649 Ontario Inc, 2001 SCC 81, [2001] 3 SCR 575; R v Babos, 2014 SCC 16, 
[2014] 1 SCR 309. But see the back-and-forth that played out in: Canada (Justice) v 
Khadr, 2008 SCC 28, [2008] 2 SCR 125; Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 
3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44;  Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), 2010 FC 715, [2010] 4 FCR 
36; Canada v Khadr, 2011 FCA 92. 
301




in chapter four. But the new legislation would do more than merely restate the idea of 
minimal impairment. Minimal impairment must be thought of in relation to the statutory 
objective. The draft legislation gives context to that objective, and provides the principles 
that must be considered when deciding whether or not a decision is proportional to the 
expected public health gain. No legislation could ever guarantee that the courts will agree 
with the decision maker’s proportionality assessment, but the law reform proposed in this 
thesis would at least let the decision maker know what they are supposed to be weighing. 
It would be ignominious for the decision maker to have a decision declared unreasonable 
after failing to consider principles and factors they did not, at the time of the decision, 
know they were supposed to be considering.
302
 
Consider the case of Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration).
303
 In that case, the Minister possessed significant discretion to decide 
whether to permit a non-national to remain in Canada on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds. In addition to finding that the process afforded Ms. Baker had 
been unfair owing to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the assessing 
immigration officer, the Supreme Court of Canada found the Minister’s decision to deny 
Ms. Baker’s claim was in any case unreasonable. The Court quashed the refusal, and 
remitted it back for reconsideration. 
In finding the Minister’s (really, his delegate’s) decision unreasonable, the Court 
did recognize the discretionary nature of the decision. Notwithstanding that neither the 
regulations, nor their authorizing statute, delineated mandatory factors for the Minister to 
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consider, L’Heureux-Dubé J., writing for the majority, determined that the Minister was 
obliged to consider the best interests of Ms. Baker’s children in accordance with: the 
Court’s interpretation of one of the objectives of the statute
304
; the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child;
305
 and the values and principles expressed in the Minister’s own 
Ministerial Guidelines. She further stated that the Minister was required to give 
substantial weight to that factor.
306
 
Reflecting on the rulings in both Doré and Baker, it is possible to forecast to a 
certain degree the types of principles and factors the courts might expect the emergency 
decision maker to weigh
307
 in the absence of legislation. These would of course include at 
a minimum Charter values and the objectives of the authorizing statute, but could 
potentially also include international legal instruments;
308
 soft-law documents (for 
example Ministerial guidelines); and potentially public health and public health law 
principles, practices, and approaches. Legislation is capable of capturing all such 
considerations. And while in Baker the Court expressed a positive attitude towards using 
soft-law instruments as interpretive aids, the danger posed by over-reliance on them was 
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seen in chapter three through the very recent case of Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration),
309
 where the Supreme Court ruled that a decision maker’s over-
reliance on Ministerial Guidelines resulted in a fettering of her own discretion and so her 
decision was unreasonable (notwithstanding that those very same guidelines had 
previously been given favourable treatment by lower courts).
310
 Legislation, then, 
remains the preferred tool for proactively ensuring the decision maker knows what she is 
supposed to be balancing when she decides if a particular emergency measure is 
proportional, or justified, in light of the Charter rights it may impact or limit. 
6.4 THE DIALOGUE METAPHOR 
 
 In 1997, Peter Hogg and Allison A. Bushell wrote an article
311
 in the Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal describing the post-1982 relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary as one of “dialogue”. Using the examples of legislative responses to judicial 
declarations of invalidity (under s. 52 of the 1982 Constitution
312
), the authors attempted 
to challenge the anti-majoritarian criticism of judicial review of legislation under the 
Charter by empirically demonstrating that in a majority of cases where the courts struck 
down democratically enacted legislation for lack of compliance with the Charter, the 
legislature responded by either invoking s. 33
313
 of the Charter (which was rare),
314
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enacting revised legislation envisioned as justified under s.1
315
, or by enacting reformed 
legislation in accordance with the court’s decision. This phenomenon, according to the 
authors, weakened the anti-majoritarian claim that unelected and unaccountable judges 
were usurping the role of democratically elected, and accountable, lawmakers.  
By 2007, the scholarly and juridical discourse concerning the metaphor they had 
unleashed led to an entire volume of that journal
316
 being dedicated to the topic. Writing 
the first article in that volume, the original authors (now joined by others) commented 
upon the state of the phenomenon they had ten years ago set in motion: 
We could not possibly have anticipated back in 1997 that the article, and in 
particular our use of the dialogue metaphor, would become the subject of 
so much discussion, debate, and deconstruction by judges, law professors, 
and political scientists. By 2006, a total of 27 reported decisions (ten 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions, five provincial appellate decisions, 
seven decisions by superior courts of the provinces or territories, one 
decision of the Federal Court of Appeal, and one of a provincial court) had 
referred to the concept of Charter dialogue. Charter dialogue has been the 
subject of speeches by members of Parliament and members of the 
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judiciary, and has been a topic for academic for academic discussion in 




As indicated, scholarship considering the metaphor is as varied as it is abundant. 
The authors themselves summarize that: 
Scholarly critique has ranged from articles that suggest that dialogue has 
the potential to undermine judicial review to articles that accuse it of 
lending a false legitimacy to the influence of an undemocratic “court 
party” over courts and legislatures. The use of legislative sequels as a 
proxy for dialogue has been criticized by some as overstating the 
relationship between courts and legislatures, by some as understating it, 




The metaphor was powerfully brought to bear by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Justice Iacobucci’s decision in Vriend v Alberta,
319
 where the Supreme Court added 
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination to Alberta’s anti-
discrimination statute by “reading it in”. Since the Alberta legislature had debated and 
explicitly rejected the proposal to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground, this 
decision was of course bound to be controversial. Iacobucci J. was not blind to the 
criticism being levied against judges. While he was unequivocal in ruling that the Court, 
since at least the advent of the Charter, had the power to strike down law, he 
acknowledged that: “giving courts the power and commandment to invalidate legislation 
where necessary has not eliminated the debate over the “legitimacy” of courts taking such 
action.”
320
 Invoking the dialogue metaphor in an aspirational manner, Iacobucci J. 
highlighted the constitutional importance granted to the protection of minorities before he 
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asserted that the Court’s ruling was not the ending of the law’s development. Legislative 




Perhaps the most promising decision, if one were to favour the idea that the so-
called “dialogue” between courts and legislatures might resemble some kind of 
continuing discussion, was R v Mills.
322
 A “second look” case, the Supreme Court of 
Canada upheld an amendment to the Criminal Code notwithstanding that the amendment 
was not in compliance with one of its earlier decisions (Parliament had, instead, largely 
adopted the reasons of the dissent). Writing for the majority, Justices McLachlin (as she 
then was) and Iacobucci developed what had begun in Vriend: 
A posture of respect towards Parliament was endorsed by this Court in 
Slaight Communications, supra, at p. 1078, where we held that if 
legislation is amenable to two interpretations, a court should choose the 
interpretation that upholds the legislation as constitutional. Thus courts 
must presume that Parliament intended to enact constitutional legislation 
and strive, where possible, to give effect to this intention. 
 
This Court has also discussed the relationship between the courts and the 
legislature in terms of a dialogue, and emphasized its importance to the 
democratic process.  In Vriend, supra, at para 139, Iacobucci J. stated: 
 
To my mind, a great value of judicial review and this dialogue 
among the branches is that each of the branches is made 
somewhat accountable to the other. The work of the legislature is 
reviewed by the courts and the work of the court in its decisions 
can be reacted to by the legislature in the passing of new 
legislation (or even overarching laws under s. 33 of the Charter). 
This dialogue between and accountability of each of the branches 
have the effect of enhancing the democratic process, not denying 
it. 
 
See also P. W. Hogg and A. A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between 
Courts and Legislatures” (1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75. If the common 
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law were to be taken as establishing the only possible constitutional 
regime, then we could not speak of a dialogue with the legislature. Such a 
situation could only undermine rather than enhance democracy. 
Legislative change and the development of the common law are different. 
As this Court noted in R. v. Salituro, 1991 CanLII 17 (SCC), [1991] 3 
S.C.R. 654, at p. 666, the common law changes incrementally, “while 
complex changes to the law with uncertain ramifications should be left to 
the legislature”.  While this dialogue obviously is of a somewhat different 
nature when the common law rule involves interpretation of the Charter, 
as in O’Connor, it remains a dialogue nonetheless. 
 
Moreover, in this Court’s recent decision Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, 1998 CanLII 793 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, we affirmed the 
proposition that constitutionalism can facilitate democracy rather than 
undermine it, and that one way in which it does this is by ensuring that 
fundamental human rights and individual freedoms are given due regard 
and protection (at paras 74-78). Courts do not hold a monopoly on the 
protection and promotion of rights and freedoms; Parliament also plays a 
role in this regard and is often able to act as a significant ally for 
vulnerable groups. […] If constitutional democracy is meant to ensure that 
due regard is given to the voices of those vulnerable to being overlooked 
by the majority, then this court has an obligation to consider respectfully 






Most poignant for our purposes, the court went on to state: “Parliament has enacted 
this legislation after a long consultation process that included a consideration of the 
constitutional standards outlined by this Court in O’Connor. While it is the role of the 




Despite the promise that Mills seemed to hold, since Mills,
325
 the judicial responses 
to requests from the government for deference under the banner of dialogue have ranged 
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 to completely hostile. Indeed, in Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral 
Officer),
327
 McLachlin CJ, in her majority decision, was openly contemptuous of the idea 
that the Court should show deference to the legislature just because it had made an 
answer to a previous Charter decision:  
My colleague Justice Gonthier proposes a deferential approach to 
infringement and justification.  He argues that there is no reason to accord 
special importance to the right to vote, and that we should thus defer to 
Parliament’s choice among a range of reasonable alternatives.  He further 
argues that in justifying limits on the right to vote under s. 1, we owe 
deference to Parliament because we are dealing with “philosophical, 
political and social considerations”, because of the abstract and symbolic 
nature of the government’s stated goals, and because the law at issue 
represents a step in a dialogue between Parliament and the courts. 
 
I must, with respect, demur.  The right to vote is fundamental to our 
democracy and the rule of law and cannot be lightly set aside.  Limits on it 
require not deference, but careful examination. This is not a matter of 
substituting the Court’s philosophical preference for that of the legislature, 
but of ensuring that the legislature’s proffered justification is supported by 




The core democratic rights of Canadians do not fall within a “range of 
acceptable alternatives” among which Parliament may pick and choose at 
its discretion. Deference may be appropriate on a decision involving 
competing social and political policies. It is not appropriate, however, on a 
decision to limit fundamental rights.  This case is not merely a competition 
between competing social philosophies.  It represents a conflict between 
the right of citizens to vote — one of the most fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter — and Parliament’s denial of that right.  Public 
debate on an issue does not transform it into a matter of “social 
philosophy”, shielding it from full judicial scrutiny.  It is for the courts, 
unaffected by the shifting winds of public opinion and electoral interests, 
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Finally, the fact that the challenged denial of the right to vote followed 
judicial rejection of an even more comprehensive denial, does not mean 
that the Court should defer to Parliament as part of a “dialogue”.  
Parliament must ensure that whatever law it passes, at whatever stage of 
the process, conforms to the Constitution. The healthy and important 
promotion of a dialogue between the legislature and the courts should not 






We might glean from the cases referenced in chapter two, and could infer from the 
obiter above in section 6.2,
329
 that the judiciary might take a more supportive attitude 
towards showing deference to legislative choices concerning infectious diseases. But all 
the same, these words from the Chief Justice of Canada temper the enthusiasm over the 
prospect that infectious disease emergency law reform might develop through a discourse 
begun with the legislature. The legal rights at stake in an infectious disease emergency 
will of course be ‘fundamental,’ and their prospective definition and balancing will of 
course also be topics of philosophical, political, and social consideration (in addition to 
scientific attention).  
Thankfully, public health, public health law, and ethics lend themselves attractively 
to the kinds of constitutional legal assessments which both the legislature and the courts 
are likely to make. If the law providing the decision maker with guidance were crafted, as 
has been suggested in this thesis, with a view to enhancing attentiveness to Charter 
values, giving life to unwritten constitutional principles such as democracy and the 
protection of minorities, improving transparency, providing accountability, and 
improving public health efficiency and effectiveness, it would stand a better chance of 
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being shown “deference as respect” by the courts as one of many permissible regimes 
within a range. Surely, it will stand a better chance of being shown deference than the 
status quo we saw in chapter four, namely, the complete absence of articulable legislative 
guidance. And yet, the legislature does not have to act in this way. It could take an 
entirely different approach to the rights, but would still be proactively participating in the 
discourse. 
An exhaustive analysis of scholarship and jurisprudence considering the dialogue 
metaphor would be a thesis in itself, but the metaphor, along with the judicial usage of it, 
is nonetheless pertinent. This author agrees with Peter Hogg et al. when they write: “If 
‘genuine dialogue’ can occur only where legislatures share coordinate authority with the 
courts to interpret the constitution, then by definition it cannot exist in Canada, where 
legislatures have no such authority.”
330
 That is, if by “interpret” those authors are 
referring to interpretation in the course of adjudication or dispute-resolution. In the 
Canadian legal structure, the courts will always have the final word in resolving any such 
constitutional dispute.
331
 But, this does not mean the legislative branch of government 
does not have coordinate authority before any such dispute is live before the courts. In his 
2009 article “The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature Dialogue”,
332
 
Gregoire Webber lamented how Canadian legal discourse had missed an opportunity to 
develop the dialogue metaphor, which is his view was more aptly described as a kind of 
dialectic, to enhance the interpretation of constitutional rights: 
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In this way, dialogue provides a richer epistemological account than the 
idea of judicial deference. Whereas deference is generally understood in 
spatial terms such that the court exercises voluntary restraint in favour 
of a legislative choice that is not, according to the court, either 
unreasonable or sufficiently within the court’s sphere of competence to 
evaluate (Hunt, 2003) dialogue focuses on the exchange of reasons 
justifying constitutional meaning. Each institution’s reasons for action 
are subject to critical evaluation by the other. The court evaluates the 
justification for legislation and highlights its insufficiency, if any. In 
light of the court’s judgment on the failed justification, the legislature in 
turn further participates in the exchange of reasons either by re-enacting 
the same legislative account of rights with a different justification or by 
enacting a modified legislative proposal. The aim of the dialogic 
exchange is reasoned agreement. 
[…] 
 
The argument developed here does not depend on the view that the 
legislature or the court has poorly performed the task of expounding the 
meaning of the constitution, or that one or the other is institutionally 
unsuited to that task. Nor does the argument depend on comparative 
institutional analysis, evaluating the different institutional capacities of 
court and legislature before concluding in favour of one or the other as 
the preferred expounder of constitutional meaning (see Komesar, 1994; 
Fuller, 1978: 393ff). Rather, it is grounded in the conviction that the 
court should not be the sole or supreme expounder of the constitution. 
Constitutional scholarship should forgo the thought that any legislative 
challenge to a judicial determination of constitutional meaning 
“diminishe[s] respect for the Court as an institution, trivializes the 
Court’s precedents, and allows the rights of the most unpopular people 
to be defined by elected politicians” (Roach, 2001a: 276). It is no 
violation of the rule of law to question a judicial ruling on the meaning 
of the constitution. It does not require one to confront false statements 
like “either the Constitution is supreme or it is not” (Cameron, 2000: 
[27]). Unless one erroneously equates the court’s constitutional 
decisions with the constitution itself, a legislative challenge to the 
court’s judgment is no affront to the supremacy of the constitution 
(Huscroft, 2004: 249). Rather, it is a challenge to judicial supremacy, a 
challenge to the court’s delimitation of a constitutional provision, but 




In this thesis, we are considering the case for anticipatory and preventative 
legislative action where there is no such specific judicial decision or interpretation for the 
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legislature to ‘challenge’. In any case, it is unhelpful to characterise the interaction that 
will occur between courts, decision makers, and legislatures in this way. Should the 
legislature “speak first” in a genuine attempt to breathe constitutional life into emergency 
decision-making, the decider (and their advisors) will ex ante be in a better position to act 
in accordance with the rule of law.
334
 The trepidation expressed by the Campbell 
Commission concerning emergency statutes would be mitigated. Instead of a void, the 
courts will have a statute (debate, preamble and all), along with argument from an 
Attorney General, to assist it as it wrestles with intricate constitutional issues. And lastly, 
concerning the decision or decisions being impugned, it is of course possible that the 
emergency decision maker, being human, may get some decisions wrong. Armed with 
the expanded legislation, the court will be pre-equipped with a stronger statutory context 
within which to judge the reasonableness (or correctness) of any decisions taken under 
that same statutory authority. This does not describe any branch of government 
challenging another. It is rather the purest form of teamwork: the three branches of 
government fighting together to ensure that the infectious disease emergency is 
overcome, constitutional rights are valued, and the rule of law is maintained in the face of 
adversity.  
This approach has the added benefit of incorporating the federalist nature of 
Canada. As Webber writes: “[t]he dialogues about the meaning of the constitution can be 
as multiple as the range of constitutional meaning. By allowing the legislatures of Canada 
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to assume a co-ordinate role in expounding this meaning, the actualization of 
constitutional rights may differ from one jurisdiction to another.”
335
 Though Canada’s 
constitutional design has bestowed upon the courts final interpretive authority, there is no 
reason for the legislature not to tackle difficult issues of rights definition, scope, and 
balancing.
336
 A legislature sitting in ‘peace time’ has some considerable advantages over 
a judge sitting alone during (or even immediately after) an emergency. Peter Hogg et al. 
seem to share this position in the broad sense: 
We should make clear that our support for the traditional role of the 
courts as the authoritative interpreters of the constitution should not be 
taken to suggest that the courts are more important or useful or 
progressive institutions than the legislative and executive branches. In a 
democracy, that would be a ridiculous position. Important change 
inevitably comes primarily from the legislative and executive branches 
of government, not from the courts. The courts have very limited power 
to cause social change. They are not accountable to public opinion (and 
have no way of canvassing it anyway); they have no power to order 
independent research or to hold public hearings on policy issues; they 
have no power to create many of the policy instruments that legislatures 
routinely use; they have no access to public funds; and, they have no 
capacity to administer programs. Unemployment insurance, workers’ 
compensation, old age pensions, social assistance, food and drug 
standards, labour standards, public health care, public education and 
human rights codes are among the progressive measures initiated and 





Concerning emergencies, David Dyzenhaus similarly accepted the role of the 
legislature and the executive when he wrote: “Certain situations, and emergencies are 
one, might require that Parliament or the executive play the lead role. The rule of law 
                                                 
335
 Webber, supra note 332, at 461. 
336
 Hogg et al, Charter Dialogue II, supra note 317, at 37. Of course, the salient issues 
encountered during infectious disease emergencies will be challenging and invite 
controversy. This of course makes them, practically speaking, politically less than 
palatable; as a practical matter, it may be difficult to get them on the legislative agenda.  
337




project does not require allegiance to a rigid doctrine of the separation of powers in 
which judges are the exclusive guardians of the rule of law.”
338
 But, Dyzenhaus offered 
the following caveat: “Nevertheless, judges will always have some role in ensuring that 
the rule of law is maintained even when the legislature and the executive are in fact 
cooperating in the project. Judges also have an important role in calling public attention 
to a situation in which such cooperation wanes or ceases.”
339
 That critical role is the one 
just described in the vision above. 
6.5 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION 
 
Canadian courts may never return to the constitutional discourse that appeared 
briefly in Mills, but this does not truly inhibit our design. Mills concerned law passed in 
response to a judicial decision; on our facts, it is actually only the legislature that can 
meaningfully create a “permissible regime” ex ante. To propose otherwise, i.e. to await 
for a challenge and direction from a judge once the emergency powers are deployed, is to 
doom all parties to a legal regime which will be pronounced unacceptably late: both for 
the public as a whole, who are counting on the emergency being successfully met in 
accordance with the rule of law, and for the individuals or vulnerable groups whose rights 
may be at risk of unjustified infringement. If even one person falls sick and dies as a 
consequence of inaction due to legal uncertainty, it is too late to pass a statute relying on 
section 1 or invoking section 33 of the Charter. In contrast, once a mandatory inoculation 
is unjustifiably administered under an insufficient statutory regime, it will be too late to 
draw out the serum. 
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 Emergencies will most likely result in flexibility from the courts, but only insofar 
as they are convinced such flexibility is justified; law reform in this area does not need to 
be purely reactionary and fear-driven, and indeed this thesis is driven by neither. As we 
saw in both chapters one and three, public health emergency legal preparedness is 
forward-looking, with a view to ultimately improving the concrete outcomes experienced 
by the public. The legal advantages that decision makers (and their advisors and staffs) 
will gain from law reform will not be insular. By incorporating both Canadian 
constitutional requirements and public health principles, the emergency law will be a 
stronger tool for public health, better able to serve what Gostin posited as “the prime 
objective of public health law… to pursue the highest possible level of physical and 
mental health in the population, consistent with the values of social justice.”
340
 And 
lastly, using legislation, or hard law, to achieve this objective seizes a prime opportunity 
to breathe a new kind of life into Canadian constitutional law and the dialogue metaphor. 
By speaking first when only it can, the legislature can provide the courts with a 
constitutionally informed public health decision-making framework, allowing for a more 
focused and meaningful judicial review that is less likely to get it wrong from either a 
public health or constitutional perspective. 
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
 Since SARS, Canada has taken some steps towards improving its preparedness to 
deal with infectious diseases, both in their everyday occurrences, and in the event of an 
emergency. This preparation includes legal preparedness. However, as we have seen, 
there has been a lack of attention paid to an important component of legal preparedness. 
The legislature should act to remedy this deficiency.  
 In chapter five there are sample draft legislative provisions. A full discussion 
about how this legislation ought to look, and what its provisions ought to say, would be 
an entire thesis in itself, and if the democratic aspirations of public health and Canada’s 
constitution are to be respected, then the legislature, with its inherent legitimacy and the 
ability to engage in public consultation, is the appropriate body to take on this challenge. 
In any event, the argument of this thesis is not that the guidance to be embedded in 
legislation should reflect precisely the values this author thinks it ought to. Rather, it is 
that legislation should provide more guidance than it now does in any jurisdiction in 
Canada, informed by the principles of public health, ethics, and Canadian constitutional 
law. This will enrich our constitutional discourse and improve Canada’s readiness to 
meet future infectious disease emergencies. The sample legislation sketched here is 
meant only to serve the modest purpose of demonstrating that what is proposed, namely 
the integration of public health and ethical principles into legislative guidance, is not 
impracticable. It can be done.  
 And we ought to do so. Silence on the issue is a choice. Intentionally or not, it 
communicates something about our underlying normative values. To let the law remain 




the vulnerable minority; harmful to both the public good and individual rights. It would 
also be a tragic waste. The fruits of further research, debate, and jurisprudence in this area 
could be relevant to other professional and scholarly fields beyond the already numerous 
fields of emergency legal preparedness, public health, public health law, public health 
ethics, and constitutional and administrative law. It could encourage research and the 
exchange of ideas, leading to the development of stronger theoretical and ethical 
frameworks. Perhaps some of them will challenge and test the argument that professional 
ethics ought to be informed by law. Such research and discussion can only benefit 
Canada’s emergency legal preparedness. I agree with Tracey M. Baily et al.: “The Time 
for Talk is Now.”
341
 Let us reflect now upon whether we are being guided by the best 
principles, and even whether we are asking the right questions. Let us step back from the 
question “In an emergency, what are we going to do?” and ask a deeper, more 
fundamental question. 
 “In time of emergency, what kind of a people do we want to be?”. 
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Bugaric, Bojan. “Openness and Transparency in Public Administration: Challenges for  
 Public Law”, (2004) 22:3 Wis Int’l LJ 483 
 
Dyzenhaus, David. “Constituting the Rule of Law: Fundamental Values in  
 Administrative Law” (2002) Queens LJ 445.  
 
 ———. “The Logic of the Rule of Law: Lessons from Willis” (2005) 55 UTLJ 691. 
 
———. “Schmitt v Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside or Outside the Legal Order?”  
 (2006) 27 Cardozo L Rev  2005. 
 
———. “Introduction: Legality in a Time of Emergency” (2008) 24 Windsor Review of  
 Legal and Social Issues 1. 
 
——— . “The Puzzle of Martial Law” (2009) 59 UTLJ 1.  
 
———. “The Very Idea of a Judge” (2010) 60 UTLJ 61. 
 
———.  “Dignity in Administrative Law: Judicial Deference in a Culture of  
 Justification” (2012) 17:1 Rev Const Stud 87. 
 
Forcese, Craig. “Clouding Accountability: Canada’s Government Secrecy and National  
 Security Law ‘Complex,' (2004/2005) 36:1 Ottawa L Rev 49. 
 
Funk, William. “Public Participation and Transparency in Administrative Law – Three  
 Examples as an Object Lesson” (2009) 61 Admin L Rev 171. 
 
Gostin, Lawernce O and Benjamin E Berkman. “Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and  
 the Public’s Health,” (2007) 59:1 Admin L Rev 121at 149-150. 
 
Harding, Mark S and Rainer Knopff “Constitutionalizing Everything: The Role of  
 Charter Values” (2013) 18:2 Rev Const Stud 141 
 
Hennigar, Matthew A. “Exploring Complex Judicial-Executive Interaction: Federal  
 Government Concessions in Charter of Rights Cases” (2010) 43:4 Canadian 
 Journal of Political Science 821. 
 
Horner, Matthew. “Charter Values: The Uncanny Valley of Canadian Constitutionalism”  
 (2014) 67:2 Sup Ct L Rev 361. 
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